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ABSTRACT
Child pornography has quickly escalated in the U.S. to one of most severely punished
crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Responding to a moral panic, Congress passed the
Protect Act of 2003. This act lengthened for child pornography offenses the term of supervised
release, which is a term of post-conviction supervision, from a maximum of three years to a
minimum of five years to life. Congress also directed the United States Sentencing Commission
(USSC) to include a policy statement in the federal sentencing guidelines directing judges to
impose lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders. This policy covers all
offenses enumerated under child pornography statutes including possession, receipt,
transportation, distribution, and production. If the policy is followed directly, one would expect
that the exact same sentence of lifetime supervised release would be meted out across all child
pornography cases. However, only approximately 33% of child pornography offenders convicted
in federal court in fiscal year 2012 received a life term of supervised release. Such variation
suggests two things: (1) a disconnect between Congressional will and the will of the sentencing
court, and (2) the possibility of unwarranted supervised release sentencing disparities for child
pornography offenders.
Since the passage of the Protect Act of 2003, no studies have examined judicial decisionmaking in the context of supervised release sentences and child pornography offenders. This
issue is important in that the supervised release sentence has significant consequences for those
receiving the most severe terms. Specifically, those who receive lifetime supervision are subject
to lifelong formal social control and the possibility of life imprisonment if revoked. This study,
which examines the effects of individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level contextual
factors on supervised release, is the first to explore the correlates of supervised release sentences
for child pornography offenders. The focal concerns, the court communities, and social/group
threat perspectives of judicial decision-making serve as the theoretical underpinnings to explain
individual-level and district-level variation in sentencing outcomes.
The individual-level data for this dissertation comes from the USSC dataset for fiscal
year 2012. These data are supplemented with district-level contextual factors tabulated and
compiled from the USSC 2012 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Statistics; 2012
Federal Court Management Statistics (FCMS); the USSC 2012 study of child pornography
offenses; and the Federal Election Commission’s 2013 report on the 2012 Federal Elections.
District-level factors examined in the study include region, percent who voted Republican in the
2012 presidential election, district size, child pornography caseload pressure, guidelines
compliance rate, Kimbrough-based policy disagreement, and mandatory minimum state-level
penalties for possession of child pornography. Multilevel modeling techniques are used to
analyze the data.
Preliminary data analyses reveal that approximately 27% of the variability in supervised
release sentence length is at the district–level with the remainder at the individual-level.
Findings also indicate that at the individual level, both legal (offense seriousness, plea, criminal
history, detention, number of counts, departure/variance) and extralegal factors (race, education,
citizenship, age, family ties) influence the sentence of supervised release. Findings also show
that the effects of some of these factors vary across courts, meaning that there is variability in the
extent to which individual district courts consider certain factors as relevant for their sentencing
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decisions. Finally, I find that at the district-level, courts located in the Western region of the
United States sentence child pornography offenders to longer sentences of supervised release
than those located in the East.
The findings from this study highlight the problematic nature of a statutory supervised
release range of 5 years to life for all child pornography offenses. This wide range allows for
disparity in sentencing decisions. With little guidance from the USSC, judges must decide on
their own how to impose the sentence of supervised release, and extralegal and court contextual
factors appear to play a role in this decision. In order to reduce disparities found in these
sentences and promote greater uniformity and fairness in sentences, the USSC should consider
revising the supervised release sentencing guideline. One way would involve the USSC
calculating the supervised release sentence in the same manner that the sentence of imprisonment
is calculated. This strategy would base supervised release sentences solely on legal factors such
as offense seriousness and criminal history, thereby reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities
and promoting greater uniformity and predictability of sentences.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
‘There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in which it treats its children.”1

Background
Child pornography is one of the fastest growing offenses prosecuted in federal courts.
According to a special bulletin published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in 2006,
69.4% of sex offenses referred for federal prosecution were child pornography offenses, a figure
up from 21.8% in 1994, representing a growth of 82% (BJS, 2007). More recent statistics place
federal prosecution of child pornography offenses well over 2,000 cases per year (USSC,
Sourcebook 2012). Although still only a small percentage of the overall federal court caseload,
it is the punishment - particularly the supervised release sentence for child pornography offenses
- that pales in comparison to other offenses. 2
Both the sentences of imprisonment and supervised release term for child pornography
offenses have increased in severity over the past thirty years (USSC, 2009; Kaiser and Spohn,
2014). The increase is due in large part to punitive legislation born out of what many argue is a
“moral panic” and a political culture of fear of the sexual exploitation of children (Basbaum,
2010; Hamilton, 2011; Spearit, 2011). As Hamilton (2012) points out, “As child pornography is
the most visible type of child sexual exploitation offense, it appears to have taken on the status of
a signal crime, acting as an alarm to society that children are in danger” (p.1684). The fear
ignited by the public, the media, and moral crusaders sparked sweeping congressional changes to
federal child pornography laws. These laws ultimately call for longer minimum and maximum

1

Nelson Mandela
In fiscal year 2012, child pornography offenses comprised approximately 2.4% of all offenses adjudicated in
federal court, a minority compared to drug and immigration offenses, which comprised 62.4% of all cases (USSC,
Sourcebook 2012).
2

2

sentences of imprisonment. But it is the supervised release sentence that is most remarkable – a
sentence aimed at total formal social control.
Supervised release is a period of post-conviction community supervision that is imposed
at the time of sentencing.3 Not to be confused with parole, supervised release adds a period of
supervision to be served upon completion of the sentence of imprisonment. Parole on the other
hand, is period of supervision carved out from the length of the original sentence. 4 For child
pornography offenders specifically, the supervised release term is particularly important because
of the statutory override found in 18 U.S.C 3583(k), which enhances the length of the term from
a maximum of three years to a minimum of five years to life. No other category of offenders in
the federal system faces a more serious supervised release term. Congress declared harsher
penalties for all child pornography offenders with specific directives to the United States
Sentencing Commission (USSC) to include policy statements in the sentencing guidelines
regarding the imposition of supervised release. According to the policy statement, if the offense
of conviction is a sex offense, the statutory maximum term of supervised release, which is a life
term, is recommended.
Statement of the Problem
If the policy statement in the guidelines recommending the maximum supervised release
term for all child pornography offenses is followed directly, one would expect a sentence of
lifetime supervised release would be meted out across all child pornography cases. However,
3

A sentencing court is authorized and, in some cases, statutorily required to impose a term of supervised release in
addition to a term of imprisonment (see general supervised release statute under 18 U.S.C 3583 in Federal Criminal
Code and Rules).
4

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal offenders who committed their offenses on or
after November 1, 1987.
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federal data reveals that there is a great deal of variability in the length of supervised release
sentences and that judges give out life sentences in over a third of cases (Vinyard, 2016). In
fiscal year 2010, the average term of supervised release for non-production cases was
approximately 20 years (220.3 months for offenders convicted of possession and 273.7 months
for offenders convicted of receipt, transportation and distribution offenses). The average term of
supervised release for offenders sentenced for production of child pornography was nearly 27
years (USSC, 2012, p.316). Such data suggests two things: (1) a disconnect or policy
disagreement between Congress and the sentencing court; and (2) the possibility of unwarranted
supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenders. An unwarranted
sentencing disparity refers to unequal sentencing resulting from unfair, unjustifiable or
unexplained causes rather than a legitimate use of judicial discretion (Rigsby, 2010).
Significance of the Problem
It is particularly important for researchers and policymakers alike to explore potential
supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenses for several reasons.
First, Congress did not differentiate between child pornography offense types when it set the
statutory range of punishment for supervised release and ordered the USSC to include a policy
statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervision. In other words, Congress has explicitly
stated that all child pornography offenses are serious and deserve equal supervised release
sentences. But some judges may not be willing to sentence similarly for offenses that are
essentially different, which leaves room for disparity. As Kaiser and Spohn (2014) point out,
one of the main criticisms of the current child pornography sentencing scheme is its failure to
distinguish between variations of severity. Because of this, they argue it is possible that judges
will be more likely to use their discretion when imposing sentences.

4

Perhaps one of the most important reasons to examine the supervised release sentences of
child pornography offenders is the nature and potential consequences to those sentenced to the
most severe term. For example, the supervised release statute allows for the revocation of
supervised release for an offender who violates the terms of release, which could result in the
incarceration of the offender for the remainder of the period. 5 As an example, if an offender who
is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
engages in any conduct constituting a new sex offense, including child pornography, while on
supervised release, the court must revoke the term of supervised release and require the offender
to serve a term of imprisonment. Thus, child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervised
release if revoked, would face life imprisonment. Second, irrespective of the threat of life
imprisonment if revoked, child pornography offenders sentenced to lifetime supervised release
will likely never be discharged from supervision. 6 Supervision includes at least twice monthly
meetings with a probation officer either in the home, probation office, or community. The
offender must also adhere to the standard conditions of supervised release (i.e., not leaving the
judicial district without permission) as well as special sex offender conditions including but not
limited to polygraph testing, sex offender treatment, sex offender registry, no contact with
children under the age of eighteen, restricted use of a computer/internet, and a search condition
allowing probation officers to search the residence, vehicle, office, and other personal items. In

5

6

See 18 U.S.C 3583(e)(3) authorizing the incarceration of a defendant that violates the terms of supervised release.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may terminate an offender’s term of supervised release “at any time after the
expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant released and the interests of justice.” Such early terminations may occur even in cases where a statute
originally required the sentencing court to impose a term of supervised release in excess of one year. Such early
terminations have occurred in a relatively small percentage (12%) of total supervision cases in recent years. (USSC,
2010).

5

other words, a life term permanently binds an offender under a criminal justice sentence where
the potential threat of revocation looms indefinitely.
Ramifications for lifetime supervised release sentences do not solely rest with the
offender. Practical implications also exist for the federal criminal justice system. For instance,
U.S. Probation Offices across the nation are tasked with the supervision and monitoring of these
offenders for life, which among other things, requires advanced and specialized training in
surveillance, electronic monitoring, and treatment techniques (Cornish, 2010; Palmiotto and
MacNichol, 2010). U.S. Probation Offices may also have to allocate more funding toward sex
offender treatment at the expense of other services such as drug treatment and mental health
treatment in order to compensate for the increased number of offenders serving lifetime
supervised release.
Moreover, additional officers may need to be hired to keep pace with the increased
workload of child pornography offenders on community supervision (Bishop, 2010). For
instance, the U.S. Probation Office in the Eastern District of Missouri (ED/MO) recently created
a specialized sex offender unit. This unit, which is comprised of eight officers and one
supervisor, supervises only child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervision. 7 One of
the reasons for the creation of this unit was the caseload size. The ED/MO, District of Arizona
and the Central District of California have the largest sex offender caseloads in the federal
system (DSS Report, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2014). Similar resources for
manpower may also be needed at U.S. Attorney’s Offices and Federal Public Defenders Offices.
These agencies are responsible for the prosecution and defense of supervised release violators.

7

Each officer supervises approximately 35 offenders.
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Likewise, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) will require resources as they are tasked with housing
offenders whose supervised release terms are revoked.
Purpose/Objective
Despite the serious implications associated with sentencing child pornography offenders
to lifetime supervised release, few empirical studies have addressed the factors that influence this
sentencing decision. In fact, there is only one published article (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014) that
examines judicial discretion and child pornography offenses and this study focuses on the
likelihood of downward departures. Even more scarce is empirical literature that uses the
supervised release sentence as the dependent variable. This dissertation remedies this gap in two
ways. First, I focus on the sentence of supervised release as the dependent variable. This is
important because much of what matters in sentencing decision-making for the sentence of
imprisonment and/or the decision to incarcerate is well established. Research consistently finds
that legal factors at the individual-level including criminal history and offense seriousness are the
best predictors of imprisonment sentence length and the decision to incarcerate. Research also
finds that extralegal factors including gender, race, and age also influence imprisonment length
and/or the decision to incarcerate. Missing in federal sentencing research is whether and the
extent to which these factors influence the sentence of supervised release. And more
importantly, whether these factors contribute to unwarranted supervised release sentencing
disparities. Second, I marry the sentence of supervised release with the offense of child
pornography, an offense recognized as one of the most serious federal crimes (Rigsby, 2010).
The intersection of the supervised release sentence with the offense of child pornography draws
together the purpose of this dissertation which is the exploration of factors that influence
supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders.

7

Overview and Outline of the Dissertation
In an earlier inquiry of supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography
offenses, I explored the individual-level effects of legal and extralegal factors on the decision to
impose lifetime supervised release (Vinyard, 2016). I found both legal and extralegal factors are
statistically associated with the likelihood of being sentenced to the most severe term.
Specifically, legal factors such as sentence length (months of imprisonment) significantly
increased the likelihood that child pornography offenders were sentenced to lifetime supervised
release, while a downward departure/variance significantly reduced the likelihood of lifetime
supervised release. Additionally, I found that older child pornography offenders were more
likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised release. But major limitations of this work include
the failure to use a multilevel methodology (hierarchical modeling) and failure to consider how
district-level contextual factors influence supervised release sentencing outcomes. The problem,
as explained Wu and Spohn (2010), with failing to use a multilevel approach in analyzing federal
sentencing data is that aggregated data may cloud important differences among district courts
and lead to misleading conclusions about the existence of unwarranted disparity. Sentencing
research over the past several years using a multilevel methodology has revealed that sentence
length varies significantly across courts and district-level contextual factors do play a role in
federal sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase, and
Schulz, 2005).
In view of the aforementioned limitations, this dissertation improves upon my initial
efforts by using a multilevel methodology that includes both individual-level legal and extralegal
factors as well as district-level court contextual factors hypothesized to influence supervised
release sentences of child pornography offenders. These district-level factors, which will be

8

discussed in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four, include district size, child pornography
caseload, guidelines compliance, region, political ideology, mandatory minimum state-level
penalties for possession of child pornography, and Kimbrough-based policy disagreement. 8 In
addition, instead of focusing solely on the most severe supervised release sentence (life) as I did
in previous research, I also consider supervised release length and a four-category ordinal
measure of the supervised release sentence. My rationale for transforming the dependent variable
is explained in greater detail in Chapter Four. My three indicators of the dependent variable aid
in providing a more comprehensive picture of supervised release sentences of child pornography
offenders. I also improve on my previous analysis by adding additional case and individual
independent variables not used before. These variables include: offense severity score, number
of counts of conviction, detention status, offense type, number of dependents, and citizenship
status.
Altogether using a more superior analytic technique, along with the addition of
individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level contextual factors not previously considered,
this dissertation asks and answers:
1. What proportion of the variability in supervised release sentences is at the individuallevel versus the district-level?
2. What individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables account for variability in
supervised release sentences?
2A. Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of supervised release
sentences differ across offense type (non-production versus production)?

8

U.S. v. Kimbrough (2007) is a case involving crack cocaine decided by the Supreme Court that allows judges to
use their discretion and reject a guideline for policy reasons. According to Hamilton (2014), some sentencing judges
have used the rationale applied in Kimbrough to disregard or reject the child pornography guidelines based on a
policy disagreement. The result is a circuit split on whether judges can disregard the child pornography guideline
based on this split.

9

3. Above and beyond individual-level variables, are district-level contextual variables
related to supervised release sentencing outcomes?
4. Do the effects of individual-level variables on sentence length differ across courts? If
so, can these differences be explained by characteristics of the court and district?
Equally important in this dissertation, is a discussion of moral panic and its tether to child
pornography. Moral panic as described by Cohen (1972) occurs when a group of people who
have social, political or economic power believe that a particular subgroup is threatening the
established status quo. In this conceptualization of moral panic, Congress has a formative role in
responding to the public’s rising anxieties about the sexual exploitation of children through stiff
legislation. This trend is evident in the increase over time in statutory minimum and maximum
sentences of imprisonment and supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders.
Given the argument that punitive legislation of child pornography offense is driven by moral
panic (Basbaum, 2010), Chapter Two begins with a detailed review of the fear of child
pornography and the moral panic surrounding this group of offenders. Then I discuss
congressional response to this panic as well as disagreements within the federal judiciary on how
to sentence child pornography offenders.
Chapter Three lays out a discussion of prominent theories of judicial decision-making
including uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution, focal concerns, court communities, and
social/group threat. Uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theorizes that judicial actors
attempt to make rational decisions, but do so within a context of uncertainty (Albonetti, 1991).
The focal concerns perspective proposes that judicial sentencing decisions are guided by three
key concerns: blameworthiness, community protection, and practical constraints and
consequences (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). I use the courts communities
perspective, which states that courts function like communities with their own working norms
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and organizational relationships, to explain differences in sentencing outcomes across districts
(Eisentein, Fleming, and Nardulli, 1988, Ulmer, 1997). I also employ Blalock’s (1967)
social/group threat perspective which says that as a subordinate group increases in size, the
dominant group will feel threatened and in turn in-part methods of social control to maintain
their superior status, to explain differences across district courts. Each of the theoretical
perspectives outlined above are explained in greater detail in Chapter Three, followed by a
review of the empirical literature more generally as it pertains to individual and contextual
influences in sentencing. Drawing from theory and the empirical literature, Chapter Three
concludes with a restatement of the research questions followed by theorized hypotheses of the
influence of individual-level legal and extralegal factors and district-level contextual factors on
supervised release sentencing outcomes.
Next, Chapter Four provides information on data sources, descriptions of measures, and
the analytic strategy employed to test the research questions. Chapter Five presents the findings,
followed by a detailed discussion in Chapter Six. In Chapter Seven, implications of the research
are addressed, followed by ideas for future research, and final thoughts. The dissertation closes
with two appendices - Appendix A and Appendix B. Appendix A includes the results of
supplemental data analyses using ordinary least squares regression, logistic regression, and
ordinal regression that assess the robustness of the multilevel models. Appendix B is an
illustration of the sections and format of a standard presentence report as approved and adopted
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Each appendix is identified in the body of
relevant chapters and cross referenced to the end of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER TWO: MORAL PANIC, CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE, AND JUDICIAL
DISSONANCE
Introduction
Federal child pornography offenses are unique and unlike other federal offenses in terms
of statutory and guideline punishment for the supervised release sentence. This chapter provides
the underlying context of these penalties, starting with “moral panic.” Specifically, I trace how
the fear of child sexual exploitation escalated to a full-on moral panic of child pornography
offenders. Next, I detail the development of child pornography legislation in response to this
panic, and discuss congressional manipulation of sentencing policy as described by legal
scholars (Stabenow, 2009). Afterwards, a discussion of child pornography recidivism in the
context of actual risk versus moral panic is presented. To aid in understanding child
pornography legislation alongside federal sentencing policy, I include an outline of the federal
sentencing structure. More specifically, I discuss the specialized sentencing structure for child
pornography offenders with particular attention to the supervised release sentence. Finally, this
chapter introduces the main thesis of this dissertation, which is the apparent disconnect between
congressionally mandated severe sentencing policies such as lifetime supervised release and
actual sentencing decisions.
Fear of Child Sexual Exploitation
The origin of modern day child pornography laws and policies begins in the late 1970s
when the problem of child sexual abuse was "discovered” (Adler, 2001; Jenkins, 1998). The
term “discovered” is used lightly, as the treatment of children as sexual objects is as old as
humanity (Jenkins, 1998; Wortley and Smallbone, 2012). Throughout the twentieth century,
child pornography was a hidden and restricted activity (Jenkins, 1998). But it was not until the
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1960s, a decade characterized for its sexual liberalism that child pornography came out of hiding
and openly flourished. Wortley and Smallbone (2012) advance this change in public sentiment
was due in large part to social liberalization and relaxation of obscenity laws in Scandinavia
(Jenkins, 2001; Wortley and Smallbone, 2012). Indeed, the sexual liberation movement of the
1960s is credited with the development of pedophile organizations such as NAMBLA (North
American Man/Boy Love Association) and British Pedophile Information Exchange (Jenkins,
2001). These groups openly expressed the idea of sexuality between adults and children.
Moreover, the 1960s marked a time when well over 250 child pornography magazines were
circulating in the U.S. with titles such as Lolita and Children-Love Taken (Wortley and
Smallbone, 2012). As a result of seeming public tolerance, there was a mini-boom in the amount
of child pornography being produced (Jenkins, 2001).
The 1970s marked a reversal of the pendulum when feminists, social workers, and
decency campaigners began raising concerns over child abuse (Jenkins, 2001). During this
period, the public, the media, and interest groups began recognizing child sexual exploitation,
including child pornography, as a form of abuse (Jenkins, 2001). Immediately thereafter, the
public began to react unfavorably to any sexual interest and/or contact between adults and
children (Jenkins, 2001). This reaction soon transformed to a national and political concern that
linked child pornography not only with child abuse, but with every other social ill involving
children at the time, including kidnapping, child murders and organized sex rings (Bella, 2011;
O’Brien, 1983; Jenkins, 2001). The media served to fuel public outrage. For example, a 1977
NBC television news broadcast claimed that “as many as two million American youngsters were
involved in child pornography." (Jenkins, 2001, p.33). That same year, the Chicago Tribune
reported that "child pornography has become a nation-wide multi-million dollar racket that is
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luring thousands of juveniles into lives of prostitution and exploiting up to 100,000 children at
any time” (Jenkins, 2001, p.34). Consequently, child pornography was touted as the new social
menace of the time (Bella, 2011; Jenkins, 2001; Adler, 2001).
Following increased public scrutiny, the federal government stepped in and passed the
first laws against producers, transporters, distributors, and receivers of obscene child
pornography (Wortley and Smallbone, 2012; Rogers, 2013). 9 During this time, the states began
passing their own laws against child pornography even without the obscenity requirement
(Rogers, 2013).10 This led to the notable landmark 1982 Supreme Court ruling in New York vs.
Ferber (1982) (Adler, 2001). In this case the Supreme Court held that child pornography was
not protected by the First Amendment even if it was not obscene because it was intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children (Adler, 2001; Rogers, 2013). Specifically, the Supreme
Court defined the harms linked to child pornography as:
The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. The materials produced are a
permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated
by their circulation…pornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than
does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions are reduced to a recording,
the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took
place. A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the

9

Obscenity refers to material that is more than indecent. Specifically, it is regarded as any material depicting actual
sex with a minor. The Child Protection Act of 1984 ultimately declared all sexual depictions of children as obscene
whether or not the child was participating in sexual activity (Jenkins, 1998).
10

The obscenity requirement was based on congressional fear that the courts would strike the legislation as
unconstitutional if not included (Rogers, 2013).
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recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography
(Rogers, 2013, p. 1017).
The public campaign waged against child pornography and the landmark Supreme Court
decision in New York vs. Ferber succeeded in driving child pornography back underground
(Wortley and Smallbone, 2012).
Child pornography later re-emerged with vigor in the 1990s due in large part to the
proliferation of the Internet (Jenkins, 2001). The Internet and associated technologies including
peer-to-peer networks, bulletin boards, and chat rooms are charged with exponentiating and
revolutionizing the child pornography industry by increasing the volume that is available, the
efficiency with which it is disseminated, and the ease by which it can be accessed (Wortley and
Smallbone, 2012). From 1996 to 2002, online images of sexual exploitation of children
increased by almost 2,000% (Spearit, 2009). It is estimated that there are at least 100,000
websites containing child pornography (Wortley and Smallbone, 2012). One report showed that
from 2005 to 2009, the U.S. had the largest share of commercial child pornography websites,
accounting for almost half of the global volume (Spearit, 2009).
Moral Panic and Child Pornography
The public’s fear of child pornography that began in the 1970s and escalated with the
emergence of the Internet, has all the makings of moral panic. By definition, moral panic is the
sudden eruption of outrage towards a specific group disproportionate to any harm caused. Cohen
(1972) was first to coin the term and his definition more specifically includes: (1) concern about
the potential or imagined threat; (2) moral outrage toward the actors who embody the problem;
(3) widespread agreement that the threat exists and that something should be done about it; (4) an
exaggeration of the number or strength of cases, in terms of damages, moral offensiveness, and
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risks if ignored; and (5) the panic erupts and dissipates suddenly without warning. Garland
(2008) added two more elements: (1) the actors who embody the problem are viewed as
threatening to the status quo; and (2) without action, they risk destroying society.
Jenkins (1998) and others have invoked Cohen’s model of moral panic to explain societal
fear of child pornography. Jenkins (2001) claims that it was during the initial crusade against
child pornography in the 1970s that moral crusaders competed to assert the most incendiary
claims about child pornography, including that it was a well-organized, multi-billion dollar
industry and that the number of children exploited was in the millions. Jenkins (2001) notes that
while most of these claims were discredited, fear persisted. As Walker (2010) describes:
“Anxiety over child sexual abuse and the inability to protect children from harm is a
salient fear in present society. Despite other, more probable dangers, these issues remain
a large concern. Moreover, they are an agreed upon social harm. Child sexual abuse is
decried unanimously as a moral wrong and a violation of social norms.” (p.198)
Similarly, Ost (2002) explains that the main causes of the moral panic over child pornography
“are the moral values which affirm the sacred status of the child and the rights that our society
has ascribed to children.” (p.443)
The only criterion of Cohen’s moral panic model that appears not to have been met in the
case of child pornography offenders is the fifth. Meaning, at this time, there is no dissipation of
the panic. Unlike other panics such as the Salem Witch trials or the crack cocaine epidemic,
both of which had a start and end date, the panic over child sexual exploitation has been durable,
long-lasting and now in its fourth decade (O’Hear, 2008). Walker (2010) argues the only thing
that has changed with the child pornography panic is the fervent role of the state in responding.
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The federal government has created a number of laws intended to severely punish and control
child pornography offenders.
Congressional Response to Child Pornography
Increasing scope of the law and manipulation of sentencing policy.
Many legal scholars contend that the current federal laws and resulting sentencing
policies surrounding child pornography are inspired by moral panic directed toward child
pornography offenders (Adler, 2001; Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2011). Wortley and Smallbone
(2012) point out that laws indeed are an expression of society’s moral sentiments and that in
furtherance of this expression, Congress has taken an undifferentiated approach that all child
pornography offenses are universally heinous and deserve strict punishment. The rationale for
such appears based on three concerns (Basbaum, 2010). First, is the notion that restricting child
pornography reduces the demand, which in turn reduces the sexual abuse of children. Second,
many believe that possession of child pornography leads to actual hands on physical and sexual
abuse of children, and whets the appetites of pedophiles. Third, many argue that child
pornography is not a victimless crime and in fact constitutes a permanent record of the child
abuse and each viewing of an image is akin to another episode of abuse (Basbaum, 2010).
Walker (2010) explains that policymakers consider child pornography offenders a
defined controllable risk that justifies ever-increasing surveillance and governmental intrusion.
As a result, federal child pornography legislation has grown increasingly expansive and punitive,
calling for lengthier periods of incarceration and supervised release (see Table 2.1 below).
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Table 2.1
Development of Child Pornography Laws in the U.S.

Date
1977

Legislation
Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act

1982

New York v. Ferber (1982)

1984

Child Protection Act

1988

Child Protection and
Obscenity Enforcement Act

1990

Osborne v. Ohio (1990)

1990

Child Protection Restoration
and Penalties Enhancement
Act
Child Pornography Prevention
Act

1996

2003

Protection Act (Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to

Comment
Outlawed commercial
production, transportation,
distribution and receipt of
obscene material featuring
children under age 16;
established 10 year maximum
for first time offenders and a
15 year maximum and 2 years
minimum for a subsequent
offense
Supreme Court held child
pornography is not protected
by the First Amendment
Eliminated commercial
purpose requirement and
removed the obscenity
requirement from production
and distribution and changed
the age of a minor from 16 to
18
Extended child pornography
laws to use of a computer to
transport, distribute or receive
illegal material
Supreme Court upholds
criminal sanctions for private
possession of child
pornography
This act made the mere
possession of child
pornography a federal crime
Bans virtual child
pornography – computer
generated images that appear
to depict real children. This
Act was later struck down by
the Supreme Court
Outlawed attempts to trade
material under the pretense

18

End the Exploitation of
Children Today)

2008

Protect Our Children Act

2012

Child Protection Act

that they are, or contain child
pornography; enhanced
minimum and maximum
sentence lengths for
possession, transporting,
distributing, receiving, and
production of child
pornography; amended the
guidelines to reduce
incidences of sentencing
departures and increased
guideline offense levels in
child pornography cases;
prohibited judges from
considering family ties and
responsibilities as well as
community ties in cases
involving a minor victim;
amended the Bail Reform Act
to create a presumption that
child pornography defendants,
except those charged with
simple possession, are
dangerous to the community
and should be denied bail;
lengthened the supervised
release range from three
years to five years to life
Created a new offense –
unlawful production with
intent to distribute, or
knowingly distributing child
pornography that is an adapted
or modified image of an
identifiable minor
Raised the statutory maximum
penalty for possession,
attempted possession, or
conspiracy to possess child
pornography from 10 to 20
years for offenders who
possess images of minors
under the age of 12
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Table 2.1 demonstrates the increasingly punitive stance Congress has taken towards child
pornography offenses. This message was made explicit by President George W. Bush in a press
statement upon signing of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006: 11
Protecting our children is our solemn responsibility. It is what we must do. When a
child’s life or innocence is taken it is a terrible loss - it’s an act of unforgiveable cruelty.
Our society has a duty to protect our children from exploitation and danger. By enacting
this law we’re sending a clear message across the country: those who prey on our
children will be caught, prosecuted and punished to the full extent of the law (Kimball,
2011, p.1535).
An analysis by the USSC of child pornography laws revealed three key beliefs held by
Congress about child pornography: (1) commercial and non-commercial distribution and receipt
of child pornography contribute to molestation and abuse of children; (2) child pornography had
become a highly organized, multi-million dollar industry that operates on a nationwide scale, and
federal law enforcement efforts should not be limited to large scale distributors of child
pornography; and (3) child pornography causes substantial harm to both the victim and to society
as a whole (USSC, 2009). These beliefs comport with parts of Cohen (1972) and Garland’s
(2008) definitions of moral panic, which include concern about the potential threat; moral
outrage toward the actors who embody the problem; and widespread agreement that the threat
exists and that something should be done about it.

11

According to the Fact Sheet, this law was promoted as a strengthening of federal laws to protect children from
sexual abuse and other violent crimes, prevention of child pornography and a means of making the Internet safe for
children (see Fact Sheet found at www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/release/2006). This Act had no
direct impact on child pornography laws.
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In sum, this section described the congressional expansion of and increased statutory
penalties for child pornography offenses. This provides important context for understanding the
next section, which discusses congressional input in the federal sentencing guidelines for child
pornography offenses.
Congressional manipulation of the federal sentencing guidelines.
The preceding section discussed the expanding scope of the law and rationale behind
child pornography laws. This section discusses the evolution of the child pornography
sentencing guidelines and congressional manipulation for severe sentences based on moral panic
rather than empirical evidence. Although the focus of this dissertation is on the supervised
release sentence, most of the guideline manipulation by Congress impacts the sentence of
imprisonment. This is because the guideline for the supervised release sentence is open to far
less congressional manipulation than the sentence of imprisonment: There are no adjustments or
enhancements built into the supervised release guideline schemata. Nonetheless, this section
establishes the foundation for congressional support for severe sentences and shows how this
position extends to the supervised release sentence. This discussion sets up the final section of
this chapter, which details the disharmony between congressional policy and the will of some
sentencing courts.
While Congress is tasked with setting statutory minimum and maximum sentences of
imprisonment and supervised release for child pornography offenses, the USSC’s duty is to set
proposed sentence lengths within the statute. 12 But power held by the USSC to make and
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The sentencing guidelines are created by the USSC - an independent body of neutral experts in the judicial branch
(Krohel, 2011). The duties of the USSC are to formulate and constantly refine national sentencing policy by
developing and monitoring the guidelines. This is done through an empirical methodology that considers data from
national experience and past sentencing practices (Freidman and Supler, 2008).
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influence federal sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenses, has slowly migrated
toward congressional actors (Bowman, 2005). Over the past twenty years Congress has directly
intervened or manipulated the work of the USSC, directing the agency to increase guideline
penalties and reduce incidences of downward departures for child pornography offenses in an
effort to achieve guideline sentences at or near statutory maximum sentences (Friedman and
Supler, 2008).13
The first of many congressionally mandated guidelines enhancements came in 1990 after
Congress passed, as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Child Protection Restoration and
Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 (USSC, 2009). This Act contained a general directive
regarding child sex abuse crimes that instructed the USSC to amend existing guidelines for
offenses involving sexual crimes against children so that more substantial penalties may be
imposed if the USSC determines current penalties are inadequate (USSC, 2009). But this was
true so long as Congress agreed that the penalties proposed by the USSC were adequate. For
example, in 1991 after possession of child pornography was criminalized, the USSC had to
determine whether to treat possession cases as equivalent to trafficking cases or whether to create
a separate guideline. The USSC proposed to refine the guidelines for trafficking in child
pornography and implement a new guideline for the lesser harms of possession, receipt, and
transportation of child pornography (USSC, 2009). Congress disagreed with the USSC’s
proposal. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina stated Congress’s position: “The Sentencing
Commission has undermined Congress’s attempt to assure severe punishment for dealing in child
pornography.” (USSC, 2009, p.20). Congress responded to the USSC’s proposed amendment

13

For a complete history of congressional efforts pushing lengthier child pornography sentences – see History of
Child Pornography Guidelines (2009).
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with superseding legislation that directed the USSC to raise the base offense level for all child
pornography offenses and return the offense of receipt of child pornography back to the
trafficking guideline (USSC, 2009).
In December 1995, Congress passed the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of
1995, which directed the USSC to increase all penalties covering child pornography offenses,
including increasing the base offense levels. In October 1998, Congress legislated the Protection
of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 which again addressed penalties for child
pornography offenses. One of the main provisions of the Act was that it directed the USSC to
ensure that sentencing guidelines and policy statements within the guidelines were consistent
with congressional intent that offenders convicted of child pornography offenses be sentenced
severely. Later, in 2003, specific directives in the Protect Act ordered the USSC to make
adjustments to the offense levels for child pornography offenses based on the number of images
and/or videos (Stabenow, 2009). Additional adjustments were included for images portraying
depictions of sadistic and masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence. No empirical
evidence or rationale was provided to justify these enhancements (Stabenow, 2009).
Congressional manipulation of the child pornography guidelines has contributed to
average child pornography imprisonment lengths growing from 36 months in 1994 to 109.6
months in 2007, an increase of 300% (Friedman and Supler, 2008). Such congressional action
has not been without public support. Various lobbyists, including Morality in Media, Inc.,
Citizens for Decency Through Law, and dozens of concerned citizens have favored
congressional proposals for increases in sentence severity (USSC, 2009; Friedman and Supler,
2008).

23

Although most Congressional changes to the federal sentencing guidelines for child
pornography offenses were directed at the sentence of imprisonment, they did not ignore the
sentence of supervised release. Unlike the guidelines for the sentence of imprisonment, the
supervised release guidelines do not allow for direct congressional manipulation because there
are no adjustments or enhancements built into the supervised release guideline schemata.
Instead, Congress passed the Protect Act of 2003 (see Table 2.1), which among other things
lengthened the supervised release term for child pornography offenders from a maximum of
three years to a minimum of five years to life. Congress specifically directed the USSC to
include a policy statement in the supervised release guidelines recommending the maximum
sentence of life for anyone convicted of a child pornography offense. Congress justified the
enhanced supervised release term with deterrence and rehabilitation arguments:
[18 U.S.C. 3583(k)] responds to the long-standing concerns of federal judges and
prosecutors regarding the inadequacy of the existing supervision periods for sex
offenders, particularly for the perpetrators of child sexual abuse crimes, whose criminal
conduct may reflect deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not likely to disappear
within a few years of release from prison. The current length of the authorized
supervision periods is not consistent with the need presented by many of these offenders
for long-term--and in some cases, life-long-monitoring and oversight (Shockley, 2010, p.
356).
Congress’s supervised release policy appears to provide punishment for child
pornography offenders on the basis of their risk for future offending rather than punishment
directly related to the instant offense. Hessick (2010) calls this preventative punishment.
Preventative punishment is when you punish behavior in order to avoid the risk of future crime.
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Thus, the supervised release policy appears to reflect notions of public protection and a belief
that the recidivism rate of child pornography offenders is high and they cannot be rehabilitated.
It also assumes all child pornography offenders are equally at risk for reoffending regardless of
the crime or social circumstances. Thus, a particularly salient question likely in the minds of
judges before they impose supervised release sentences is how likely are child pornography
offenders to commit a sexual offense involving contact with a child while on supervised release?
The next section assesses empirical evidence of actual risk posed by child pornography
offenders.
Moral Panic vs. Real Danger: Empirical Evidence of Recidivism
As previously mentioned, some legal scholars argue that the increasingly punitive stance
by Congress toward child pornography offenders is the result of moral panic and a political
culture of fear of the sexual exploitation of children (Basbaum, 2010; Spearit, 2011; Stabenow,
2009). Others argue that the impetus behind Congress’s punitive stance is an underlying
presumption that anyone involved in child pornography is really an undetected child molester
(Hamilton, 2011). An exploratory psychological study on child pornography offenders by
Bourke and Hernandez (2009) bolstered this presumption. They found that what judges knew at
the time of sentencing about the offender’s documented criminal sexual history (as found in the
presentence report), underestimated their self-reported criminal sexual history disclosed at the
end of treatment.14 Although the study had many limitations, including generalizability, it armed
Congress and those who agree with its findings with empirical evidence to justify previously
imposed punitive child pornography statutes and guidelines.

14

At the time of sentencing, only 26% of the offenders had a prior documented contact offense. By the end of
treatment, 85% admitted they had at least one hands-on offense.
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There is much concern by Congress about the likelihood that child pornography offenders
will commit contact sexual offenses against a child, but long-term recidivism studies are
unavailable. However, researchers are beginning to explore this issue and have concluded that
the rate of sexual recidivism for child pornography offenders is less than commonly assumed.
For example, the USSC conducted its own study of 610 non-production offenders sentenced in
fiscal years 1999 and 2000 to assess known general recidivism and sexual recidivism. The
general recidivism rate for the sample was 30%, a rate similar to all federal offenders, and the
sexual recidivism rate was 7.4% (45 of the 610). Of those 45 sexual recidivists, 3.6% were
arrested for or convicted of a sexual contact offense (i.e., rape or sexual assault of an adult or
child); 2.3% were arrested for or convicted of a subsequent child pornography offense and 1.5%
were arrested for or convicted of a non-contact sex offense involving obscenity or commercial
sex. The minimum follow up period was twenty-four months and the average follow-up period
for all of the offenders was eight and half years.
A 2005 Canadian study by Seto and Eke monitored 201 child pornography offenders with
the objective of answering two questions: (1) how likely are child pornography offenders to incur
new charges or convictions of any kind?; and (2) how likely are they to specifically incur new
charges or convictions for contact sexual offenses?15 They found that 17% of the sample
offended again during 2.5 year time period and 4% committed a new contact sexual offense
(defined as physical contact with the victim). Child pornography offenders with prior records
were significantly more likely to offend again in any way during the “at risk” period. Child
pornography offenders who had committed a prior contact sexual offense were most likely to
15

Seto and Eke examined new charges or convictions post-conviction of the instant child pornography conviction.
They also examined their criminal records to identify potential predictors of later offenses. Fifty six percent of the
sample had a prior criminal record, twenty-four percent had prior contact sexual offenses, and fifteen percent had
prior child pornography offenses. The average time at risk was 2.5 years.
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offend again, either generally or sexually. They found that, of 76 men with a history of child
pornography offenses but no contact offenses, only one person committed a contact sexual
offense during the follow-up period.
More recently, a meta-analysis by Seto, Hanson and Babchisin (2011) examined the
recidivism rates from nine follow-up studies of child pornography offenders (N = 2,630). The
meta-analysis revealed that 4.6% of child pornography offenders committed a new sexual
offense; 2.0% committed a contact sexual offense, and 3.4% committed a new child pornography
offense. These results suggest child pornography offenders are unlikely to commit a detected
contact sexual offense. 16 But for those who did sexually recidivate, risk factors included
criminal history, younger offender age, substance use, self-report sexual interest in children, low
education, history of prior treatment for sexual offending, and being single. These factors varied
across the nine studies, except for criminal history which was common to all.
Though these few recidivism studies appear to undermine congressional rationale for
severe supervised release sentencing for child pornography offenders, such studies do have
limitations. The use of criminal records to measure re-offending frequently leads to an
underestimation of actual sex crimes (Basbaum, 2010) because sex offenses against children
often go unreported or undetected. Thus, recidivism studies of child pornography offender
should be viewed with caution and considered as known rates of recidivism (USSC, 2012).
Nonetheless, these studies expose a serious flaw in the rationale behind strict sentencing for child
pornography – namely that it is built around panic. The supervised release sentence rose
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The average time at risk was 1.5 to 6-years.
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dramatically from a maximum of three years to five years to life, in part due to the belief that
child pornography offenses lead to contact offenses.
But some judges in the federal judiciary appear not to respond to moral panic with severe
sentencing. On the contrary, a number of sentencing courts have expressed their disagreement
with the severity of child pornography sentencing guidelines through increased use of belowguidelines variance and downward departures (USSC, 2009, 2012). Before providing evidence
of such sentencing variation, a review of the sentencing structure of the federal courts as well as
the specific sentencing structure for child pornography offenses is necessary to show where
variability and unwarranted supervised sentencing disparities can occur.
Sentencing Structure of the Federal Courts
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).
Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed unfettered sentencing discretion as long as they
imposed sentences within the statute. The problem with indeterminate sentences was that
similarly situated defendants often received different sentences (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011).
As a means of limiting disparities in sentencing, Congress in 1984, passed the SRA which
established a statutory framework for federal sentences (Kimball, 2011; USSC Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012). The SRA was motivated in part by Congressional desire
to establish a rational sentencing system to provide for certainty, uniformity, and proportionality
in criminal sentencing (Rigsby, 2010). The intent of Congress was to eliminate an unjustifiably
wide range of sentences for similarly situated offenders.
As such, the SRA also transformed federal sentencing from an indeterminate system to a
determinate system through the use of presumptive sentencing guidelines (Rigsby, 2010). The
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guidelines operated to constrain judicial discretion. That is, judges had to use the guidelines to
calculate the guideline range, which was developed based on the seriousness of the offense and
the defendant’s criminal history (Kimball, 2011). Although the guidelines were mandatory, a
judge could depart from the guidelines, but if and only if a particular case presented atypical
features or upon a 5K1.1 motion filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the defendant’s
substantial assistance.17 The guidelines were intended to base judicial sentencing entirely on
legally relevant factors such as the seriousness of the offense and prior criminal history.
The SRA set forth several substantive requirements that have guided the USSC’s actions
in the area of child pornography offenses (USSC, 2009). Statutory provisions outlining the
Commission’s duties direct the Commission to act in a manner consistent with all pertinent
provisions of any federal statute when creating guidelines and establishing sentencing policy.
Accordingly, under the SRA, the USSC is required to consider the same factors that a sentencing
court must consider (USSC, 2009). For example, the SRA directs the Commission to take into
account certain characteristics of the offender, including criminal history, while assuring that the
guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.
Additional characteristics the SRA instructs the USSC to consider are the offense,
including the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense; the community view of the
gravity of the offense; the public concern generated by the offense; the deterrent effect on others
particular sentence may have; and the current incidence of the offense in the community and in
the nation as a whole (USSC, 2009). Such characteristics are used by the Commission to
17

Substantial assistance motions or 5K1.1 motions as they are typically called, are filed by the U.S. Attorney’s
Office when the defendant provides a substantial form of assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person engaged or previously engaged in a federal crime. This motion allows judges to depart below any statutory
minimum sentence.
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establish the relative seriousness of the offense as compared to other offenses and to maintain
proportionality throughout the guidelines (USSC, 2009).
The supervised release sentence.
The enactment of the SRA effectively eliminated parole and established supervised
release. As explained in Chapter One, supervised release is a term of post-conviction
supervision overseen by federal district courts with the assistance of federal probation offices
(USSC, 2010). Initially, when the law for supervised release was written, the primary goal of
supervised release was to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of
a long prison term, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who had spent a fairly short period
in prison for punishment or other purposes, but still needed supervision and training programs
after release.18 Accordingly, this meant that supervised release was not originally intended for
purposes of control, revocation, or community safety. The law for supervised release was later
amended in 1984 and 1986 respectively, to include provisions for affording adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; providing protection to the public from further crimes committed by the
defendant; and providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment (USSC, 2010).
A sentencing court is authorized and in some cases required to impose a term of
supervised release to follow a term of imprisonment.19 Once a sentencing court determines that a
term of supervised release is authorized or required, it must then decide the length of the term.
Under 18 USC 3583(b), the primary statute governing supervised release, the maximum

18
19

See S. Rep. No 98-225, p.124 (1983).

A sentencing court is required to impose a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment when supervised
release is required by statute or when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed. The guidelines
authorize the court to depart from the supervised release guideline and not impose a term of supervised release if
supervised release is not required by statute.
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authorized supervised release term for Class A or B felonies is five years; it is three years for
Class C and D felonies; and one year for Class E felonies or misdemeanors. According to
Section 5D1.2, Application Note 3 of the federal sentencing guidelines, in determining the length
of supervised release, the court is required by statute to consider the guidelines and, among other
factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the
defendant; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (3) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct; and (4) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
The guidelines also indicate that a defendant with a more serious criminal history warrants a
greater need for supervision. Finally, the guidelines direct the court to ensure that the term
imposed on the defendant is long enough to address the purposes of imposing supervised release
on the defendant.
When a court imposes a term of supervised release, it must set conditions of supervision
which may include mandatory, standard and/or special conditions. The court also has discretion
to order any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation and any other condition
it considers to be appropriate as long as the condition is reasonable and appropriate to the
effective supervision and rehabilitation of the offender (USSC Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manual, 2012). Common conditions include maintaining stable employment and refraining from
use of illegal controlled substances. For child pornography offenses, common special conditions
include: (1) requiring the defendant to participate in a program for the treatment and monitoring
of sex offenders, including polygraph testing; (2) limiting the use of a computer or interactive
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computer service in cases in which the defendant used such items; (3) limiting contact with
children under the age of eighteen without supervision and with the approval of the probation
office; and (4) requiring the defendant to submit to a search, at any time, of the defendant’s
person and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, other electronic
communication or data storage devices or media based upon a reasonable suspicion concerning a
violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the defendant (USSC
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012, p. 424). Appeals courts have held that such
conditions are reasonable as long as they are tailored specifically to each offender and are
reasonably related to the effective supervision and rehabilitation of the offender.
Supervised release is very similar to probation and parole in that if an offender violates
the terms of release, the sentencing court is authorized, and in some cases required, to revoke the
term of supervised release and require the offender to serve all or part of the supervised release
term in prison (USSC, 2010). Moreover, in the instance of a finding of a violation, the court may
also extend the supervised release term, provided that the statutory maximum term was not
previously imposed.
Specialized sentencing structure for child pornography offenses.
Congress has made it clear that child pornography is a serious crime. As a means of
deterring offenders, eliminating the market and ending the abuse of children, Congress has said
harsh punishment for all child pornography offenders is warranted (Hamilton, 2011). The
statutory penalties for these offenses reflect this sentiment. Simple possession offenses prescribe
no statutory mandatory minimum penalty and a maximum term of 10 or 20 years of
imprisonment. However, if an offender has a prior sex offense conviction, possession would
result in a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years and a maximum term of 20
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years (USSC, 2012). Receipt, transportation, or distribution offenses carry a statutory mandatory
minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 20 years (with
increased minimum and maximum penalties if the offender has a prior conviction for a sex
offense). In justifying this punitive legislation, Congress has said that intrastate distribution,
receipt and possession of child pornography fuel the interstate market and is harmful to the
children depicted and to society as a whole (Krohel, 2011). Production offenses prescribe a
statutory mandatory minimum term of 15 years of imprisonment and a maximum term of 40
years (with increased minimum and maximum penalties if the offender has a prior sex offense).
The sentencing guidelines for the sentence of imprisonment for these cases generally fall
into two categories: non-production offenses and production offenses. Non-production offense
types include possession, receipt, transportation, and distribution. These offense types represent
approximately 90 percent of all federal child pornography prosecutions (USSC, 2012). The
other 10 percent of federal cases are production offenses (USSC, 2012). Non-production cases
are sentenced under 2G2.2 of the federal sentencing guidelines and production offenses are
sentenced under 2G2.1. Each of these guidelines respectively, provide sentence enhancements
or reductions to the base offense level for specific offense characteristics such as the use of a
computer, material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,
and the number of images/videos possessed. The base offense level for a non-production offense
such as possession of child pornography is 18, while the base offense level for a production
offense is 32.
Specialized supervised release sentencing structure for child pornography.
Prior to the Protect Act of 2003, offenders convicted of child pornography offenses were
subject to the general supervised release provision in 18 USC 3583(b). This meant that the
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maximum term of supervised release a court could impose was three years because child
pornography offenses are either Class C or D felonies. The Protect Act significantly lengthened
the supervised release term, creating an override from the general supervised release statute to 18
USC 3583(k). Under 18 USC 3583(k), the length of the supervised release term for child
pornography offenses is a minimum of five years to life. The enumerated offenses in 18 USC
3583(k) includes an array of offenses varying in statutory maximum sentences, which
demonstrate Congress’s recognition that offenses have differing degrees of seriousness
(Shockley, 2010). But there is an equalization of all child pornography offenses enumerated
under 18 USC 3583(k), meaning regardless of the charge, all child pornography offenders are
subject to a supervised release range of five years to life.
Supervised release sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses including child
pornography offenses are found in Chapter Five, Part D of the Guidelines Manual. To aid in
understanding the supervised release sentence, Section 5D1.2 of the guidelines manual is
recreated here:
5D1.2 Term of Supervised Release
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if a term of supervised
release is ordered, the length of the term shall be:
(1) At least three years but not more than five years for a defendant
convicted of a Class A or B felony.
(2) At least two years but not more than three years for a defendant
convicted of a Class C or D felony.
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(3) One year for a defendant convicted of a Class E felony or a Class A
misdemeanor.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a)(1) through (3), the length of the term of
supervised release shall be not less than the minimum term of years
specified for the offense under subdivisions (a)(1) through (3) and may be
up to life, if the offense is(1) Any offense listed in 18 USC 2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of
which resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious
bodily injury to another person; or
(2) A sex offense.
(Policy Statement) If the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense,
however, the statutory maximum term of supervised release is
recommended.
(c) The term of supervised release imposed shall not be less than any
statutorily required term of supervised release.
As shown, Section 5D1.2(b)(2) provides that a sentencing court must impose at least the
statutory minimum term or life if the offense is a sex offense. The policy statement within the
sentencing guidelines explicitly recommends the maximum term of supervised release (life) be
imposed if the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense. Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, such policy statements are to be considered by the sentencing judge (Shockley,
2010).
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The policy statement within the guidelines recommending the maximum supervised
release term has been criticized because it was promulgated before the Protect Act of 2003
increased the maximum term in child pornography offenses from three years to life (Shockley,
2010; USSC 2012). Meaning, before the Protect Act, it was the intent of Congress for child
pornography offenders to receive three years of supervised release. Defense attorneys point out
that the USSC never amended the language in Section 5D1.2 following the Protect Act of 2003,
and that it does not necessarily comport that Congress intended for all child pornography
offenders to receive lifetime supervised release (Stabenow, 2009). Nonetheless, the life term has
been upheld by appeals courts. In U.S. v. Cope (2008), the appeal court ruled that imposition of
lifetime supervised release is a reasonable sentence even for possession of child pornography
cases.
Another criticism of the blanket policy recommendation for lifetime supervised release is
that it does not differentiate among child pornography offenders with regard to the type of child
pornography offense committed and need for lifelong monitoring (USSC, 2012). Specifically,
18 USC 3583(k) includes an array of child pornography offenses with varying seriousness, as
evidenced by the wide range of maximum sentences of imprisonment (Shockley, 2010).
Hamilton (2012) argues that such a blanket policy recommendation for lifetime supervised
release represents a deontological perspective that judges all sexual images of children as
immoral and therefore deems anyone who possesses, receives, distributes, transports or produces
such images to be a criminal who deserves strict punishment and social control. The USSC, in
their 2012 report to congress on child pornography, noted that they were considering amending
the supervised release guideline in a manner that provides guidance to judges on how to impose a
term of supervised release within the statutory range of five years to life that is more tailored to
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an individual offender’s risk and corresponding need for supervision (p.326). To date, there
have been no changes to the supervised release guidelines for child pornography offenses.
The length of the supervised release term is of particular importance for child
pornography offenders subject to the enhanced supervised release provisions because the statute
also provides for the revocation of supervised release resulting in the incarceration of the
offender for the remainder of the period. Another concern with the supervised release statute and
revocation for child pornography offenders is the potential problem of revocation versus
prosecution (Shockley, 2010). For example, if a child pornography offender serving lifetime
supervised release for possession of child pornography commits another possession of child
pornography offense, they would face a revocation sentence of five years to life. The revocation
sentence could entail an even greater punishment than if the offender were prosecuted for
committing a second offense for possession of child pornography, which carries a sentence of
imprisonment of 10 to 20 years. Shockley (2010) argues “By allowing a steeper punishment for
a second offense via the revocation process than that intended by Congress, the system
undermines legislative intent” (p.32). This potential problem highlights why the supervised
release sentence imposed for child pornography offenders is significant. Statistics regarding how
often child pornography offenders on supervised release are revoked for committing new child
pornography offenses and returned to prison are not available.
Return of Judicial Discretion – U.S. v. Booker (2005), Rita v. U.S. (2007), Gall v. U.S. (2007),
and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007)
The constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines was successfully challenged in
2005 with the landmark U.S. v. Booker (2005). The Supreme Court held that the mandatory
Guidelines were unconstitutional. To remedy this, the Supreme Court excised the mandatory
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nature of the guidelines, rendering them advisory. The Supreme Court reasoned that an advisory
guideline system, while lacking the mandatory features that Congress enacted, retains other
features that help to further congressional objectives, including promoting certainty and fairness
in sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and maintaining flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted (USSC Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2012).
Excising the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines restored discretion to federal judges.
Although the Booker case demonstrated an inclination toward providing judges with
greater discretion, it was not the only significant case with implications for federal sentencing.
Decisions in Rita v. U.S. (2007), Gall v. U.S. (2007), and Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) extended
judicial discretion even more. In Rita v. U.S. (2007), the Supreme Court had to determine
whether it was proper to apply a presumption of reasonableness to within guideline sentences on
appeal. The Supreme Court found that a sentencing court could presume that a within guideline
sentence was reasonable (Rigsby, 2010).
Following the Rita decision, the Supreme Court had to determine in Gall v. U.S. (2007)
whether it was proper to apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the
guideline range (Rigsby, 2010). The Supreme Court ruled that appellate courts may not apply a
presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence that departs from the guidelines (Basbaum, 2010;
Rigsby, 2010). In other words, sentencing courts have the power to impose any sentence so long
as they explain their reasoning for the sentence.
In Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a
sentencing judge’s policy disagreement with the crack cocaine guidelines was permissible to
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impose a below-guideline sentence.20 This case ultimately extended discretion to permit a
categorical rejection of a guideline for policy reasons (Hamilton, 2014). The Supreme Court
ruled that as long as a sentencing court appropriately considers the factors in 18 USC 3553(a)
when imposing a sentence, the sentence is reasonable even if it does not fall within the
prescribed sentencing guideline range (Basbaum, 2010; Rigsby, 2010).
Although the issue at hand in each of these Supreme Court decisions was the sentence of
imprisonment, and although the Supreme Court was silent specifically on the sentence of
supervised release, these cases have significant implications for supervised release sentences of
child pornography offenders. Specifically, the rendering of the guidelines as advisory in effect
rendered Chapter 5, Part D (Supervised Release) advisory as well. This means the policy
statement recommending the maximum term of supervised release for child pornography
offenders is also advisory. And while the supervised release guidelines are also advisory, judges
must still consider them and any other applicable policy statements contained therein before
imposing the supervised release sentence. At the same time, many circuit courts have authorized
their district courts to use the decision in Kimbrough to depart from the guidelines in child
pornography cases based on a policy disagreement (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014). According to
legal scholars, district courts situated within circuits that authorize judicial departures based on
Kimbrough, have used the rationale in Kimbrough to impose below guideline range sentences of
imprisonment (Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2014). Thus, if some district courts are applying the
rationale in Kimbrough to categorically reject child pornography guidelines for the sentence of
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In U.S. v. Kimbrough, the sentencing judge declined to follow the sentencing guideline range of 228 to 270
months for crack cocaine trafficking and instead imposed a downward variance of 180 months in prison. The
district court based this variance in part on the fact that the guidelines treat one gram of cocaine base as equivalent to
one hundred grams of powder cocaine. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s sentence. The Supreme Court
ruled that the crack cocaine guideline does not exemplify the USSC’s exercise of its institutional role because it was
not based on empirical evidence and national experience (Basbaum, 2010).
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imprisonment, it is not an illogical conclusion that they may also apply Kimbrough to reject the
policy statement in the supervised release guideline for lifetime supervised release.
Judicial Dissonance
Child pornography sentencing is arguably the hottest topic in federal sentencing today
(Hamilton, 2014). This is because there is a “tug of war” between Congress and some judges in
the federal judiciary as to how to sentence these cases. As previously noted, Congress’s position
is for severe sentences. But some judges have responded in the opposite manner, refusing to
follow the child pornography guidelines, willing to risk reversals of their sentences and face
congressional backlash. Why one may ask? Because a number of scholars and judges believe
the child pornography guidelines and resulting sentencing policies are a by-product of moral
panic and congressional manipulation (Basbaum, 2010; Rogers, 2013). Additional grievances
are that child pornography guidelines are not empirically based and are too severe. Indeed, a
survey of district court judges conducted by the USSC in 2009, shows that 70% believed the
guidelines range for possession of child pornography was too high; 69% believed the range for
receipt was too high; and 30% believed the range for distribution was too high. 21 Some judges
have expressed their discontentment with the guidelines by imposing sentences that fall below
the recommended guidelines range, both before and after the Protect Act of 2003, which sought
to eliminate downward departures for child pornography offenders (Rigsby, 2010).
Legal researchers offer three possible explanations for why judges are imposing nonguidelines sentences (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011). First, some judges view the current
sentencing structure for child pornography offenses, particularly non-production offenses, as too
severe. The child pornography guidelines as they currently stand call for enhancements if certain
21

It should be noted that criticism by judges and others is not directed at guideline ranges for producers of child
pornography, but rather at disproportionately harsh sentences for non-production case (Hughes, 2013).
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factors such as use of a computer/Internet, number of images, or if images involved children
under the age of twelve, are present. Some judges find these often-applicable enhancements,
inherent factors in the crime of child pornography. For example, the Internet, which requires the
use of a computer, is touted as revolutionizing the way child pornography is accessed,
disseminated, and managed. Meaning, hard photographs of child pornography are virtually
obsolete. Therefore, most people charged with child pornography receive the enhancement for
use of a computer/Internet. Some judges believe these enhancements unfairly increase the
guidelines range and use their discretion to circumvent what they believe are overly harsh
sentences (Rigsby, 2010). In other words, sentencing courts are more likely to depart from the
child pornography guidelines than from other guidelines, particularly for non-production
offenses, because they believe the guideline sentence is too harsh. Indeed, Kaiser and Spohn
(2014) found that judges were more likely to use downward departures for non-production child
pornography offense compared with sexual abuse offenses. Some of the reasons judges gave
when granting departures suggested that they believed the guidelines for non-production cases
were too harsh (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014).
A second explanation is that some judges view child pornography as a victimless crime
and/or view child pornography offenders as harmless (Hamilton, 2011). In her review of judicial
justifications of non-guidelines sentences, Hamilton (2011) highlighted one judge’s view: “From
my experience, most of these men have no prior criminal history. They usually have healthy
family lives and productive careers” (p.562). Similarly, U.S. District Judge Robin J. Cauthron
during her 2009 testimony to the USSC in which she advocated reducing the severity of child
pornography guidelines said “It is too often the case that a defendant appears to be a social misfit
looking at dirty pictures in the privacy of his own home without any prospect of touching or
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otherwise acting out to any person” (Cardona, 2009, see section titled “Several Medical
Problems”).
A third explanation is that child pornography offenders represent a different demographic
than judges are accustom to encountering. Indeed, trends in federal data have distinguished child
pornography offenders from the overall average defendants involved in federal prosecutions.
Child pornography offenders, who account for 2.3% of federal prosecutions, are 99.3% male and
88.7% white; moreover, 35.1% have completed some college, 17.5% are college graduates and
27.2% are age 50 and older (USSC Sourcebook, 2010). Kimball (2011) argues that judges are
using these characteristics in addition to family ties and employment to justify below guideline
sentences. Krohel’s (2011) review of sentences imposed on child pornography offenders
highlighted one such example. In United States v. Grossman (2008), the offender pled guilty to
possession of child pornography. The guideline sentencing range was 135 to 168 months and the
supervised release range was five years to life. The judge imposed a non-guideline sentence of
60 months imprisonment and 10 years supervised release. In justifying the sentence, the judge
noted he was “troubled” by the discovery that the thirty-five year old married father was facing
more than ten years in prison for a single-count of possession of child pornography. The judge
also highlighted that the offender was educated in justifying the non-guideline sentence.
Many of the below-guidelines opinions rely on the Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough
line of cases (Basbaum, 2010). Under these cases, and Kimbrough in particular, district courts
may refuse to follow the guideline ranges if they find that the guidelines do not exemplify the
Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. For example, in United States v.
Ontiveros (2008), the recommended guideline range was 97 to 121 months for a defendant
convicted of receiving child pornography. The range was so high in part because of
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enhancements for computer use, distribution, and possession of a large number of images/videos
(over 600). The judge disregarded the guidelines, and imposed a five-year sentence, pointing out
the defendant's lack of criminal history, his steady employment, and his efforts to stop viewing
child pornography as justification. Most important in the court's consideration was a finding that
section 2G2.2 does "not reflect the kind of empirical data, national experience, and independent
expertise that are characteristic of the Commission's institutional role." (Basbaum, 2010).
Notwithstanding the above, discontentment in the judiciary is not unanimous. There are
some judges and scholars who support the guidelines and concur with Congress’s position that
all child pornography offenses including possession offenses are serious and warrant serious
punishment. Like Congress, some judicial officers believe child pornography offenses fuel the
interstate market increasing the production of child pornography resulting in more children being
sexually abused. Judges who take this position do not find the guidelines excessive and
expectedly comply with the guidelines ranges, including the policy statement to impose lifetime
supervised release.22
As can be seen, the lack of agreement between Congress and some judges in the federal
judiciary coupled with judicial discretion provided by Booker and its progeny has led to variation
in child pornography sentencing outcomes. On one hand, a person convicted of a nonproduction offense could receive a sentence as lenient as probation if his/her sentencing judge
deviates from the guidelines. On the other hand, another person convicted of the same offense
could receive a sentence up to ten years if his/her sentencing judge abides by the guidelines. The
literature contributes much of the below-guideline sentencing to a variety of factors including
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The author is a former Senior U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern District of Missouri and has prepared
hundreds of presentence reports for child pornography offenders. The statement is based on five years of direct
observation of judicial officers imposing guideline sentences including lifetime supervised release for child
pornography offenses in the U.S. District Court/Eastern District of Missouri.
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extralegal factors. It is possible, however, that the extent to which these types of extralegal
factors come into play in the supervised release decision depends on the type of offense.
Judicial Dissonance – Non-production versus Production
There are two types of child pornography: non-production and production. Nonproduction includes possession, receipt, transportation and distribution. According to the
USSC’s 2012 report on child pornography, much of the sentencing disagreements within the
judiciary is for non-production offenses. This is because of the consensus that production
offenses are more serious (USSC, 2012).23 To demonstrate, in 2010, the USSC surveyed judges
regarding their feelings about the production guideline and 67% responded that the mandatory
minimum statutory penalty for production was appropriate. In a similar tone, 72% responded
that the guideline ranges for production offenses were generally appropriate.
At the same time, the USSC finds that some courts, although a minority in the judiciary,
have also expressed criticism of the production guideline and have rejected this guideline based
on similar policy grounds as for non-production offenses. As a result, production offenses have
also witnessed judicial discretion in the sentences imposed. According to the USSC, data for FY
2010 reveals that since Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, 56.8% of production cases were
sentenced within the guideline range and 35.9% were sentenced below the guideline range
(USSC, 2012).
But we still do not know how this judicial dissonance affects the sentence of supervised
release, and more specifically, whether it plays differently for production and non-production
child pornography offenses. Neither Congress nor the USSC has differentiated between nonproduction and production offenses when it comes to the supervised release sentence. That is,
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The average sentence of imprisonment in fiscal year 2010 for non-production offenses was 63 months and 160
months for production offenses (USSC, 2012).

44

the supervised release guideline recommends lifetime supervised release for production and nonproduction cases. Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson (2010) point out that different offense types
present qualitatively different implications for attributions of offender blameworthiness and
community protection, which may ultimately impact the sentence imposed. For instance,
because production is generally viewed as more serious, judges may be less likely to consider
extralegal mitigating factors because the seriousness of the offense overrides any potential
extralegal mitigating factors. At the same time, judges may be more willing to consider
extralegal factors aside from seriousness in non-production cases because non-production
offenders are viewed as less dangerous and blameworthy. Accordingly, if judges perceive
producers as more culpable than non-producers, production cases may receive more severe
sentences or be sentenced to lifetime supervised release a vast majority of the time. However,
data from fiscal year 2012 shows that not all production offenders are sentenced to lifetime
supervised release.24 As such, uncovering the correlates of supervised release sentences for both
production and non-production cases is important to help specify the nature of these sentences.
This is particularly important given the variability of supervised release sentences and the
potential for unwarranted supervised release sentencing disparities.
Conclusion
In sum, a combination of punitive child pornography statutes, born largely out of moral
panic, alongside congressional manipulation of the child pornography sentencing guidelines and
sentencing policy, has culminated into a seeming “power struggle” between Congress and some
judges. Some judges are using their recently regained discretion in Booker and its progeny to
impose below guideline sentences for child pornography offenders resulting in wide variation in
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Preliminary data analysis reveals that of the 237 production cases sentenced in fiscal year 2012, 57.4% received
lifetime supervised release.
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sentencing outcomes and potentially unwarranted sentencing disparities. The variation in
sentencing outcomes among child pornography offenders is so great that one legal scholar
likened child pornography sentencing to a lightning strike, wherein congressionally mandated
severe sentences like lifetime supervised release strike some offenders and miss others (Rigsby,
2010). In the next chapter, I discuss leading theoretical perspectives used to explain variation in
sentencing outcomes and unwarranted sentencing disparities, followed by a review of the
empirical sentencing literature.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, EMPIRICAL LITERATURE,
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND HYPOTHESES
Introduction
Other than the presentence report and the policy statement within the guidelines
recommending lifetime supervised release, federal judges have little to assist them in making
supervised release sentencing decisions for child pornography offenders. Complicating this issue
is the fact that supervised release decisions are “back end” sentences. That is, sentences imposed
at adjudication, but served after a period of incarceration. In other words, judges impose
supervised release sentences including conditions of post-release supervision at the time the
sentence of imprisonment is imposed. Unlike state parole boards who make “back end”
discretionary release decisions of sex offenders with the aid of the presentence report,
institutional records, and institutional risk scores (Huebner and Bynum, 2006), federal judges
have limited knowledge of the offender and no tools for predicting future behavior with any
degree of certainty.
In the face of incomplete information, what factors influence judges’ decisions regarding
supervised release sentences for child pornography offenders? Although the answer to this
specific question is unknown, the extant sentencing literature reveals that in addition to legal
factors including offense severity and criminal history, characteristics of the offender such as
race (Mitchell, 2005; Spohn, 2000), age (Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and
Kramer, 1995; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998), education (Mustard, 2001), and gender
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998) also influence sentencing decisions.
More recently, research found that above and beyond offender and case-level
characteristics, contextual influences such as court contexts also are related to criminal

47

sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson,
2010). This is particularly important for sentencing studies using federal data because of the
federal courts’ geographic organization and structure. The geographic organization and structure
of the federal courts suggests that an exclusive focus on individual-level factors has the potential
to omit important court contextual factors related to the sentencing decision. Indeed, Kautt
(2002) calls into question the validity of a single-level approach to federal sentencing outcomes.
Similarly, Johnson (2006) argues that from a methodological standpoint, sentencing studies that
fail to incorporate court context not only risk omitted variable bias, but may also risk model
misspecification. Researchers have found that together, both individual-level and court
contextual factors provide a more comprehensive understanding of the correlates of sentencing
outcomes (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 2006).
Multilevel sentencing studies using federal data have almost exclusively focused on more
common offense types such as drugs, fraud, firearms, and immigration (Kautt, 2002; Johnson,
Ulmer and Kramer, 2008; Eisentein et al., 2010). This is significant because there are
differences between these types of offenses and child pornography offenses that may yield
different outcomes. The most obvious difference is the supervised release statute: for all child
pornography offenses, the general supervised release statute found in 18 U.S.C 3583(b), is
trumped by 18 U.S.C 3583(k) which authorizes the term and length of the supervised release
specifically for child pornography offenses. Another difference is the personal characteristics of
child pornography offenders. Trends in federal data depict the average child pornography
offender as an older white male with at least a high school diploma whereas the typical federal
offender is a young minority male with less than a high school education (USSC Sourcebook,
2012). Some legal scholars argue that it is these demographic differences between child
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pornography offenders and the typical federal offender that may lead to differential and
preferential treatment of child pornography offenders in the sentencing process (Kimball, 2011,
Krohel, 2011). For example, Krohel (2011) argues that some judges use extralegal factors such
as employment and family ties to impose below-guideline sentences for child pornography
offenders.
Empirically, however, we do not know how these differences play out in the supervised
release sentencing process because few studies focus solely on child pornography offenses. In
fact, I know only one empirical study, conducted by Kaiser and Spohn (2014), that examines
individual and case-level factors to determine whether downward departures are more likely for
child pornography offenders than in case involving sexual abuse. 25 In general, they find child
pornography offenders receive significant reductions in sentences. More specific findings from
Kaiser and Spohn’s (2014) study are discussed throughout this chapter. Another study by
Patrick and Marsh (2011) examines the influence of characteristics of the offense, offender, and
victim on sentence length of child sex offenders, not specifically child pornography offenders. 26
They find that characteristics of the offense play the largest role in sentencing outcomes. Neither
Kaiser and Spohn (2014) nor Patrick and Marsh (2011) however, examine supervised release as
the dependent variable. As such, there is no way to know whether the correlates of sentencing
decisions observed for general offenders hold true for child pornography offenders and the
sentence of supervised release. To be clear though, this dissertation does not aim to compare
sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders with sentencing outcomes for the typical
federal offender. Instead, I expound that what we know about sentencing outcomes generally
may or may not hold true for child pornography offenders and the sentence of supervised release.
25

Kaiser and Spohn’s analytic approach utilized a three-stage analysis: tobit regression, propensity score matching,
and the rate at which judges go outside the traditionally accepted reasons for giving a below-guideline sentence.
26
Patrick and Marsh’s analytic approach utilizes binomial and linear regression techniques.
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Many theoretical perspectives have been espoused to explain why individual-level legal
and extralegal factors and court contextual factors influence sentencing decisions. In this
chapter, I focus and review four of these perspectives – uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution,
the focal concerns perspective, the courts as communities perspective, and social/group threat.
Following my discussion of theoretical perspectives, I review empirical work on the correlates of
sentencing outcomes. This includes summarizing the findings reported by a large body of
individual-level sentencing research as well as multilevel studies that examine both individuallevel and court context simultaneously. I close this chapter with a review of my research
questions and hypotheses.
Sentencing Disparities: Theoretical Explanations at the Individual-Level
Because my study is a multilevel analysis, my conceptual approach to supervised release
sentencing decisions draws on four theories of judicial decision-making – uncertainty
avoidance/casual attribution; the focal concerns perspective; the court communities perspective;
and social/group threat perspective. This approach provides theoretical grounding for including
individual-level factors and district-level court contextual and environmental factors to explain
supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders. First, I present
Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution theory of judicial discretion,
followed by the focal concerns perspectives. Both of these perspectives provide a framework for
understanding why individual-level extralegal factors influence sentencing decisions despite the
formal guidelines system (Doerner & Demuth, 2010). Afterwards, I present the court
communities perspective and group threat perspective, as these perspectives are frequently used
to explain sentencing outcomes across courts.
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Uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution.
Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/casual attribution perspective theorizes that
judicial actors attempt to make rational decisions, but do so within a context of uncertainty. This
perspective merges research of the structural perspective of rational decision-making (March and
Simon, 1958; Simon 1957; Thompson 1967) with the social-psychological perspective of causal
attribution in punishment (Shaver, 1975; Hawkin, 1981; Carroll & Payne, 1976; Heider, 1958;
Fontaine & Emily 1978; Lippman, 1922). Rational choice is a decision wherein all possible
alternatives to an outcome and potential ramifications of the outcome are identified and known
even though in reality, a decision-maker rarely has complete information (Albonetti, 1991).
Rational choice surmises that complete knowledge of a situation eliminates uncertainty in
decision-making. Accordingly, in a situation having incomplete knowledge, the court actor
attempts to reduce uncertainty by relying upon a rationality that is the product of habit
(Albonetti, 1991). This means decisions are based on past experiences, stereotypes, and
prejudices (March and Simon, 1958). Stated differently, decision makers achieve a measure of
rationality by developing “patterned responses” that serve to avoid, or at least reduce, uncertainty
in obtaining a desired outcome (Albonetti, 1991).
Next, Albonetti (1991) links the concept of “patterned responses” to causal attribution, a
second theoretical perspective useful in understanding discretionary decision-making. The
causal attribution perspective on punishment says that judgments of causality are premised on
both personal and environmental forces that are thought to contribute to behavior (Albonetti,
1991). In other words, court actors attribute meaning to past and future behavior consistent with
stereotypes associated with members of certain social groups. Thus, according to Albonetti
(1991):

51

based on the work on uncertainty avoidance and casual attribution in punishment, judges
would attempt to manage uncertainty in the sentencing decision by developing patterned
responses that are themselves the product of an attribution process influenced by causal
judgments. Judges would rely on stereotypes that link race, gender, and outcomes from
earlier processing stages to the likelihood of future criminal activity. Imposing
punishment in the criminal justice system, similar to other highly discretionary decisions,
is the result of “satisficing” or simplifying causal assumptions in an effort to achieve
rationality (p.250).
This perspective would suggest that extralegal factors may play a role in judicial stereotypes of
child pornography offenders and their risk of recidivism when imposing supervised release
sentences.
The Focal Concerns Perspective.
The focal concerns perspective is one of the more widely cited individual-level
frameworks used to explain the influence of legal and extralegal factors on sentencing decisions.
Drawing from Albonetti’s (1991) work, the focal concerns perspective draws on the notion of
uncertainty avoidance and causal attribution. This perspective asserts that judges or court actors
base sentencing decisions on three main considerations: blameworthiness, protection of the
community, and practical constraints and consequences (Steffensmeier, 1980; Steffensmeier et
al., 1998).
Blameworthiness.
Blameworthiness centers on issues of culpability and just deserts (Steffensmeier et al.,
1998). The main objective of blameworthiness is to assess whether the legal sanction imposed is
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consistent with the seriousness of the offense (Huebner & Bynum, 2006). Judges’ views of
blameworthiness are constructed by legal factors including offense severity, guilty pleas,
criminal history, and the offender’s role in the offense such as being a leader or organizer
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). For example, offenders with longer criminal histories generally
receive more severe punishments because such histories suggest greater culpability
(Wooldredge, 2010).
The federal sentencing guidelines take into account indicators of blameworthiness to
assist judges in making sentencing decisions. Blameworthiness is evaluated through the
applicable offense level (offense seriousness), the offender’s criminal history, the offender’s role
in the offense, and acceptance of responsibility. For example, Chapter Two of the USSC Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Manual pertains to the offense conduct. This chapter is organized by
offense type and each offense has a corresponding base offense level. Generally, more serious
offenses have higher corresponding base offense levels. Additionally, offenses may have one or
more specific offense characteristics that adjust the offense level upward or downward increasing
or decreasing the applicable punishment.
Thus, in the case of child pornography offenses, production of child pornography carries
a greater base offense level and corresponding punishment than a non-production offense like
possession of child pornography. This is because production of child pornography carries a
statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. The legal literature suggests that
judges’ view of the seriousness of child pornography is linked to the charge (Rigsby, 2010;
Krohel, 2011; Hamilton, 2011). If this is the case, possessors may be deemed least culpable,
followed by the receivers, transporters and distributors, who may be perceived as equally
culpable, with the producers being most culpable. In their analysis of FY 2010 sentencing data,
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the USSC found that variability of sentences was more likely to found within non-production
cases (USSC, 2012). For instance, USSC FY 2010 data shows 39.8% of non-production cases
were sentenced within the guideline range, in comparison to 56.5% for production offenses.
Another indicator of blameworthiness taken into account by the guidelines is criminal
history. The federal sentencing guidelines also allow for incremental increases in punishment
based upon an offender’s criminal history. According to the introductory commentary of
Chapter Four of the federal sentencing guidelines which pertains to criminal history:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal
conduct dictates that a clear message is sent to society that repeated criminal behavior
will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from
further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal
behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited
likelihood of successful rehabilitation. (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual, p. 3).
Together with offense severity and criminal history, the offender’s role in the offense is
another indicator of blameworthiness factored into the guidelines. Specifically, the federal
sentencing guidelines also allow for increases or decreases in punishment based upon the role the
defendant played in the offense (aggravating or mitigating role). With regard to an aggravating
role, Chapter Three, Section 3B1.1 states:
This Part provides adjustments to the offense level based upon the role the defendant
played in committing the offense. The determination of a defendant’s role in the offense
is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of Section 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct) i.e., all conduct included under Sections 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and not solely on the
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basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction (2012 USSC Guidelines
Manual, p.341).
Alternatively, an offender who is deemed a minimal or minor participant would be entitled to
decreased punishment. In essence, the role the offender plays in the offense speaks to the
offender’s level of culpability and likelihood of recidivism, which is important for supervised
release.
Finally, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility for the instant offense is another
indicator of blameworthiness captured by the guidelines. Acceptance of responsibility is
addressed in Chapter Three, Part E of the federal sentencing guidelines. Pursuant to Section
3E1.1(a), if a defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, he/she
is entitled to a two-level decrease in their total offense level (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual).
In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this decrease, considerations include, but are
not limited to the following: truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct; voluntary termination
or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; voluntary payment of restitution prior to
adjudication of guilt; voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the
offense; and post-offense rehabilitative efforts (i.e., counseling or drug treatment). An additional
one-level deduction pursuant to Section 3E1.1(b) is available upon a motion by the government
stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government to allocate
their resources efficiently.
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Protection of Community.
Protection of the community refers to the level of danger an offender poses to the public
and addresses judges’ concerns with protecting the community from offenders who they believe
are likely to recidivate (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Similar to
blameworthiness, this concern is influenced by legal factors such as the seriousness of the
offense and the offender’s criminal history. In the case of the criminal history of child
pornography offenders, the guidelines under Chapter Four, Section 4B1.5 (Repeat and
Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors) also makes special provisions for increases in
punishment for any offender who commits the instant federal offense subsequent to sustaining at
least one sex offense conviction.
Although all of the references to criminal history in the federal sentencing guidelines
apply toward the sentence of imprisonment, this focal concern could also be extrapolated to the
supervised release sentence. That is, the criminal history of an offender identified as a repeat and
dangerous sex offender in a crime involving minor may play into the focal concerns of judges
that there may be a likelihood of recidivism and may impact the ultimate length of the supervised
release sentence.
In the case of child pornography offenders, Congress has explicitly stated through
legislation that all child pornography offenders are dangerous and the public is in need of
protection from these offenders. This notion of protecting the community from child
pornography offenders is exemplified in the enhancement for lifetime supervised release and
implies that these offenders cannot be rehabilitated, although a preliminary view of the data
indicates that not all judges are imposing lifetime supervised release for all child pornography
offenders. Protection of the community is one of the statutory sentencing factors judges are
mandated to consider when imposing the supervised release term. In determining where within
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the five years to life range to impose supervised release for child pornography offenders, the
court is to consider the guidelines as well as statutory sentencing factors which include the nature
and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the offenders; deterrence;
public protection; and needed educational/vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment.
Exactly how judges assess community protection and recidivism of child pornography
offenders before imposing the supervised release term is unknown. But it is likely they employ
cues similar as to the sentence of imprisonment, such as offense seriousness and criminal history.
The legal literature finds that judicial perception of seriousness of child pornography is linked
with the charge (Rigsby, 2010; Krohel, 2011). That is, non-production offenses are viewed as
less serious than production offenses for reasons including lesser statutory imprisonment
penalties and no “hands on” or actual victim. This may come into play as judges impose the
length of the supervised release sentence. Meaning, we may find that those convicted of less
serious or non-production offenses receive more lenient supervised release terms than those who
produce child pornography because they are considered less culpable.
In like manner, criminal history, particularly any prior history that includes a prior sex
offense conviction, and where the offender received a sentencing enhancement for being a repeat
and dangerous sex offender against minor, may be more likely to receive a longer supervised
release term or life. This is because the commentary in Application Note 5 of Section 4B1.5
specifically addresses public protection (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual). According to
Application Note 5 (Treatment and Monitoring), the statutory maximum term of supervised
release is recommended for any offender receiving the enhancement for being a repeat and
dangerous sex offender against a minor. The maximum term is lifetime supervised release.
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In addition to offense seriousness and criminal history, offender characteristics such as
race, employment, education, and family ties also contribute to this focal concern (Albonetti,
1991; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). For example, in describing evolving perceptions of minority
crime, Mauer (1999) explains that it was not until the 1970s and early 1980s that the stereotype
of the young black man evolved from petty theft to ominous predator. Such fear has resulted in
minority offenders being stereotyped as more dangerous and criminally responsible (Welch,
2007). Previous research has linked the defendant’s race/ethnicity to notions of dangerousness
and recidivism (Albonetti, 1991; Steen, Engen, & Gainey 2005). The threat that minorities are
thought to pose has resulted in harsher sentencing outcomes (Welch, 2007).
But while race is relevant in sentencing of other types of crimes, it may not matter here
given the unique makeup of child pornography offenders (i.e., older, white, male, educated).
Instead, it may be possible that other extralegal statuses such as family ties, education, and
employment inform the sentencing decisions of child pornography offenders. For example,
education and employment have been linked with notions of reduced dangerousness. As an
illustration, in U.S. v. Ontiveros (2008), the defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography.
The guideline sentencing range was 97 to 121 months imprisonment and a supervised release
range of five years to life. The judge disregarded the guideline range and sentenced Ontiveros to
five years of imprisonment, followed by lifetime supervised release. In justifying the nonguideline sentence, the court noted the defendant's lack of criminal history and his steady
employment. In the same fashion, judges may view child pornography offenders who are
married and/or have children as less dangerous than those child pornography offenders who are
unmarried and living alone. The thought being that marriage/family curtails or insulates
offenders from engaging in new criminal behavior. At this time, the USSC does not collect data
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on marriage/family, but they do collect data on dependents. Information concerning marriage
and family ties are indicated in presentence reports.
Practical Constraints and Consequences.
The final focal concern is practical constraints and consequences. This concern refers to
how sentencing decisions impact the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the
individual defendants and their families and communities (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
Organizational concerns include efficiency, flow of cases, overcrowding of correctional
organizations and maintaining positive working relationships among courtroom actors
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Practical consequences for the individual offender include concerns
about the offender’s ability to do time, health conditions, special needs, and disruption of family
ties (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
Legal scholars maintain practical constraints and consequences are considerations that
some judges consider before imposing sentencing for child pornography offenders (Hamilton
2011; Krohel, 2011). Specifically, Hamilton (2011), notes “when downward varying, judges
also appeared concerned defendants would suffer ills beyond the sentence imposed, such as
informal stigmatic harms and vulnerability to civil suits” (p.563). The case of U.S. v. Beach
illustrates Hamilton’s point. In this case, the district court varied downward from a guideline
range of 210-240 months to a sentence of 96 months. In justifying the sentence, the court
considered the special conditions (mental health treatment, sex offender treatment, sex offender
registration, and no Internet use) of the three-year supervised release term a consequence and
unnecessary hardship (Friedman and Supler, 2008).
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Likewise, Krohel (2011) uses the case of U.S. v Grossman (2006) to demonstrate the
sentencing court’s concern of disruption to the family. In Grossman, the offender pled guilty to
possession of child pornography. The guideline sentencing range was 135 to 168 months and a
supervised release range of five years to life. The court imposed a non-guideline sentence of
sixty months imprisonment and ten years supervised release. The court highlighted its concern
of disrupting Grossman’s family ties with a sentence of more than ten years imprisonment. And
while the guidelines do not provide judicial actors with guidance on this particular focal concern
and how it relates to the sentence of supervised release, it is not unreasonable to think that judges
may consider practical constraints and consequences of the supervised release sentence of child
pornography offenders.
Equally important to the practical constraints and consequences the supervised release
sentence may have for the individual offender, there may also be constraints and consequences to
the functioning of the criminal justice system that play into the focal concerns of judges, namely
the functioning of U.S. Probation Offices. U.S. Probation Offices are tasked with monitoring
and supervising child pornography offenders post-conviction. Indeed, the general nature of child
pornography offenses and history and characteristics of these offenders led to the formation of
separate and specialized policies for the supervision of these offenders (see Part I – Sex Offender
Management in the Guide to Judiciary Policy).27 In addition to specialized monitoring, the
supervision of child pornography offenders requires specialized training in surveillance,
electronic monitoring, and treatment techniques (Cornish, 2010; Palmiotto and MacNichol,
2010). There are also financial costs to probation offices including funding for sex offender
treatment and the hiring of additional officers to supervise these offenders. As mentioned in
27

Part I – Sex Offender Management provides specific guidance to U.S. Probation Officers in performing their
duties related to the investigating and supervising persons charged or convicted of sex offenses.
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Chapter One, the U.S. Probation Office in the Eastern District of Missouri recently created a
specialized unit comprised of a supervising probation officer and seven line officers to supervise
child pornography offenders serving lifetime supervised release. This appears to be a trend as
the U.S. Probation Office for the District of Nevada instituted a similar specialized supervision
unit specifically for child pornography offenders. In as much as there may be practical
constraints and consequences for U.S. Probation Offices, this may play into the concerns of
judges in considering the sentence of supervised release.
Similar resources for manpower may also be needed at U.S. Attorney’s Offices and
Federal Public Defenders Offices. These agencies are responsible for the prosecution and
defense of supervised release violators. Likewise, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) will require
resources as they are tasked with housing offenders whose supervised release terms are revoked.
In essence, all of these considerations are resources that judicial actors may be sensitive to when
imposing the supervised release sentence of child pornography offenders.
To summarize, uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution and the focal concerns
perspective of case processing and judicial actors’ decision-making provides a framework for
understanding why legal and extralegal factors might continue to influence supervised release
sentencing decisions despite a formal guideline system (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer, 1997;
Spohn & Holleran, 2000). The next section reviews the empirical literature on the correlates of
individual-level sentencing outcomes generally because very little empirical literature exists that
examines sentences for child pornography offenders and/or the supervised release sentence.
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Empirical Literature
Legally relevant sentencing factors.
USSC data for FY 2010 show that there is substantial variability in supervised release
sentences imposed on child pornography offenders (USSC, 2012). And while prior research has
not examined the individual-level legal, extralegal, and district-level factors that influence
supervised release decisions, it is not unreasonable to assume that factors which influence the
sentence of imprisonment may also influence supervised release decisions. This is because like
the sentence of imprisonment, the sentence of supervised release also mandate that judges
consider the guidelines as well as statutory sentencing factors which include the nature and
circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the offender; deterrence; public
protection; and needed educational/vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment of the offender. In addition, the theoretical perspectives discussed earlier imply that
these considerations may also come into play in supervised release decision-making. Although
some factors, like offender race, may operate differently for child pornography offenders due to
the unique characteristics of this population of offenders.
By and large, prior research consistently finds that differences in legal factors operating
at the individual-level – such as offense seriousness, criminal history, multiple charges, and
mode of conviction – are the best predictors of whether the defendant is incarcerated and for how
long (Johnson, 2006; Kautt, 2002). Indeed, the federal sentencing guidelines base guideline
calculations for punishment on legal factors such as those mentioned above. It may follow then,
that these same legal factors may account for the bulk of variation of supervised release
sentences. Because the extant literature routinely finds that legal factors play a dominant role in
sentencing decisions as they should, a review of these factors will not be elaborated upon.

62

Individual-level: extralegal influences on sentencing decisions.
Extralegal characteristics have also been found to influence sentencing outcomes. It is
important to bear in mind, however, that the extralegal characteristics of child pornography
offenders are vastly different than those of the average offender convicted in federal court. The
typical child pornography offender is an older white male with at least a high school diploma,
whereas the average federal offender is young minority male with less than a high school
education (USSC, 2012). Moreover, most child pornography offenders are employed full-time
(Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell, 2011). Given the uniqueness of child pornography offenders,
extralegal factors may operate differently for these types of offenders. To be clear, this study is
not comparing child pornography offenders to other types of offenders in terms of sentencing
outcomes, but this study is interested in determining whether and to what extent extralegal
factors account for variability of supervised release outcomes for child pornography offenders.
The federal sentencing guidelines manual devotes an entire section (see Chapter 5,
Section H) to a discussion of offender characteristics including sex, race, national origin, creed,
religion and socioeconomic status that are clearly identified as irrelevant and prohibited from
consideration. Additional characteristics, such as age, education, vocational skills, mental and
emotional conditions, physical condition, employment record, family and communities ties are
identified “as not ordinarily relevant in determining if a departure is warranted” (see Chapter 5,
Section H). This means that courts are not to consider these characteristics unless they are
present to an unusual degree. Although legal factors operating at the offender level are the best
predictors of whether the offender is incarcerated and for how long (Johnson 2006; Spohn &
Holleran 2000), empirical studies have also found extralegal factors such as race, age, gender,
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education and socioeconomic status play a role (for comprehensive reviews see Chiricos and
Crawford, 1995; Spohn, 2000, Zatz, 2000).
Race effects.
Early studies found that race had little substantive effect on sentencing outcomes (Kleck,
1981; Kramer & Steffensmeier, 1993). More recent studies utilizing federal data have concluded
that blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans receive harsher sentences than whites (Albonetti,
1997; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Everett & Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Mustard, 2001). For example,
Doerner and Demuth (2010) used USSC data for fiscal year 2001 to examine the independent
and joint effect of race/ethnicity, gender and age on sentences imposed on 33,305 offenders
convicted in federal court. They found that Hispanics and blacks, males, and younger offenders
received harsher sentences than whites, females and older offenders. In another federal
sentencing study, Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) found that blacks, Hispanics, and Native
Americans received harsher sentences than whites and that these differences were only partly
explained by offense-related variables. In her examination of the literature on race and
sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines, Spohn (2013) reviewed eight
methodologically sophisticated studies and found that each of these studies revealed that racial or
ethnic minorities were sentenced more harshly than whites, either for all offenses or for some
types of offenses.
Mitchell (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 71 published and unpublished studies on
race (i.e., being black in comparison to being white) and sentencing outcomes. This analysis
included a mix of studies that used federal data and state level data. As a whole, the studies
found that even after taking into account offense seriousness and prior criminal history, blacks
were generally sentenced more harshly than whites. Mitchell (2005) also found that the
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magnitude of unwarranted disparity was generally statistically significant, but substantively
small and variable.
Based on the literature, it would appear that race influences sentencing outcomes to the
extent that methodological problems are eliminated. But if and how this factor influences child
pornography offenders and supervised release sentences is unknown. Few studies examine the
effects of extralegal factors on sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenders. Kaiser and
Spohn’s (2014) study is one of the few that does. They examined the effect of race and other
extralegal characteristics on the likelihood of downward departures for child pornography
offenders, and they found no differences by race. Patrick and Marsh (2011) examined whether
race and other non-legal factors had an impact on sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex
offenders (not specifically child pornography offenders) and also found that race was not related
to sentencing outcomes. However, race differences have not been explored for the sentence of
supervised release, which is a different consideration than the sentence of imprisonment because
federal judges consider general deterrence and incapacitation for the sentence of imprisonment,
but recidivism and community protection post-release (USSC, 2010).
Age effects.
Many empirical studies on sentencing outcomes fail to extensively address age (for
exceptions see Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). That is to say that age is
not the primary focus and is frequently used as a control variable (Steffensmeier, Kramer &
Ulmer, 1995; Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000). Studies that have examined the impact of age
on sentencing measure age in one of three ways: (1) a continuous variable; (2) two subgroups,
“young offenders” and “old offenders”; or (3) multiple narrowly defined categories. Models that
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code age as a continuous variable assume a linear effect (Klein, Petersilia & Turner, 1988; Myers
& Talarico, 1987; Wolfe et al., 2010).
In their review of studies that examine the influence of age as a continuous measure, Wu
and Spohn (2009) found that some studies concluded that older offenders were sentenced more
severely than those who were younger (e.g., Curry, Lee, & Rodriguez, 2004; Helms & Jacobs,
2002; Mustard, 2001) or that age was inversely correlated with prison terms (e.g., KempfLeonard & Sample, 2001; Spohn, 1990;Ulmer, 2000), whereas others found that age did not have
a significant effect (e.g., Bushway & Piehl, 2001; Chiricos & Bales, 1991; Engen & Gainey,
2000; Hebert, 1997; Johnson, 2006; Kautt & Spohn, 2002; Nobiling, Spohn, & DeLone, 1998;
Pasko, 2002; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996; Wooldredge, 2007).
Studies that analyze age into two subgroups “young offender” and “old offender” do so
because prior research has found that older offenders (age 50 and older) are sentenced more
leniently than younger offenders (under age 50) and, if imprisoned, older offenders receive
shorter sentence lengths (Champion, 1987; Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000). However, those
studies that compartmentalized age into more narrowly defined categories find that a curvilinear
relationship emerges with those adults ages eighteen to twenty-one receiving more lenient
sentences than adults ages twenty-one through twenty-nine but similar leniency for thirty to
thirty-nine year olds (Steffensmeier et al., 1995). Steffensmeier et al. (1998) argue that models
assuming a linear continuous age effect are inappropriate. Age influences sentence severity in a
curvilinear fashion and is best depicted by an inverted U-shape, with offenders over 50 or under
21 receiving the least severe sentences (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
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According to Wu and Spohn (2009), these mixed findings of age are not theoretically
inconsistent. In the case of the focal concerns notion of blameworthiness, Wu and Spohn
contend that if judges stereotype the crime of the youngest offenders as most harmful, then
sentencing decisions will produce a linear effect. Moreover, if judges stereotype the crime of the
oldest and youngest offenders as less harmful than those in their twenties and thirties, sentencing
decisions will produce a curvilinear effect. With regard to protection of the community, Wu and
Spohn (2009) note that if judges view younger offenders as more likely to recidivate, they may
receive a harsher punishment. But they also point out that if younger offenders are considered
more amenable to rehabilitation than offenders in the crime prone years, they may receive more
lenient sentences than similarly situated offenders in their twenties and thirties, and another
curvilinear effect would result. Likewise, they note that judges’ concerns about practical
constraints and consequences such as the offender’s ability to do time could produce either
longer or shorter sentences for young and old offenders.
Wu and Spohn (2009) conducted a meta-analysis to assess the magnitude of the effect of
age on sentence length. Their findings revealed that the age of the offender has no effect on the
length of the prison term and that the strength of the association between the two variables is
extremely weak. Kaiser and Spohn’s (2014) study of the likelihood of downward departures for
child pornography offenders also found that age was not statistically significant. In comparison,
Patrick and Marsh’s (2011) study of sentencing outcomes for child sex offenders found increases
in age of the offender increased the odds of being sentenced to prison.
Notwithstanding the above, we still do not know how age influences supervised release
sentences and in particular the supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders. It
seems likely that age may be a focal concern of judges as they consider the sentence of
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supervised release. For instance, age may speak to the focal concern of blameworthiness as
judges consider the discrepancy in age between the depicted minor in the child pornography
images and the age of the offender.28 Federal data for fiscal year 2010 found that child
pornography offenders ranged in age from 19 to 82 years of age with an average age of 42.26
years. So if judges stereotype the child pornography offenses of the youngest as being less
harmful because they are closer in age to the depicted minor, they may receive a shorter term of
supervised release than older offenders. Likewise, if judges stereotype the child pornography
crimes of the youngest as being less harmful because “they are ignorant of the law,” they may
receive a shorter term of supervised release than older offenders. And given that judges impose
the post-conviction supervised release sentence at the time sentence of imprisonment is imposed,
age may speak to the focal concern of practical constraints consequences. The average sentence
of imprisonment in FY 2010 for non-production offenses was 63 months and 160 months for
production offenses (USSC, 2012). Judges’ concerns about an offender’s ability to complete
supervised release may be a focal concern as the offender will be much older upon his release
from prison.29
Education effects.
While the guidelines cite the defendant’s education as generally irrelevant in determining
a sentence, some studies have nevertheless found that those offenders who are poorly educated
are sanctioned more harshly (Clarke & Koch, 1976; Kruttschnitt, 1980/1981). Mustard (2001)
found offenders who did not graduate from high school received longer sentences (having no
28

According to the USSC Sourcebook 2010, virtually all child pornography offenders (96.3%) possessed images of
minors who were prepubescent or under the age of twelve.
29

In my experiences in conducting presentence investigations of child pornography offenders in the Eastern District
of Missouri and observing the sentencing hearings of these cases, there was one judge who did consider the age of
the offender when determining the length of the supervised release sentence and would mention that he did not feel
that an offender should be elderly and still on supervised release. Thus, he rarely imposed lifetime supervised
release no matter the offense seriousness.
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high school diploma resulted in an additional 1.2 months). Offenders with college degrees
received shorter sentences than high school graduates. College graduates were more likely to
receive downward departures, less likely to receive upward departures, and more frequently
received large downward departures. Likewise, Albonetti’s (1997) study of 14,189 drug
offenders sentenced in federal court in 1991-92 found that offenders with higher levels of
educational attainment received shorter sentences. More recent research using federal data
reported similar findings. Specifically, Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson (2010) noted reductions in
sentence lengths for offenders with greater levels of education. Franklin (2015) found that
offenders who graduated from high school were less likely to be incarcerated than offenders who
did not graduate high school.
Franklin (2015) ties previous research findings of the effects of education and sentencing
outcomes to the focal concerns perspective. He surmises that offenders with higher levels of
education may be viewed as less risky or possessing the necessary skill set to meaningfully
contribute to society and remain crime free. In other words, it is possible that offenders’
education levels directly influence court actors’ perception of dangerousness and threat of future
offending.
Notwithstanding the above, studies focused specifically on child pornography offenders
found no effect of education on sentencing outcomes. For instance, Kaiser and Spohn (2014)
examined the effect of education on the likelihood of downward departures for child
pornography offenders. They found that education was not statistically significant. Patrick and
Marsh (2011) included education in their study of convicted child sex offenders and also found
that education was not related to sentencing outcomes. Given the findings of these two studies,
education may or may not be a factor that judges likely consider when imposing a sentence of

69

imprisonment for child pornography offenders. However, this factor has not specifically been
posed to the sentence of supervised release.
Socioeconomic effects.
Few studies examine the impact of socioeconomic status on sentencing outcomes because
there are few good indicators of this in most sentencing data (Zatz, 2000). This is true for USSC
datasets. In one of the few federal sentencing studies that examined socioeconomic status,
Mustard (2001) found that offenders with incomes less than $5,000 were sentenced most harshly.
This group received sentences 6.2 months longer than offenders who had incomes between
$25,000 and $35,000. Mustard also found that offenders with annual incomes of less than
$25,000 were less likely to have their sentences reduced, and offenders with annual incomes of
more than $35,000 were more likely to have their sentences reduced. Low-income offenders
were also more likely to receive upward departures.
Given the shortage of empirical literature examining socioeconomic status on federal
sentencing outcomes, I also reviewed research examining state-level data and socioeconomic
status. For example, Nobiling, Spohn and DeLone (1998) examined the effect of unemployment
on sentence severity using data for offenders sentenced in state courts in Chicago, Illinois and
Kansas City, Missouri. While unemployment was not considered a proxy for socioeconomic
status in their study, we know that employment status is often related to an individual’s income.
Nobiling et al. (1998) concluded that unemployment had a direct effect on the decision to
incarcerate in Kansas City and also had a direct effect on the sentence length in Chicago. They
also found that in Chicago, unemployment increased the odds of incarceration for young males
and for young Hispanic males and increased the sentence length for males, young males, and
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black males. In Kansas City, unemployment had no effect on sentence length for any subgroup
but influenced the decision to incarcerate for black males.
Family ties.
Under the previous mandatory federal guidelines, family support was generally irrelevant
in determining departures from the guidelines. In fact, one of the main provisions of the Protect
Act of 2003 was to amend the then-mandatory guidelines to prohibit judges from considering
family and community ties in cases involving a minor victim (Krohel, 2011). Now that the
guidelines are advisory in nature, these statuses may have become relevant for some judges
(Hamilton, 2011; Krohel, 2011). Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s (2011) review of sentencing
decisions of child pornography offenders found that in cases where defendants received
sentencing reductions, it was common for judges to express that they were impressed by the
defendant’s family support. One judge was quoted as saying “aside from the offense, the
defendant has led a law abiding life, and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout, he
has raised a good family and been a mainstay in his community.” (Hamilton, 2011, p.562).
Work by Daly (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b) appear to parallel Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s
(2011) assertion. Specifically, she indicates that family ties constitute social bonds that decrease
the likelihood of recidivism. In other words, the greater the stake in conformity judges believe
the offender to have, the more positively judges view the offender’s rehabilitative potential
(Logue, 2011).
Federal sentencing literature that examines family ties is sparse because the USSC no
longer collects data on marital status (USSC stopped collecting after FY 2003). Some studies
using federal data have included family ties – either marriage and/or number of dependents as
non-primary independent variables using data from the presentence report or data prior to FY
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2003 (Stacey & Spohn 2006; Wu & Spohn, 2010; Logue, 2011). Stacey and Spohn (2006)
examined the relationship between family ties and sentencing disparities in three U.S. district
courts. Specifically, they examined the interaction effects of gender and parental status. They
found that white females received more lenient sentences and that neither the defendants’ marital
status nor parental status had an effect on sentencing outcomes. Likewise, Wu and Spohn (2010)
found marriage did not have an effect on sentence length. Logue (2011) examined the influence
of family ties (marriage/dependents) on the likelihood of downward departures for drug
offenders. Like other studies, Logue found offenders with family ties were no more likely to
receive a downward departure than offenders without family ties.
Notwithstanding the above, we still do not know how family ties influence supervised
release sentences of child pornography offenders. As a rough proxy for family status, the
number of dependents a defendant has may be a factor judges consider when considering
supervised release decisions, including the impact the sentence and conditions may have on the
defendant’s dependents. This can be seen in one of two ways – detrimental impact or safety
concerns. In terms of having a detrimental impact, if a judge perceives the offender as having a
stable family life, a long supervised release sentence may inhibit the family from moving on and
cause instability. With regard to community protection, a judge may consider the defendant’s
dependents and whether the defendant’s instant offense poses any future risk or harm to the
defendant’s own children or society’s children. Kaiser and Spohn (2014) found the number of
dependents a defendant has had no effect on downward departures for child pornography
offenses.
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Citizenship.
Most sentencing studies that consider citizenship status treat it as a control variable.
Studies including citizenship status in analyses of sentencing decisions observed lengthier
sentences for noncitizens than for U.S. citizens (Albonetti, 1997; Hartley and Armendariz, 2011;
Mustard, 2001; Johnson and Betsinger, 2009; Wu, 2011; Wu & D’Angelo, 2014). Data from the
USSC reveal that noncitizens receive lengthier sentences and that these differences have
increased since the 2005 Booker decision (USSC, 2010). Other researchers found shorter
sentence lengths for noncitizens (Wolfe, Pyrooz & Spohn, 2011; Wu and Spohn, 2010), while
other studies find no effect (Demuth, 2002; Everett & Wojtkiewics, 2002; Kautt and Spohn,
2002). Again, with no prior studies using both the sentence of supervised release and the offense
of child pornography, it is unknown how citizenship may or may not influence supervised
release outcomes.
Summary of Extralegal Factors
In summary, both state and federal sentencing research conducted to date reveal that
sentencing outcomes are influenced by extralegal factors and supports the conclusion that legally
irrelevant factors appear to be a source of unwarranted sentencing disparity. We do not know
yet, if and how extralegal factors influence supervised release sentences of child pornography
offenders. As such, these extralegal variables known to influence federal sentencing outcomes
may influence supervised release decisions. Socioeconomic status which has been studied less in
the sentencing literature, is included in this study because of theoretical grounds. That is, there
are reasons to believe that socioeconomically advantaged child pornography offenders may be
treated more leniently than their disadvantaged counterparts. For the same reasons education,
citizenship and family ties are also included in this study. As the USSC does not collect data on
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mental health, substance abuse or employment, these factors will not be considered for study,
although these factors may have important implications for child pornography offenders and
supervised release sentences.
One of the biggest limitations of individual-level federal research is that it usually
combines data from multiple districts and does not consider if sentencing outcomes vary
depending on court context or if case-level factors operate differently across courts. Because of
this, this study also looks at whether court contextual factors have an influence on supervised
release sentencing outcomes. In the sections that follow, I review the court communities
perspective and the social/group threat perspective, followed by the empirical literature on court
level influences on sentencing outcomes.
Sentencing Disparities: Theoretical Explanations at the Court-Level
Court communities perspective.
The court communities perspective views courts as individual communities (Eisentein et
al., 1988) or distinctive social worlds (Ulmer, 1997) and is based on participants’ shared
workplace, interdependent working relations between key sponsoring agencies and distinctive
legal and organizational cultures (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Put another way, courts function
like separate individual communities with their own working norms, organizational relationships,
political climates. According to the court communities perspective, decision-making is
determined within the organizational structure of the court and broader cultural, political,
economic, and social context in which the court operates (Eisentein et al., 1988; Dixon, 1995).
In other words, judges do not make decisions in a social vacuum, but are influenced by their
social, political and organizational environment (Johnson, 2005). This environment includes the
ongoing working relationship with other court actors including the government, defense counsel,
and probation officers as well as the surrounding social and political environment.
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Court communities are said to have locally distinctive, informal and ever-evolving case
processing and sentencing norms or “going rates” (Eisentein et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997). This
reflects the attitudes, values, and norms that develop in an individual court community
concerning criminal behavior and “going rates” (Hester and Sevigny, 2016). Such “going rates”
provide courtroom work groups with “templates” for case processing strategies, including
adjudications and sentencing (Eisentein et al., 1988). The “going rates” of individual courts may
produce variation in case processing and sentence outcomes.
Based upon the description above, the 94 individual federal district courts comprising the
federal court system appear to fit within Eisentein et al.’s (1988) definition of court communities.
Kautt (2002) reached a similar conclusion explaining the court community concept within the
federal courts this way: The federal criminal justice system is comprised of 94 individual district
courts. The district courts are the federal systems primary trial courts. Each state has at least one
district court with some states having as many as four. There are 12 circuit courts which make
up the federal appellate courts and the de facto governing body for the district courts within
them. Each circuit court is comprised of three or more states with the exception of the District of
Columbia circuit. The district courts and the circuit courts make up what Kautt (2002) calls the
“Nested Model of Federal Sentencing.” This means for any case that enters the federal court,
that particular case is nested within an individual district court, operating within its own local
rules, case processing norms, “going rates” and sentencing norms. Finally, each district court is
nested within a circuit. Kautt (2002) illustrates this in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 about here

75

Figure 3.1 illustrates how individual cases are at the base, the district courts are in the middle and
the circuit court is at the top. This shows how cases are “nested” or “clustered” within the
contextual unit of analysis (district). Although not shown, the Supreme Court would be the apex.
Most importantly though, this model shows how variation in sentencing practices based on court
context is plausible based upon the structure of the federal courts and the court communities
perspective.
The concept of the court communities perspective operating in the federal judiciary is
more than just a notion. There is evidence suggestive of its existence. According to the Third
Branch (2001), the federal judiciary’s monthly print newsletter, the day to day operations and
responsibility for judicial administration lies with each individual district court. Specifically, the
chief judge of each district court plays a key leadership role in overseeing and coordinating the
efficient operations, practices, and policies of the court. Some of these practices and policies
include ensuring that the laws, regulations and court policies are followed. This includes
monitoring court caseloads; overseeing local rule making; establishing procedures for setting
trials; scheduling pretrial conferences; admitting attorneys to practice in the specific district; and
establishing the term of the court (Kautt, 2002; The Third Branch, 2001). This illustrates the
normative practices and “going rates” described by Eisentein et al., 1988.
Ulmer’s (2005) qualitative study of four U.S. District Courts also supports the court
communities perspective in terms of the existence of normative practices in federal courts.
Ulmer’s study was premised on the fact that the federal system provides a single set of federal
statutes and identical rules of procedures that are supposed to ensure uniformity and
predictability in sentencing. Ulmer found that each of the courts used key provisions of the
guidelines such as substantial assistance, acceptance of responsibility, and presentence
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investigation reports differently, which resulted in variations in punishment between the four
courts. He explained: “there are many ‘windows’ of localized discretion” and that “local court
community actors interpret guidelines and other federal justice policies differently, and use and
transform these in a variety of ways.” (p.272). Thus, the court communities perspective expects
there will be variation in district practices. Court contextual factors which may accounts for these
differences are discussed in greater detail toward the end of this chapter.
Based upon Ulmer’s (2005) study and the court communities perspective, differences in
district courts by way of court communities may translate not only into differences across courts,
but differences in the effects of individual-level factors across courts (Johnson et. al, 2008).
Indeed, the question of whether the effects of individual-level factors vary across courts was
asked by Kautt (2002) and Johnson (2006) in their respective multilevel sentencing studies. In
Kautt’s (2002) study of federal drug offenders, she found the effects of virtually all of the legal
and extralegal case-level factors with the exception of ethnicity, varied between districts. In
other words, the individual-level factors influenced sentencing outcomes differently from one
district to the next. Johnson (2006) reported similar findings in his study of the effects of judicial
characteristics and county court contexts using Pennsylvania sentencing data, suggesting that
different judges weigh the importance of individual offense and offender characteristics
differently, and the influence of these factors also varies across county contexts. The issue of
how much weight different courts give individual and case-level factors is also important for this
study. For example, border district courts like those in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas may apply more weight to citizenship status than courts like District of Iowa because these
districts have larger noncitizen populations. Accordingly, citizenship may carry more weight in
certain districts, leading the effect of citizenship to vary across district courts.
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In addition to the court communities perspective, other theoretical perspectives such as
the social group threat perspective (Blalock, 1967) indicate that the surrounding social
environment is key to explaining macro level sentencing outcomes.
Social/Group threat perspective.
The social/group threat perspective comes from Blalock’s (1967) research that says that
as a subordinate group increases in size, the dominant group will feel threatened and in turn inpart methods of social control to maintain their superior status. In other words, criminal law and
punishment are used as tools for containing groups identified as threatening by those in power
(Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). The dominant group aims to control the perceived threat of the
subordinate group because an increase in size is thought to precipitate an increase in power of the
subordinate group (Wu and D’Angelo, 2014).
Historically, blacks and Hispanics are regarded as persons/groups to be feared or groups
considered a threat to the status quo. Consequently, the social/group threat perspective is
frequently used in examination of racial/ethnic group threat to explain variations in criminal
punishment; however, much of the research has shown little to no support (Britt, 2000; Bridges,
Crutchfield & Simpson, 1987; Johnson, Ulmer & Kramer, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004;
Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011). Although this may be true, social/group threat is a broad concept
that is not limited to analysis of race. Recent work on criminal sentencing extends to the
perceived threat posed by Hispanics and noncitizens (Johnson, Stewart, Pickett & Gertz, 2011;
Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Wu and D’Angelo, 2014). For example, Wu and D’Angelo (2014)
examined noncitizen group as a potential social/group threat in criminal punishment and
sentencing to explain aggregate level group outcomes at the federal level. They found support
for the social/group threat perspective in that judges in districts with a large noncitizen
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population imposed longer sentences on noncitizen offenders than those districts with a small
noncitizen population. Despite research on social/group threat and sentencing outcomes, no
research has extended threat conceptualized as a court contextual factor such as the child
pornography caseload rate and its effect on sentencing outcomes.
I assert the social/group threat perspective may be particularly relevant in explaining
sentencing variations across courts for child pornography cases. This is because of the
analogous features to moral panic and punitive legislation of child pornography offenses. To
illustrate, as panic rises, child pornography offenders are perceived as more threatening and
dangerous, calling for increased prosecution, severe sentences, and social control. Take for
example the Protect Act of 2003 and its specific provisions for supervised release. This act
lengthened the supervised release term from a maximum of three years to a minimum of five
years to life. Congress’s basis for the increase was belief that child pornography offenders have
deep-seated disorders that are not likely to disappear after release from imprisonment (Shockley,
2010). This rationale employed by Congress suggests that child pornography offenders are a
threat to society and children in particular. It also suggests the only way to minimize or mitigate
this threat is through long-term or lifelong monitoring of these offenders. Thus, the size of a
child pornography caseload in a particular district may affect sentencing decisions, such that
districts with large child pornography caseloads may be perceived as threatening to the status
quo.
To summarize, the court communities perspective and the social/group threat perspective
provide a theoretical basis for my inclusion of district-level court contextual and environmental
factors to explain supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders and why these
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sentences may vary across courts. The next section reviews the empirical literature on the
impact of court contextual factors on sentencing outcomes.
Empirical Literature Court Context
Sentencing research considering court contexts has been spurred in large part by the court
communities perspective and its recognition that judicial decision-making is determined within
the organizational structure of the court and larger court environment (Eisentein et al., 1988;
Dixon, 1995). Examples of organizational contextual factors include court size, region,
guidelines compliance, and caseload pressure. Examples of the surrounding social environment
of the court include the crime rate, unemployment rate, political ideology, racial composition,
and socioeconomic disadvantage. These organizational and environmental contextual factors are
theorized to influence sentencing outcomes.
Sentencing research examining court context has done so in three ways (1) the cross
jurisdictional approach; (2) pooled statewide data; and (3) multilevel modeling. The cross
jurisdictional approach as described by Britt (2000), assumes the effect of social context is
indirect. This approach examines sentencing decisions across a small number of jurisdictions
and compares the results of separate regression models for each jurisdiction or includes
jurisdiction as a dummy variable (Eisentein, Fleming and Nardulli, 1988; Ulmer and Kramer,
1996; Albonetti, 1997). Some studies using the cross jurisdictional approach have examined the
impact of the size of the jurisdiction (Eisentein et al., 1988; Eisentein and Jacob, 1977), while
others have examined urban, suburban, or rural jurisdiction (Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Ulmer,
1997). The drawbacks of the cross jurisdictional approach are that they focus on a small number
of jurisdictions and preclude large scale generalizations to other courts (Britt, 2000; Ulmer and
Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase, and Schulz, 2005). Moreover, comparing the effects of
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jurisdictional dummy variables fails to show what contextual features condition variation in
sentencing (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).
The second way court context has been examined is via sentencing decisions that pool
statewide sentencing data to allow for the simultaneous study of numerous jurisdictions
(Weidner et al., 2005). For instance, Dixon (1995) studied sentencing outcomes in 73 counties
in Minnesota and found a direct contextual effect for level of bureaucratization. In the same
way, Steffensmeier, Kramer and Streifel (1993) examined sentencing outcomes of 67 counties in
Pennsylvania and found direct contextual effects for racial composition and political
conservatism. Myers and Talarico’s (1987) study used data from all the counties in Georgia.
They also found contextual effects for racial composition and urbanization. The main drawback
of these studies is that they used ordinary least squares regression and/or logistic regression to
study sentence length and/or the decision to incarcerate.
The third way that contextual factors have been studied in the literature is through
multilevel models which remedy the single-level statistical approach mentioned above. Britt
(2000) and Kautt (2002) were among the first researchers to use multilevel models to consider
context. For example, Britt (2000) examined the simultaneous relationship between court
context and racial disparities in sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania courts using data from
1991 to 1994. He found that the mean likelihood of incarceration and the mean sentence length
varies by the county in which the court is located. Additionally, Britt found that racial disparities
vary by court jurisdiction even after controlling for other offender and case characteristics.
Kautt (2002) used federal data to examine the influence of individual-level legal and
extralegal factors and district-level contextual factors on sentencing decisions for drug
trafficking cases. She used several court contextual factors she theorized as being related to
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sentence length including drug crime caseload, size of population, appeal rate, substantial
assistance rate, guidelines compliance rate, percentage of Hispanics in the population, percentage
of blacks in the population and the unemployment rate. She included drug-crime caseload and
size of the population as indicators of the impact that a district’s workload may have on
sentencing outcomes. Likewise, district appeal rate served as an indicator of lower work-group
cooperation. Both guidelines compliance rate and substantial assistance rate gauge the influence
of the guidelines on sentencing outcomes. Finally, the district unemployment rate and
percentage of black and Hispanics were included to test if demographics of the district affected
sentence length. Few of the contextual measures Kautt examined had a direct effect on sentence
length. Specifically, she found no effect for population size, drug caseload, district-level
minority composition or unemployment rate. She did find that the departure rate of the district
was significantly related to sentence length.
Following Kautt (2002), Ulmer and Johnson (2004) utilized Pennsylvania data and
examined a wide variety of direct contextual effects and cross-level interactions on sentencing
decisions from 1997 to 1999. They used more extensive court characteristics and jurisdiction,
including crime rate, poverty rate, unemployment rate, trial rate, judicial caseload, jurisdiction
size, racial/ethnic composition, jail space, and local politics. They found that most of the
variation in sentencing existed at the individual case-level, and most of the variance in
sentencing outcomes was explained by individual case-level factors. They did find significant
between-county variation in sentencing that was not explained by individual case-level factors
and that the effects of individual case-level predictors themselves varied significantly across
counties. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) found that court caseload pressure and racial/ethnic
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composition of jurisdictions affect sentencing outcomes both directly and/or in interaction with
individual case-level factors.
Weider et al. (2005) used a combination of individual-level and county-level contextual
data from a national sample of criminal trial court cases in large urban jurisdictions. They
examined several contextual factors including sentencing guidelines, the availability of
alternative sanctions, crime rate, political conservatism, racial composition, and economic
disadvantage. Results from hierarchical logistic regression analyses that control for the effects of
individual-level factors found that use of sentencing guidelines, crime rate, and racial
composition influenced the decision to incarcerate.
While many studies on court contextual influences on sentencing outcomes use state level
data (Britt, 2000; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), Kautt (2002) explains that it is not unreasonable to
expect similar differences across federal courts despite its uniform appearance of structured
sentences. Anderson and Spohn (2009) further explain:
Although decision-makers in the federal criminal justice system are guided by a more
uniform set of statutes and policies than those in the states, it does not necessarily follow
that this will eliminate inter-district disparity or produce consistent sentencing across
similarly situated offenders. Like courts at the state level, U.S. District Courts differ on a
number of dimensions, such as different caseloads and different policies and practices
regarding upward and downward departures, and these differences may influence case
processing procedures and case outcomes (p. 367).
Still, research on federal guideline sentencing has focused almost exclusively on case-level
influences (Kautt, 2002). Many studies that did consider court context, did so cursorily in that
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dummy variables were used for geographic regions, districts and circuits (Steffensmeier and
Demuth, 2000; Everett and Wojtkiewics, 2002; Kautt and Spohn, 2002). According to Johnson,
Ulmer and Kramer (2008), the focus of this work is on controlling for jurisdictional variation
rather than on investigating it.
Recent multilevel federal sentencing research continues to emphasize the importance of
contextual influences on sentencing outcomes. For example, Johnson et al. (2008) examined
interdistrict variations in the applications of downward departures from the federal sentencing
guidelines. They found that substantial variation exists in the probability of prosecutor-initiated
substantial assistance departures and judge-initiated downward departures. This variation is
accounted for in part by organizational court contexts, such as caseload pressures, and by
environmental considerations such as racial composition of the district.
In short, the literature finds that court context is an important consideration in judicial
decision-making. While I discussed many of these contextual factors generally, in the following
section, I review some of these contextual factors in-depth, particularly ones that will be used in
this dissertation.
Theorized Impact of Court Contextual Factors on Supervised Release Sentencing Decisions
In addition to individual-level legal and extralegal factors, this dissertation assesses the
impact of district-level court contextual and environmental factors that have found to be
influential in prior multilevel studies, as well as court contextual factors theorized to specifically
influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography cases. The impact of
seven contextual factors is assessed: court size, caseload pressure, guidelines compliance rate,
the Supreme Court decision in Kimbrough v. U.S., mandatory minimum state-level penalties for

84

possession of child pornography, political conservatism, and region. In addition to examining the
direct effects of these district-level court contextual factors, this dissertation also examines if the
effects of individual-level variables on sentence length can be explained by characteristics of the
court and district.
Court size (district size).
Eisenstein et al. (1988) maintain that the size of a court community shapes crucial aspects
of its operations. They note that size can be defined in several ways – the number of people
living within its jurisdiction, the number of judges, or the number of people at the core of the
court community. They further maintain that increasing size of a court jurisdiction leads to
greater diversity of interests and greater obstacles to forging a narrow consensus. In other words,
a smaller court jurisdiction would likely have a more narrow interest which in turn would
dominate leading to a greater likelihood of consensus. In contrast, larger court communities are
said to have more diversified interests, reduced media visibility in routine case processing,
greater bureaucratization of sponsoring agencies such as the U.S. Attorney’s office and the
Federal Public Defender’s office, greater use of plea bargaining, and a normative tolerance or
desensitization of deviant/criminal behavior (Eisentein et al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997; Johnson et. al,
2008).
Court size is salient in the federal system as the 94 judicial districts vary in size. The
image in Figure 3.2 shows the 94 judicial districts, including at least one in each state, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The three territories of the U.S. including the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, have district courts that hear federal cases.
The federal circuits are labeled with number one through eleven, with the District of Columbia
representing the twelfth circuit.
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Figure 3.2 about here
Court size is determined by the congressionally authorized number of judges in a district
(Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). This number is based on shifting population
numbers or a changing workload in that district. From time to time Congress will increase or,
less frequently, decrease the number of federal judgeships in a particular judicial district. The
authorized judgeship number does not include senior judges or magistrate judges. 30
Several federal districts have only 1 or 2 authorized judgeships, whereas others like the
Central District of California have as many as 28. Based upon Eisenstein et al.’s (1988)
hypothesis as well as the court communities perspective, larger size districts like the Central
District of California would likely yield less severe sentences. Johnson et al., 2008 looked at the
effects of district-level factors, including court size, on interdistrict variation in the application of
downward departures from the federal sentencing guidelines. They used the number of
authorized judges as their measure of court size and found no evidence that larger districts were
more likely to grant downward departures. Even so, other research using the court community
framework finds that sentence severity is inversely related to court community size (Ulmer,
1997; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). For example, Ulmer and Johnson
(2004), using Pennsylvania sentencing data, found that larger courts were least likely to
incarcerate offenders and smaller courts had more severe sentences.

30

Magistrate judges are referred to as federal judges, but are neither appointed by the President nor confirmed by
the Senate. A senior judge is a federal judge who has met the age and service requirement. Senior judges, who
essentially provide volunteer service to the courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts’ workload
annually.
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Despite these inconsistent findings, court size is included in this study because we do not
know how this factor influences supervised release outcomes and it seems likely that larger
courts may get less attention and less scrutiny for sentences they impose. This may be
particularly important for child pornography offenses because these are often high profile cases.
Caseload pressure.
Varying child pornography caseload rates between districts could affect supervised
release sentences. A few empirical studies have examined caseload as a correlate of sentencing
outcomes. For example, Myers and Talarico (1987) found that caseload pressure reduced the
severity of split sentences and resulted in slightly shorter sentence lengths. Results from Ulmer
and Johnson’s (2004) study of sentencing outcomes for county trial courts in Pennsylvania
indicate that caseload pressure affects sentencing outcomes either directly, or in interaction with
individual factors. Johnson et al., (2008) found that caseload pressure was significantly
associated with an increased probability of both downward departures from judges and
substantial assistance from the prosecutor. Still other studies found no influence of caseload
pressure on sentencing outcomes (Kautt, 2002). Johnson et al. (2008) surmise that it is possible
that it may be the particular type of caseload that matters for sentencing decisions. As an
example, they noted that a high violent caseload may exert a different effect than a high property
caseload. This may be true of a child pornography caseload. According to the USSC fiscal year
2010 data, non-production child pornography cases were prosecuted in every circuit and district,
but the number of cases in each circuit and district varied substantially (USSC, 2012). 31

31

With respect to the 94 districts, non-production cases occurred most frequently in the Eastern District of Missouri
(72, 3.7% of all such cases), the Central District of California (70, 3.6% of all such cases), the Middle District of
Florida (60, 3.1% of all such cases), the Eastern District of Virginia (54, 2.8% of all such cases), the Western
District of Texas (49, 2.5% of all such case), the Southern District of Florida (45, 2.3% of all such cases), and the
Eastern District of California (41, 2.1% of all such cases). These seven districts accounted for 20.3 percent of all
non-production cases in 2010.
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Variation in scope and volume of child pornography cases is vastly different from one district to
the next. It may be possible that this variation in caseload volume may influence and shape
supervised release sentencing practices. Specifically, districts with a higher volume of child
pornography cases may conclude that these offenses are problematic or large scale problems.
This may influence supervised release sentence outcomes in that judges may sentence more
harshly if they are routinely sentencing these types of cases, particularly if community protection
is of concern. This may then lead to “going rates” or a normative practice of how such cases are
sentenced in districts witnessing high volume. But judges could also sentence more leniently if
these cases become viewed as common.
Guidelines compliance rate.
Some research on court level contextual factors also suggests that guideline compliance
rates may influence sentencing outcomes beyond the impact of individual-level factors. For
instance, Kautt (2002) found that both the guidelines compliance rate and the rate of substantial
assistance departures influenced sentence length outcomes for federal drug trafficking offenders.
It appears appropriate that this contextual factor is included in the data analyses because districts
that generally comply with the guidelines may also comply with any policy statements contained
therein. Therefore, districts that generally comply with the guidelines may be more likely to
impose lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.
Kimbrough-based policy disagreement.
Another district-level factor theorized to influence supervised release sentence length is
the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Kimbrough (2007) and the resulting circuit courts split on
whether its application can be applied to child pornography sentencing. Recall, the Kimbrough
decision held that judicial departures based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines (i.e,
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crack cocaine guideline) are permissible. There is a circuit split among the circuit courts on
whether district courts can apply the decision in Kimbrough to child pornography offenses.
According to Kaiser and Spohn (2014), appellate decisions in circuits that have rejected the
application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements for non-production child pornography
offenses include the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 11th circuits. Federal circuits that have allowed
policy disagreements for non-production offenses include the 1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th circuits.
It appears appropriate to consider and include this contextual factor in the current
dissertation because at the heart of child pornography supervised release sentencing schemata is
the policy statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervised release. Likewise, the heart of
Kimbrough is the latitude for judicial downward departures based on a policy disagreement with
the guidelines. As such, circuit courts that authorize their lower district courts to depart from the
guidelines in child pornography cases based on such policy disagreements may impose
supervised release sentences other than life because they disagree with the policy statement of
the supervised release guidelines for child pornography offenders. Kaiser and Spohn (2014)
looked at this variable in their study of downward departures among non-production child
pornography offenders. They found statistical significance of a case receiving a downward
departure if the case was sentenced in a circuit that rejected policy disagreements for child
pornography offenders.
Mandatory minimum state-level penalties.
One of the main assumptions of the court communities perspectives is that the broader
social environment in which a court is located may influence sentencing outcomes. This means
that judges are likely sensitive or cognizant of the broader social environment including the
social/legal environment. As such, while this dissertation is concerned with federal child
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pornography offenses, a district-level contextual factor seemingly relevant to test is the influence
of state-level penalties for possession of child pornography on supervised release sentencing
outcomes. This contextual factor considers the influence of the broader social/legal environment
of the district court as it specifically relates to child pornography. This may be important
because child pornography is also criminalized at the state level and vary by state. According to
Hessick (2010):
States have...significantly increased their penalties [for child pornography offenses during
the same time period that Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission have
done so at the federal level]. All 50 states have specific provisions criminalizing the
possession of child pornography, and thirty states have increased penalties available for
possession of child pornography since criminalizing it. The pattern of increasing
penalties appears to be getting stronger, as twenty-eight of those increases have occurred
since 2000, nineteen have occurred since 2005, and four states have increased penalties
associated with possession of child pornography multiple times in the past twenty years
(p.5).
For example, Louisiana has a mandatory minimum of five to twenty years for possession
of child pornography and Missouri has a mandatory minimum of five to fifteen years for
possession of more than 20 images of child pornography. Mandatory minimum state-level
penalties may speak to how serious child pornography offenses are considered and/or the level of
moral panic in a state. Therefore, it is theorized that a district court located in a state with
mandatory minimum state-level penalties for child pornography may perceive child pornography
as a large scale moral problem or social group threat and thus yield more severe supervised
release sentences.
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Political conservatism.
According to research by Eisentein et al. (1988), political contexts shape sentencing
practices. They explain that judges, who are typically selected from the local community, are
likely to share the community’s values. Research on political influence and sentencing outcomes
are mixed. Some studies using a single-level analysis to assess contextual factors on individuallevel sentence length have found that political ideology, defined as the percent who voted
Republican in presidential election, has a positive influence on sentence length (Nardulli,
Fleming and Eisentein, 1988; Huang, Finn Ruback and Friedmann, 1996). For instance,
Nardulli, Fleming & Eisentein (1988), in their examination of political conservatism, used the
percentage of residents who voted for Republican candidates in local and presidential elections
as their measure of political ideology. They found that political conservatism was positively
related to sentence length for repeat offenders. Huang et. al (1996) found that political
conservatism had a positive effect on sentence length for violent crime, robbery, and assault.
In contrast, some studies using multilevel analyses have not found that the percentage
voting Republican has a significant effect on either the odds of incarceration or sentence length
(Johnson, 2005; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Weidner, Frase & Schultz, 2005). One explanation
that has been espoused is that toughness on crime has become a universal campaign theme for
both Democrats and Republicans (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Another explanation is that federal
judges are insulated from political influences due to lifetime appointment to the bench.
All the same, findings from previous studies lead me to hypothesize that the political
community in which the district court is situated may influence judges to reflect the values of the
local community context in their decision-making. For instance, a district court situated in a
state dominated by conservatism, may feel pressure to reflect the community’s value in their
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decision-making. Accordingly, a more punitive political milieu may result in lengthier terms of
supervised release.
Region.
Prior to the passage of the SRA, Congress recognized differences among judges in
sentencing philosophy and differences among regions in sentencing practices as sources of
unwarranted extralegal disparity (Rigsby, 2010). Sentencing research in the 1970’s sponsored by
the Department of Justice showed that judicial officers placed differing importance on various
factors depending on the region in which they practiced (Sutton, 1978; Rhodes & Conly, 1981).
Later sentencing research also showed differences in sentencing outcomes by region. For
instance, Albonetti (1997) reported that the probability and length of imprisonment for drug
offenses sentenced in the early years of the guidelines was affected by region in about half of the
circuits, after controlling for offense level, criminal history points, and a number of other legally
relevant factors. Everett and Wojtkiewicz (2002) grouped the circuits into five regions and
reported harsher sentencing in the southern circuits and more lenient sentencing in the
northeastern and western circuits.
Summary of Court Context
In sum, the importance of considering court context cannot be overstated in sentencing
research. This is because characteristics of the court may also influence sentencing decisions.
Moreover, various aspects of the community in which a court is situated may indirectly affect
judicial decisions as judges are likely drawn from the community they represent and are not
immune to social or legal influences of the community (Eisentein et. al, 1988; Huang et. al,
1996). Accordingly, both the court communities perspective and the social group threat
perspective are well-suited for organizing many of the familiar court contextual factors theorized
to affect supervised release sentences at the aggregate level.
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Current Study
This dissertation hopes to extend sentencing literature by presenting a multilevel analysis
of supervised release sentencing outcomes for child pornography offenses using individual-level
offender and district-level data. My aim is to uncover the circumstances under which variability
and disparity in supervised release sentences emerge. This includes an examination of the
effects of legal and extralegal individual-level factors as well as district-level factors on
supervised release outcomes.
Research questions.
My research questions, which are guided by theory and previous empirical research on
sentencing disparities, are as follows:
1. What proportion of the variability in supervised release sentences is at the
individual-level versus the district-level?
2. What individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables account for variability in
supervised release sentences?
2A. Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of supervised release
sentences differ across offense type (nonproduction versus production)?
3. Above and beyond individual-level variables, are district-level factors related to
supervised release sentencing outcomes?
4. Do the effects of individual-level variables on sentence length differ across
courts? If so, can these differences be explained by characteristics of the court
and district?
Hypotheses.
Using the focal concerns perspective, the court communities perspective, social/group
threat, and prior sentencing research as background, the following hypotheses frame this
dissertation:
Hypothesis 1: Sentence severity will vary significantly across courts.
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Hypothesis 2: Legally relevant factors will explain the majority of variation in supervised
release outcomes, but extra-legal factors will also matter.
Hypothesis 3: The seriousness of the offense will moderate the effect of legal and extralegal variables such that these factors will have less of an effect when the
offense charge is more serious.
Hypothesis 4: The effects of individual-level sentencing factors will vary across courts.

Hypotheses 5: Above and beyond individual-level variables, district-level factors will
have an effect on supervised release sentences.

As there is no research on the sentence of supervised release, not enough is known to
hypothesize the direction of all effects.
In this chapter, I have reviewed theoretical frameworks and the empirical research from
which I have speculated about the relationship between individual-level variables and districtlevel variables and supervised release sentencing outcomes. In the next chapter, I describe the
data, methods, and analytical strategy to answer the research questions.
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The Nested Model of Federal Sentencing

Circuit

District

District

Case 1a

Case 1b

Source: Kautt (2002)
Figure 3.1 The Nested Model of Federal Sentencing
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Geographic Boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeal and U.S. District Courts

Source: USSC’s 2012 report to Congress on Federal Child Pornography Offenses
Figure 3.2 Geographic Boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS

Data
I address my research questions using a combination of individual-level sentencing data
and district-level contextual data. The individual-level data come from the USSC dataset for
fiscal year 2012, which includes information on all federal offenders sentenced between October
1, 2011 and September 30, 2012. This fiscal year was selected because it marks a significant
statutory change to the maximum sentence of imprisonment for possession of child pornography,
raising the penalties from 10 years to 20 years (see Table 2.1). The USSC datasets for individual
offenders contain measures of (1) legal or court-related case processing information (e.g.,
criminal history variables, departures/variances, guideline enhancements/reductions); (2)
extralegal characteristics (e.g., gender, race, educational level, age); and (3) case and sentence
outcomes. I supplemented these individual-level data with district-level contextual factors
tabulated and compiled from USSC 2012 Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Statistics;
2012 Federal Court Management Statistics (FCMS); the Federal Election Commission’s 2013
report on the 2012 Federal Elections; and the USSC’s 2012 study of child pornography
offenses.32
Following the methodology employed by Kautt (2002), who also conducted a multilevel
analysis of federal sentencing data, this dissertation only includes those federal districts that fall
within states. Kautt (2002) explained that since states have additional authorities and privileges
than territories, treating territories as comparable may introduce nonrandom bias. Thus, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not included.
Additionally, since I am examining a district-level contextual factor that includes whether a
32

FCMS provide information about the judicial caseload profile of each federal district on an annual basis.
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mandatory minimum state-level penalty for child pornography is in effect in the state in which
the district court is situated, Washington DC is also excluded. After omitting these district
courts, 89 district courts remain (see Table 4.1 for a list).
The final individual-level data set for the analyses includes 1,900 males convicted of
child pornography. This final number excludes cases where a term of supervised release was not
imposed (n=29).33 Women offenders were also excluded as they made up such a small
percentage of the total sample (n=24). Likewise, all cases wherein the child pornography
guideline (Sections 2G2.2 or 2G2.1) was not used in the guidelines sentencing computation were
excluded (n=30). This can happen in one of two ways. The first way is when there is a cross
reference to another guideline. For example, Section 2G2.1 (production guideline) has a cross
reference to apply the guideline for murder (Section 2A1.1) if the victim was killed (USSC
Guidelines Manual, 2012). The second way is when an individual is convicted of multiple
counts involving different offenses. The guideline in Section 3D1.3 provides that in instances of
multiple counts, courts are to group the offenses and apply the guideline comprising the more
serious offense (USSC Guidelines Manual, 2012). For example, if an individual is convicted of
possession of child pornography and distribution of cocaine, the guideline for drug distribution
(Section 2D1.1) would be used because this charge is more serious in terms of the range of
punishment for the sentence of imprisonment.
Measures
Dependent Variables
Supervised Release. For this study, supervised release sentencing decisions can be
conceptualized in two ways: the decision to impose lifetime supervision; or, if life is not
33

If a case is sentenced to probation instead of a term of imprisonment, supervised release is not imposed.
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imposed, the length of the supervised release term. It is important to look at both these
dependent variables because the guidelines policy statement in Section 5D1.2(b)(2) prescribes
lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders. But we know that judges give
out lifetime supervised release in over a third of cases (Vinyard, 2016). I therefore model these
two sentencing decisions as follows: (1) The decision to impose lifetime supervised release was
coded 1 if the offender was sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 0 if the offender was not
sentenced to lifetime supervised release; (2) Supervised release length is defined as a continuous
variable measured in months. Because of the skewness in the sentence length data, I use the log
transformation of supervised release length. 34 The log transformation normalizes the skewed
distribution. While scholars have taken a variety of approaches to coding life sentences, I
followed the USSC in top-coding lifetime supervised release at 470 months. I therefore use 470
months to represent the maximum supervised release sentence. 35
In addition to the skewness revealed by histogram, the shape of the distribution of
supervised release sentence length is not normal (Kologorov-Smirnov significance value is .000
suggesting violation of the assumption of normality; kurtosis value is -1.584). A preliminary
view of the data revealed a lot of clumping. For example, 19% of cases received five years
supervised release, 25% received ten years, 8.9% received fifteen years, 5.6% received twenty
years, 1.9% received twenty-five years, 1.5% received thirty years, and 33.2% received lifetime
supervised release. The remainder of the cases received sentences other than those just
described. Based upon the distribution of the data, I found it appropriate to create and include an
ordinal dependent variable based upon meaningful categories of the data. Specifically, I created
34

Skewness = .425; Standard error of skewness = .056
There were 11 cases in this dataset that received supervised release sentences greater than 470 months. These
cases were recoded to represent lifetime supervised release.
35

99

four categories: short-term supervised release (cases that received sentences of 60 months or
less); intermediate term supervised release (sentences ranging between 72 and 120 months of
supervised release); long-term supervised release (sentences ranging between 121 months and
420 months)36; and lifelong supervised release (cases sentenced to 470 months).
Individual-Level Independent Variables. The independent variables used in the analyses are
legal variables and extralegal variables hypothesized to affect sentencing outcomes (Albonetti,
1997; Mustard, 2001; Spohn, 2006).
Legal Measures
Mode of Conviction (Plea). Plea bargaining is a common practice in the federal criminal justice
system. Approximately 97 percent of convictions in federal courts (FY 2012) were the result of
plea bargaining (USSC Sourcebook, 2012). Research has found that plea bargaining can reduce
sentence severity (Kautt, 2002). This variable was dichotomized so that a value of 1 represents
the defendant pled guilty either through a guilty plea or nolo contendere. 37 A value of 0 indicates
that the defendant had a trial (bench or jury).
Departure. Courts can sentence an individual within the specified guideline range or impose an
upward departure/variance or a downward departure/variance. 38 Departure is measured with a
categorical variable (e.g., within guideline sentence, upward departure/variance, downward

36

There were no cases with a supervised release sentence ranging between 121 to 143 months.
Nolo contendere is a plea wherein the defendant neither admits nor disputes a charge, serving as an alternative to a
pleading of guilty or not guilty.
37

38

An upward or downward departure is a sentence that is greater or less than the advisory guideline range based
upon the application of departure policy statements in the guidelines. An upward or downward variance refers to a
sentence above or below the advisory guideline range based upon the court’s weighing of one or more sentencing
factors of 18 U.S.C 3553(a).
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departure/variance [inclusive of all possible categories of downward departures and variances
including substantial assistance]), with within guideline sentence as the reference category. 39
Criminal History. This continuous variable is the final criminal history score as determined by
the sentencing court. The criminal history score, which ranges from 1 to 6, is calculated based
upon the total criminal history points calculated from Section 4A1.1 of the federal sentencing
guidelines. The higher the score, the greater the criminal history. A higher criminal history score
generally results in greater sentence severity.
Sex Offender Enhancement. This variable indicates whether an enhancement of Repeat and
Dangerous Sex Offender (see Chapter Four, Section 4B1.5 of the 2012 USSC Guidelines Manual
2012) was applied at sentencing. This enhancement is applied if the court finds that the offender
committed the current federal offense subsequent to sustaining at least one sex offense
conviction. This variable is coded as 0 if the enhancement was not applied and 1 if it was
applied.
Offense Severity Score. This continuous variable indicates the final offense level as determined
by the court (which ranges from 1 to 43). Higher offense levels result in greater sentence
severity.
Number of Counts of Conviction. This variable indicates the number of counts of conviction.
For example, an individual convicted of three counts of child pornography is subject to three
terms of supervised release whereas an individual convicted of a single-count of child
39

Substantial assistance refers to information proffered by the defendant to the government that leads to the
prosecution and conviction of another offender(s). I selected to keep this measure a three-category measure rather
than a four-category measure (separating out substantial assistance and treating it as a separate category). This is
because child pornography offenses are unique in that a computer is used nearly 100% of the time. As such, law
enforcement can obtain computer IP address information to investigate any involvement of others. Therefore, the
assistance of the defendant is not as necessary as is more common for drug conspiracies (Stacey and Spohn, 2006).
In the current data, offenders receiving substantial assistance accounted for only 72 cases or 3.8%.
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pornography is subject to a single term of supervised release. It should be noted that regardless
of the number of terms of supervised release, all terms run concurrently. This variable is
included because it may speak to blameworthiness or community protection. For example, a
sentencing court may believe that an offender convicted of multiple counts of child pornography
is more culpable and thus warrants longer community supervision as opposed to an individual
convicted of a single-count.
Detention Status. This binary variable indicates the offender’s presentence detention status.
This variable is scored 1 if the offender is detained and a 0 if the offender is on bond. Detention
status may speak to risk and/or community protection. Generally, for offenders to be detained
prior to sentencing, there are risk factors present in the defendant’s background such as failing to
appear or violence. A defendant may also be detained before trial or sentencing if the statute
mandates detention based on the seriousness of the charge. 40
Offense Type. The USSC categorizes all child pornography offenses, including possession,
receipt, transportation, distribution and production, into one offense group. For the purposes of
this dissertation, the data will be disaggregated into two groups – non-production offenses and
production offenses. Non-production offenses include possession, receipt, transportation and
distribution. Offenders convicted for these offenses are sentenced under 18 USC 2252 or 2252A
of the U.S. Code for Crime and Criminal Procedures. The applicable federal sentencing
guideline for non-production offenses fall under Section 2G2.2. Non-production offenses
involve child pornography images in which offenders had no actual contact with minors.
Production offenses, which involve the actual physical abuse of minors in making or attempting

40

Mandatory detention at arrest applies to all child pornography offenses except for possession of child
pornography. Mandatory detention at the plea and sentencing hearings apply to all child pornography offenses.
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to make child pornography images, are sentenced under 18 USC 2251 or 2260 of the U.S. Code
for Crime and Criminal Procedures. The applicable federal sentencing guideline for production
offenses fall under Section 2G2.1. The legal literature typically divides child pornography
offenses into these two types because most of the disparity in sentences generally arises from
non-production offenses (Rigsby, 2010, Krohel, 2011). This variable is scored 1 for nonproduction cases and 0 for production cases.
Extralegal Measures
Age. This variable is defined as the age of the defendant at the time of sentencing. Consistent
with research that delineates age into two subgroups “young offenders” and “old offenders”
(Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000), as well as the fact that the average age of my sample is 41.41,
I coded defendant age as a dichotomous variable, where 0 represents offenders ages 19-49 and a
1 represents offenders ages 50 and over. I did not code age as a continuous variable because
preliminary modeling showed that the effect of age was not linear. I also conducted a
preliminary analysis of the age variable using a three category measure (19-21; 22-49; and 50
and over), as suggested by Steffensmeier et al. (1998). There was no significant difference in the
likelihood of lifetime supervised between those ages 19 to 21 and 22 to 49, which suggests that
my two-category measure of age is appropriate.
Race. This variable indicates the defendant’s race self-reported to the probation officer at the
time the presentence report was prepared. Because the sample is mostly white (86.5%), this
variable was dichotomized such that a value of 1 represents whites and a 0 value represents
nonwhites. The nonwhite category is inclusive of defendants identified as black (3.5%),
Hispanic (8.9%) and other (1.1%).
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Education. This variable indicates the highest level of education completed by the defendant.
Education is a categorical variable (e.g., less than high school, high school graduate, some
college, and college graduate), with high school graduate as the reference category. This
measure is similar to the one used by Mustard (2001), who found differences in sentence length
based on levels of education. According to Franklin (2015), these four categories are
meaningfully distinct from one another and have pronounced implication for future success that
might weigh on the minds of court actors.
Fine. A variable representing socioeconomic status such as income is not available in the
current dataset. The best proxy is the imposition of a fine at sentencing. An offender’s ability to
pay a fine is based upon the offender’s net worth and net monthly cash flow documented in the
presentence report. This continuous variable indicates the fine amount imposed by the court.
Citizenship. This variable indicates whether an offender is or is not a U.S. citizen (non-citizens
include legal and illegal aliens). It is binary such that a 0 indicates the defendant is a non-U.S.
citizen and 1 indicates the defendant is a U.S. citizen.
Dependents. The only measure of family circumstances collected by the USSC is whether the
defendant has any financial dependents he is supporting, excluding himself. This variable is
measured as a binary indicator wherein a 1 indicates the defendant has financial dependents and
a 0 indicates the defendant has no financial dependents. Data on marriage and other extralegal
factors such as substance abuse history and mental health status are unavailable in the dataset.
District-Level Independent Variables
To investigate whether court contextual factors influence supervised release sentence
outcomes, I supplemented the USSC dataset with seven aggregate district-level variables
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including district size, child pornography caseload rate, guidelines compliance rate, mandatory
minimum state-level penalties for possession of child pornography, Kimbrough-based policy
decision, political conservatism, and region. These court contextual factors are included because
they are theoretically linked to supervised release sentencing decisions.
District Court Size. Following the same methodology employed by Johnson et al. (2008) to
measure district size, this variable represents the number of authorized judgeships in a federal
district for fiscal year 2012.
Caseload Pressure (Child Pornography Caseload Rate). This continuous variable indicates a
district’s child pornography caseload rate. It was calculated by taking the number of child
pornography cases emanating from a district divided by the total number cases in that district.
This quotient is multiplied by 100 to make the caseload rate a percentage. This variable is an
indicator of the impact that a district’s child pornography workload may have on sentencing
outcomes for child pornography offenders.
Guidelines Compliance Rate. This continuous variable indicates a district’s overall within
guideline sentence compliance rate for all offenses. This variable is calculated by taking the
number of cases that were sentenced within the guidelines range of a district divided by the total
number of cases that were sentenced in the district. Multiplying by 100 makes the guidelines
compliance rate a percentage. This variable gauges whether within guidelines sentence
compliance rates is indicative of districts being more likely to follow the policy statement for
lifetime supervised release.
Mandatory Minimum State-Level Penalties. This tabulated variable indicates whether a district
is situated in a state where there are mandatory minimum state-level penalties for possession of
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child pornography (State Child Pornography Statues – see Appendix F in the USSC’s 2012
Report to Congress on Child Pornography Offenses). This binary variable is coded such that a 1
indicates a district is situated in a state where there are state-level child pornography statutes
with a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child pornography and a 0 indicates
otherwise.
Kimbrough-based policy disagreement. In Kimbrough v. U.S. (2007) the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a policy disagreement with the guidelines was permissible to
impose a below-guideline sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that as long as a sentencing court
appropriately considers the factors in 18 USC 3553(a) when imposing a sentence, the sentence is
reasonable even if it does not fall within the prescribed sentencing guideline range (Rigsby,
2010). In other words, the Kimbrough decision allows sentencing courts to reject a sentencing
guideline and impose a departure/variance based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines.
In essence, this would mean that judges are allowed to impose supervised release sentences other
than the guideline recommendation for life if they categorically disagree with the guideline
recommendation for lifetime supervised release. Thus, a dichotomous variable was created to
represent whether a district court was situated in a circuit that has rejected the application of
Kimbrough-based policy disagreements regarding sentences for non-production child
pornography offenses. According to Kaiser and Spohn (2014), appellate decisions in circuits
that have rejected the application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements for child
pornography offenses include the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 11th circuits. Federal circuits that have
allowed policy disagreements for non-production offenses include the 1 st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 9th
circuits. This dummy variable is measured such that at 1 indicates a district is located within a
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circuit that has rejected the Kimbrough application and a 0 indicates a district is situated within a
circuit that has not specifically rejected this application.
Political Conservatism (percent Republican). Following the lead of Johnson (2005), political
conservatism is delineated as percent Republican. Percent Republican was measured as the
percent of the total votes cast in the state in which the district court is located for the Republican
candidate in the 2012 presidential election.
Region. This is a four-category nominal variable that indicates whether a district is situated in
the West, South, East or Midwest. East is the reference category. East was selected as the
reference category due to this region having the fewest number of district courts classified as
being in the Eastern region of the U.S. (See Table 4.1 at the end of this chapter).
Methods
Analytical Approach – Multilevel Modeling
The use of hierarchical modeling or multilevel modeling to analyze nested data is well
established in the literature (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Fearn, 2005; Weidner, Frase
& Schultz, 2005; Johnson, 2005, 2006; Ulmer, Eisentein, and Johnson, 2010). Essentially,
multilevel models allow researchers to estimate the regression coefficient, while simultaneously
modeling separate individual-level factors nested within district courts (Ulmer and Johnson,
2004). Multilevel models also allow for the partitioning of the overall variance into components
for each level – individual-level and district-level. This partitioning of the variance allows for
the calculation of the intraclass correlation coefficient, which measures the amount of variability
between district courts, and coincidentally is the first test to determine if a study merits
multilevel modeling (Garson, 2013).
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Given that individual offenders are nested within district courts, similarities among cases
at the district-level are likely to occur (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). This means residual errors are
correlated within districts, violating the ordinary least squares regression assumption of
independent errors, risking misspecification of standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002;
Garson, 2013). To remedy this, multilevel modeling incorporates a unique error term into the
equation for each county or district-level unit of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
Multilevel models also provide significance tests based on the proper degrees of freedom for the
district-level variables (Johnson, 2005). Further, multilevel models also allow for the modeling
of variations in the effects of individual-level data across court contexts (Ulmer and Johnson,
2004). Finally, these procedures allow one to properly assess theoretically important cross-level
interactions between individual-level predictors and aggregate county-level or district-level
characteristics (Johnson, 2005).
Following, the initial test of variability between districts, multilevel modeling procedures
involves the sequential estimation of several models. So far example, if an unconditional model
indicates a significant county-level or district court level variation, then a systematic sequence of
random intercept models is estimated. According to Garson (2013), the major types of random
intercept models include: random intercept model with only level 1 predictors; random intercept
model with only level 2 predictors; random intercept model with level 1 and level 2 predictors;
random coefficient model; and fully specified multilevel model with random intercept and
coefficients.
Thus, in the current dissertation, as individual cases are nested within federal district
courts, two levels of analysis are needed.41 I estimated a two-level multilevel model. Given my

41

Following the lead of Kautt (2002) no circuit-level predictors can be included because there are so few circuits (11
circuits).
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three different outcomes measures, I use hierarchical linear regression and hierarchical
generalized linear models (HGLM) with all variables centered around their grand means to
analyze the data in this dissertation.42
Analytical Strategy
My first research question asks what proportion of variability in supervised release
sentences is at the case level versus the district-level? This question was answered using a null
model for logged supervised release length, that is, a model with no predictors at any level of
analysis. The null model, also call the unconditional model or one-way ANOVA with random
effects, is a type of random intercept model that predicts the level 1 intercept of the dependent
variable as a random effect of the level 2 grouping variable, with no other predictors at level 1 or
2 in a two-level model (Garson, 2013). This model is used to calculate the intraclass correlation
coefficient (ICC) which is a test of the need for mixed modeling (Garson, 2013). As a
preliminary analysis, I did this using a one way between groups ANOVA to determine the
magnitude of between district court variation in supervised release sentence length. I found a
statistically significant difference at the p<.001 level and amount of variability between district
courts is 28.8% with the remainder of the variability in sentence lengths within courts.
My second research question asks what individual-level legal and extralegal factors
account for variability in supervised release sentences? This question was answered with a
random-intercept model that included only level-1 predictors centered on their grand means, but
no district-level variables.43 This enabled me to determine how much of the variance in

42

Grand mean centering facilitates model estimation and provides meaningful interpretation of the intercepts
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 20002; Garland, 2013).
43
Supervised release length is not normally distributed. As such, I will use the natural log of supervised release
length.
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supervised release sentence length is accounted for by characteristics of the case and the
individual.
As part of this analysis I also addressed an additional research question: “Do the
individual-level correlates of supervised release sentences differ for production versus nonproduction cases?” The most straightforward way to answer to this questions is to partition the
data by offense type and compare the magnitude of the coefficients for the independent variables
for the two offense types. However, preliminary analyses revealed that offense type and offense
severity score are highly correlated. There is a moderate to strong correlation between total
offense severity score and offense type, r=.-.491, r 2= .24, n=1,900, p=.001. The interquartile
range score for offense severity for non-production cases is 6. The interquartile range score for
offense severity for production cases is 7. For these reasons including both offense-level severity
score and offense type in the same model is problematic.
To remedy this, I examined whether a model with offense severity score or offense type
best fit the data. I checked the model fit statistics by running two separate HLM models - one
with offense type, but not offense severity score and the other with offense severity score but not
offense type. I computed the variance for each. The non-production model explains 13.8%
(.47705-.41086/.47705) of individual-level variation in sentencing and 10.5% (.17940.16047/.17940) of the district-level variation. In comparison, the model containing offense
severity score explains 22.7% (.47705-.36867/.47705) of the individual variation in sentencing
and the explained variance at the district-level is 11.8% (.17940-.15822/.17940). Thus, offense
severity had a better model fit and I used offense severity score to represent offense seriousness
rather than offense type when conducting data analyses. Notwithstanding, I conducted
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supplemental analyses partitioning the data by offense type. These models are presented as a
robustness check to my findings and are presented in Appendix A.
My third research question asks “Above and beyond individual-level case characteristics,
are district-level contextual variables related to supervised release sentencing outcomes?” In
other words, I am examining whether the characteristics and/or context of the district court affect
supervised release sentencing once the composition of the cases in the courts have been taken
into account. To answer this question, I ran a random intercept model with level-2 predictors
only. This variant of the random intercept model predicts the level-1 intercept on the basis of the
level-2 grouping variable and one or more level-2 random effect predictors (Garson, 2013).
Next, I re-ran the model introducing level-1 variables. This model estimated the joint influence
of level-1 and level-2 predictors.
My fourth question asks “Do the effects of level 1 factors on sentence length differ across
courts?” To answer this question, I estimated a random coefficient model in which I allowed the
effects of level 1 variables of interest including criminal history, offense seriousness, and
departure/variance to vary across courts.44 These models assessed whether the impact of specific
case/individual-level factors changed varied between districts. For the variables whose effect did
vary across courts, I explored whether these differential effects could be accounted for by any of
the district-level variables.

44

These variables were of interest due to their known effects across courts found in other studies (Kautt, 2002) as
well as for theorized reasons. Johnson (2010) explains “Regarding federal sentencing data, it might make
theoretical sense to investigate variations in the effect of offense severity across courts because some literature
suggests perceptions of crime seriousness involve relative evaluation by court actors (Emerson, 1983).” In terms of
theoretical reasons for the current dissertation, some presentence reports for some district courts include all known
arrests and convictions whereas presentence reports in other district court only include information for convictions
only. It is possible that differences in the content of the criminal history section in presentence reports across courts
may lead to variations in these effects across courts.

111

The analyses described above were first completed using the continuous measure of
sentence length. They were then replicated using hierarchical generalized linear models for the
binary measure of supervised release sentence (life/no life) and the ordinal measure of the
supervised release sentence.
Strengths and Limitations
Before presenting the results of the analyses, a review of the strengths and limitations of
the methodology is necessary. As the strengths of the methodology guide the analytic plan, I
discuss the strengths first followed by a discussion of the study’s limitations. One of the more
important methodological strengths is the use of federal data. The strength of utilizing federal
sentencing data as opposed to sentencing data collected by state courts is that state courts operate
under various different sentencing guidelines which make generalizability of the findings an
issue. The federal system eliminates this issue with its national guidelines system. In addition,
the data includes a wide range of information for a large number of defendants across 89 judicial
district courts and all 50 states. It includes information on demographic characteristics and
sentencing details.
A second strength is the inclusion of multiple outcome measures of the supervised release
sentence. Extant sentencing literature focuses on one or two sentencing outcomes – the decision
to incarcerate and/or sentence length. The present study not only looks at the decision to impose
lifetime supervised release and supervised sentence length, but also an ordinal outcome measure
of supervised release length. This provides a more comprehensive exploration and evaluation of
supervised release sentencing outcomes because it takes into account that even when logtransformed, supervised release sentence length is not normally distributed.
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Despite these methodological strengths, my analytic strategy is not without limitations.
One limitation is that I do not consider judge-level influences in sentences. This is significant
given that individual offenders are nested within judges. The focal concerns perspective supports
the notion that supervised release sentences could vary among judges. Specifically, judges may
have different views on culpability, dangerousness, and practical consequences of their
sentences, which may result in inter-judge sentencing disparities (Anderson and Spohn, 2010;
Johnson, Ulmer and Kramer, 2008). Another way that supervised release sentences could vary
among judges, concerns judicial characteristics including including age, gender, race, length of
term on the bench, previous experiences as a prosecutor or defense counsel. Indeed, Johnson
(2006) utilized tri-level hierarchical models to examine individual-level, judge-level, and countylevel factors on sentencing outcomes using Pennsylvania sentencing data. He found sentence
length and the likelihood of incarceration varied significantly between judges and counties. He
also found that after controlling for individual case and offender characteristics, judge-level
variables such as minority judge, age, prior military experience and judicial caseload
composition exerted direct effects on the likelihood of incarceration and length of incarceration.
The current dissertation does not consider judge-level influences on supervised release outcomes.
This is because the publicly available USSC dataset does not identify the judge who imposed the
sentence (Kautt, 2002; Anderson and Spohn, 2009).
There could be additional district-level factors that I may have failed to consider that
may influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders. As a
result, this could potentially undermine the conclusions drawn about district-level contextual
factors. I do attempt to mitigate this limitation, by exploring many of the district-level
contextual factors used in the extant sentencing literature. But of course, these factors are
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theoretically linked to sentence of imprisonment for the overall offender, not specifically child
pornography offenders or the sentence of supervised release.
Even with these limitations, this dissertation contributes to the broader sentencing
literature by providing an initial multilevel examination of the influence of individual-level legal,
extralegal, and district-level factors on supervised release sentencing outcomes of child
pornography offenders.
Chapter Five presents the findings of the multilevel models (hierarchical linear and
generalized models – HLMs and HGLMs) estimated to address the research questions of this
dissertation, followed by Chapter Six and Seven which discuss the results and the implications of
the findings, respectively.

114

Table 4.1
List of the 89 Federal Districts Included in the Analyses by Geographic Region
South

West

Midwest

East

Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Texas East
Texas North
Texas West
Texas South
Arkansas East

Washington East
Washington West
Idaho
Montana
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona

North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
Missouri East
Missouri West
Iowa North
Iowa South

Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West

Arkansas West
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Kentucky East
Kentucky West
Tennessee East
Tennessee Middle
Tennessee West
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Virginia East
Virginia West
Maryland
Delaware

Utah
Nevada
Oregon
California Central
California East
California North
California South
Alaska
Hawaii

Illinois Central
Illinois North
Illinois South
Wisconsin East
Wisconsin West
Michigan East
Michigan West
Indiana North
Indian South
Ohio North
Ohio South
Minnesota

Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania Middle
Pennsylvania West
New Jersey
Connecticut
Rhode Island

*Regions based upon U.S. Census Bureau States Region Map
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS
Introduction
This chapter reports the results from the analyses of the effects of individual-level legal
and extralegal factors, as well as district-level contextual factors on supervised release sentences
for child pornography offenders. Presentation of the results is organized into four sections.
Section I includes the descriptive statistics for the full sample and then by offense type (nonproduction and production). I present separate descriptive statistics by offense type because I am
interested in exploring differences in sentencing based upon offense seriousness, which is highly
dependent on whether the case involved production or non-production. 45 Also included in this
section are the results of bivariate analyses of the relationships between the dependent variables
(supervised release length and the decision to impose lifetime supervised release) and the
individual-level legal and extralegal variables. Next, I report the results of the bivariate analyses
of the relationships among my district-level independent variables. Section I concludes with the
results of preliminary data analyses of the linearity of the relationships between the continuous
individual-level independent variables and supervised release sentences.
Section II present results that correspond to each of my four research questions for my
first dependent variable, sentence length measured in months (logged). This section begins with
the results from the null model. This model provides estimates of the relative amount of
sentencing variation that occurs at the individual and district level. The next part of this section
includes results from hierarchical linear regression models that examine the influence of
individual-level legal and extralegal factors on supervised release length. This section also
45

As noted in Chapter 4, data analyses for all models in this study use the variable offense severity score rather than
the offense type variable. This is due to the collinearity between offense type and the offense severity score
variable. There is a moderate to strong correlation between offense type and offense level severity, r=.-.491, r 2= .24,
n=1,900, p=.001. I selected offense severity score for use in my data analyses because model estimates reveal it is a
better fit than the offense type variable.
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includes results from cross-product interaction terms between offense severity score and each of
the legal and extralegal factors. The results of these two-way interactions address the second
part of my second research question: Do individual-level correlates (legal and extralegal) of
supervised release sentences differ by severity of the offense? Next, I present findings from my
random coefficient models. The results of these models answer my third research question: Do
the effects of individual-level factors vary across courts? Following this, I examine whether
district-level contextual variables are related to supervised release sentencing outcomes above
and beyond individual-level factors. I conclude this section with findings from my final model –
a mixed multilevel model including random intercepts, random coefficients, and cross-level
interactions. The results from this model provide information on how individual-level and
district-level factors operate together to impact supervised release sentencing outcomes.
In Section III, I present the results of my four research questions, but with the binary
dependent variable – the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. Finally, in Section IV I
present the results of my research questions using a four-category ordinal measure of supervised
release length because a preliminary view of the data shows sentence length is non-normal even
when logged.46 This chapter closes with a summary section that summarizes the main results of
the analyses. All tables and figures referenced in this chapter are located at the end. In
Appendix A, located at the end of this dissertation, I include supplemental analyses that assess
the robustness of my earlier results. Specifically, I use ordinary least squares regression (OLS),
logistic regression, and ordinal regression models to determine if the correlates of supervised
release sentences differ by offense type (non-production versus production). Even though this
46

Recall from Chapter 4 that a preliminary view of the data shows clumping. That is, 19% of cases received five
years supervised release, 25% received ten years, 8.9% received fifteen years, 5.6% received twenty years, 1.9%
received twenty-five years, 1.5% received thirty years, and 33.2% received lifetime supervised release. The
remainder of the cases received sentences other than those just described.
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step is completed as part of research question 2A using hierarchical linear modeling, this
additional step assesses whether the decision to use offense seriousness instead of offense type as
a moderator influences the results. This is necessary because of the collinearity between offense
severity score and offense type.
SECTION I: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses
Individual-Level Factors
Descriptive Statistics – Full Sample
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses. 47 The
sample is comprised of 1,900 male offenders convicted of child pornography offenses and
sentenced to a term of supervised release. The shortest term imposed is 12 months and the
longest term is life (470 months). The average term is 242 months (SD=170.78). Nearly half the
sample (48.3%) was sentenced to either a short-term (20.1%) or an intermediate (28.2%) term of
supervised release, while the other half (51.8%) received either long-term supervised release
(18.6%) or lifetime supervised release (33.2%).
An overwhelming majority (95.7%) of the sample pled guilty. More offenders received a
downward departure/variance (63.3%) than were sentenced within the guidelines range (34.5%).
Only 2.2% received an upward departure/variance. The average criminal history score is 1.37
(SD=.902). This means they have no criminal history or only one criminal history point. 48 Only
about 5% of the sample received an enhancement for having a previous sex offense. The offense
severity score ranges from 16 to 43, with an average offense severity score of 32. The number of

47

Included in these descriptive statistics are two district-level factors: (1) district average supervised release
sentence length; and (2) district average percent of cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release. These factors are
not included in the data analyses, but provide additional descriptive statistics of the 89 district courts.
48
Recall, the criminal history score, which ranges from 1 to 6, is calculated based upon the total criminal history
points calculated from Section 4A1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines. The USSC codes this variable as 1
through 6. The higher the score, the greater the criminal history.
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counts of conviction for the sample ranges from 1 to 26, averaging 1.49 counts per offender. Just
under two-thirds (61.3%) of the sample was detained prior to sentencing.
The sample is comprised mostly (86.5%) of whites. Almost three-quarters (72.7%) of the
offenders are younger than age 50. Although not shown in the table, the average age is 41.41
years (SD=13.23). This is an educated group of offenders. Just over 90% have at least a high
school education. The average fine imposed was $808, with 87.4% of offenders not incurring a
fine, and one offender receiving a fine totaling $100,000. The court generally waives fines based
upon the inability to pay. The fact that most of the offenders did not receive a fine indicates that
there was an inability to pay or the fine would have been a burden on the defendant’s
dependents. The sample is comprised mostly of U.S. citizens (96.7%). Finally, 29.6% of the
sample claimed dependents.
Table 5.1 about here
Descriptive Statistics by Offense Type – Non-production & Production
Table 5.2 present descriptive statistics by offense type to visualize how legal and extralegal characteristics differ between more serious (production) and less serious (non-production)
cases. Starting with non-production, approximately 87.5% (n =1,663) of child pornography
offenders were convicted for this offense type. The average supervised release sentence for this
group is 229.09 months. The shortest term imposed is 12 months and the longest is 470 months
(life). Approximately 29.7% of non-producers received the most severe term of life. Regarding
individual-level legal factors, many of these descriptive statistics for non-producer’s mimic those
found in the full sample. There are, however a few exceptions. For instance, very few nonproducers received the enhancement for having a prior sex offense (.7%) and at 30.9 points, the
average offense severity score was almost two points lower than in the full sample.
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Production cases (n=237) differ from non-production cases in many important ways.
First, producers were sentenced to more severe terms of supervised release than non-producers.
The minimum supervised release sentence for a producer is 36 months compared to 12 months
for non-producers. The average supervised sentence length for production cases is 332.79
months (SD=167.39) versus 229.09 months (SD=167.35) for non-producers, a difference of over
8 years. An independent samples t-test indicates this difference is statistically significant (t
(1898) =-8.922. p<.001). In addition, there is a significant difference in the likelihood of being
sentenced to lifetime supervised release for production versus non-production offenders (x 2(1) =
71.70, p<.001, phi=.194). More than half (57.4%) of the producers were sentenced to the most
severe term (life) in contrast to 29.7% of non-producers.
Regarding individual-level legal factors, almost 10% of offenders convicted of
production were disposed by trial compared to 3.5% of non-producers, which is a significant
difference (X2(1) = 19.64, p<.001, phi=.102). Interestingly, 36.4% of production cases received
the enhancement for having a prior sex offense compared to .7% of non-production cases (X2(1)
= 538.75, p<.001, phi=.533). For producers, offense severity scores range from 24-43, and for
non-producers scores range from 16-43. The average offense severity score for producers
(M=39.13; SD=3.84) was 9 levels higher than for non-producers (M=30.98; SD=4.90), a
significant difference (t(1898)=-24.537, p<.001, two-tailed). Likewise, production cases
(M=2.28; SD=2.5) averaged 1 more count of conviction than non-production cases (M=1.38;
SD=1.4) (t(1898)=-7.95, p<.001, two-tailed). Finally, over 90% of producers were detained
prior to sentencing compared to 57.6% of non-producers ( X2(1) = 119.66, p<.001, phi=.251).
Production cases also differed from non-production cases with regard to the extralegal factor of
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claiming dependents. Unexpectedly, 41% of producers claimed dependents compared to 27.9%
of non-producers (X2(1) = 16.91, p<.001, phi=.096).
Table 5.2 about here
Bivariate Analyses
Pearson and Point Biserial Correlations.
To examine the bivariate relationships among measures of sentence length and the
independent variables, I computed Pearson and point biserial correlations for continuous and
dichotomous variables, ANOVAs for continuous and categorical variables with more than two
categories, and chi-square tests of independence for categorical variables. Table 5.3 presents the
correlations for individual-level factors. Several of the legal independent predictors are
significantly correlated with the dependent variables. Positive correlations include number of
counts, sex offender enhancement, criminal history score, offense severity score, and detention.
To illustrate one of these correlations, there is a weak to moderate relationship between
supervised release length and detention, r=.276, r2=.07, p<.001. This means that those who are
detained prior to sentencing have longer sentences. In addition, non-production cases receive
shorter sentences and are less likely to receive lifetime supervised release. There are also several
significant correlations among the legal and extralegal variables. Among the strongest
correlations is the relationship between offense severity score and offense type. There is a
moderate to strong correlation between the two variables, r=.-.491, r2= .24, p<.001. Another
strong correlation is between offense type and the enhancement for having a prior sex offense,
r=-.533, r2=.28, p=.001. Moderate and positive relationships also exist among offense severity
score and each of the dependent variables (supervised release length and the decision to impose
life), r=.338, r2=.11 p<.001; r=.302, r2=.09, p<.001. This means that as offense severity score
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increases, supervised release length also increases as does the likelihood of being sentenced to
lifetime supervised release.
Table 5.3 about here
ANOVA.
A one-way anova was utilized to explore the relationship between supervised release
length and education. Education is categorized into four groups: less than high school, high
school graduate, some college, and college graduate. There is a statistically significant
difference in supervised release length and education level (F (3, 1874) =3.453, p<.01.), although
the actual difference in mean sentence lengths between the groups is quite small (eta squared =
.005). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean sentence for
offenders with less than a high school degree (M=255.26, SD=171.94) is significantly longer
than for those with some college (M=230.27, SD=167.50). There are no differences in sentence
length between any of the other education groups.
While region is not an individual-level variable, I also used ANOVA to explore sentence
length by region. This was done to further explore supervised release sentences in greater detail.
There is a statistically significant but small difference in supervised release sentence length by
region, F (3, 1896) =11.462, p<.001, eta squared = .01. Cases in the East have the shortest
average sentence length, 192.14 months (SD=153.64), while those in the West have the longest
average supervise release lengths at 264.30 months (SD=169.63). Those in the South
(SD=167.58) and Midwest (SD=180.25) are in between with average supervised release lengths
of 251.22 and 242.54 months, respectively. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test
indicate that the mean supervised release length for those sentenced in the East is significantly
different from those in the South, West, and Midwest.
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Chi-square tests.
I conducted chi-square tests to explore the relationships between lifetime supervised
release and each of my binary and categorical legal and extralegal variables. These variables
include – the enhancement for having a prior sex offense, plea, detained, guidelines departure,
race, citizenship, education, dependents, and age over 50. Chi-square tests revealed only
statistically significant relationships between lifetime supervised release and two of the legal
variables – detention and the enhancement for having a prior sex offense. Offenders who were
detained are significantly more likely to receive lifetime supervised release (x2 (1) =107.660,
p<.001, phi=.240) as are those who received the enhancement for having a prior sex offense (x2
(1) =52.814, p<.001, phi=.169).
While region is not an individual-level variable, I also used chi-square tests to explore the
relationship between lifetime supervised release and region. A chi-square test indicated a
significant association between region (West, East, South and Midwest) and the decision to
impose lifetime supervised release, x 2(3) = 27.288, p<.001, Cramer’s V=.120. Cases in the
South are most likely to receive lifetime supervised release followed by the Midwest, West, and
East. Likewise, there is also a significant association between region and the four-category
ordinal measure of supervised release, x2(9) = 92.66, p<.001, Cramer’s V = .128.
District-Level Factors
Descriptive Statistics
The characteristics of the 89 federal district courts are also presented in Table 5.1.
Districts vary widely in size with several federal districts having only 1 or 2 authorized
judgeships, whereas others have as many as 28. The average number of judgeships for all
districts is 7 (SD=5.60). The percentage of all cases in the district that are child pornography
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cases (i.e., the child pornography caseload rate) ranges from 0.2% to 13.1%, with an average
child pornography caseload rate of 3.7% (SD=2.4%). On average, the guideline compliance rate
is 51.1% for all federal districts, with some districts having guidelines compliance rates as low as
22.8% and some as high as 81%. Just under half (49.4%) of district courts are situated within
states that have a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography.
A little over three-quarters of the districts are located within circuits that rejected the application
of Kimbrough to non-production offenses. Of those who voted in the 2012 presidential election,
the average percent who voted Republican for all the districts was 50.4% (SD=9.6%) with a low
of 28% and a high of 73%. Finally, the federal districts are split across the four regions of the
United States with 19.1% of districts in the West, 42.7% in the South, 15.7% in the East, and
22.5% in the Midwest.
I also looked at the district average for the supervised release sentence length as well as
the district average percentage of cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release. The shortest
average supervised release term is 60 months and the longest average term is life (470). The
average term for the mean of the 89 districts is 240.11 months (SD=101.40). The range of the
percent distribution of districts that sentenced their cases to lifetime supervised release is 0% to
100%, with a mean of 33.2% (SD=26.1%).
Bivariate Analyses
Pearson and Point Biserial Correlations.
To examine the bivariate relationships among measures of mean supervised release
length and the percent sentenced to lifetime supervised release for each of the 89 districts and the
district-level independent variables, I computed Pearson and point-biserial correlations for
continuous and dichotomous variables (see Table 5.4). District size is negatively related to child
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pornography caseload rate, guidelines compliance rate, and percent of voters who voted
Republican in the 2012 presidential election. These negative correlations are relatively weak. In
districts situated within states with mandatory minimum state-level penalties, the mean
supervised release length and percent sentenced to lifetime supervised release is higher. These
correlations are also weak. The guidelines compliance rate is positively correlated with percent
Republican. In addition, districts that reject Kimbrough have higher compliance rates than those
that have not rejected Kimbrough, as do districts situated within states with mandatory minimum
state-level penalties. But the correlation between Kimbrough and percent Republican is
remarkably strong (rpb=.518). Districts that reject the application of Kimbrough to nonproduction child pornography cases have greater percentages of voters that voted Republican.
Table 5.4 about here
Supervised Release Sentences in Context – Individual District Supervised Release
Descriptive Statistics
To display the differences in supervised release sentences across districts, I created a
separate table (see Table 5.5) displaying the percent distribution of districts that sentenced their
cases to short-term supervised release (60 months or less), intermediate supervised release
(sentences ranging between 72 months and 120 months), long-term supervised release (sentences
ranging between 121 months to 420 months), and lifetime supervised release (cases sentenced to
470 months).49 I also created a table showing the percentage of the total sample of child
pornography cases sentenced in each district for all cases (see Table 5.6). 50 As shown in Table
5.5, twenty-two districts did not sentence any cases to a short-term period of supervised release
and one district, Oklahoma East, sentenced 100% of its cases to short-term supervised release.

49

There were no cases with a supervised release sentence ranging between 121 to 143 months.
The table displaying the percentage of child pornography sentenced in each district is not the same as the child
pornography caseload rate variable.
50
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As far as intermediate terms of supervised release, twelve districts did not impose this term to
any of their cases, while only Louisiana Middle sentenced 100% of its cases to an intermediate
term. Regarding long-term supervised release, twenty-one districts did not sentence any of their
cases to long-term supervised release, and no district sentenced all their cases to long-term
supervised release. Finally, eleven districts including Maine, Massachusetts, New York South,
Louisiana Middle, Tennessee Middle, Tennessee West, Iowa South, South Dakota, Kansas,
Oklahoma East, and Oklahoma North did not impose lifetime supervised release on any of their
cases.51 Three districts, North Carolina East, Alabama Middle, and Alabama South, sentenced
100% of their cases to lifetime supervised. 52 Other districts including New Hampshire,
Mississippi South, Indiana South, Wisconsin West, Missouri East and Arizona sentenced more
than 75% of their cases to lifetime supervised release. 53
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 about here
I also created separate tables that display descriptive statistics of how each district
sentenced their cases to short-term, intermediate, long-term, and lifetime supervised release by
offense type as well as the percentage of child pornography cases sentenced in each district by
offense type (see Tables 5.7 through 5.10). Starting with non-production offenses, only three
districts sentenced 100% of their cases to lifetime supervised release, in contrast to 22 districts
that sentenced 100% of their production cases to lifetime supervised release. Oklahoma East
was the only district to sentence 100% of its non-production cases to short-term supervised
release, while only one district, Oklahoma West sentenced 100% of its production cases to shortterm supervised release.

51

All of these districts except for Iowa South and Kansas, sentenced less than 1% child pornography cases.
Each of these districts sentenced less than 1% of child pornography cases.
53
With the exception, of Missouri East, Nevada, and Indiana South, these districts sentenced less than 1% of child
pornography cases in 2012.
52
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Tables 5.7 through 5.10 about here
Preliminary Data Analyses
Prior to beginning my analyses, I explored the possibility that the relationships between
my continuous independent variables (offense severity score, criminal history score, fine, and
number of counts) and the supervised release term are non-linear. 54 This was done in two ways.
First, I looked at the scatterplot between each of these variables. An examination of the
scatterplots based on a visual inspection, suggests a non-linear relationship between supervised
release length and all the continuous variables.
Second, I created squared terms for each of these variables. I regressed supervised
release length on the linear and quadratic term for each of these variables, one at time and then
all together. The squared terms of age, fine, and criminal history score were not statistically
significant predictors of the logged supervised release sentence length. The squared terms for
offense severity score and number of counts were significant, indicating that these variables have
a curvilinear relationship with logged sentence length.
To obtain a visual picture of the curvilinear relationships of offense severity score and
number of counts, I graphed each of these variables with the predicted unlogged measures of
supervised release length. The unlogged outcome was graphed because it is easier to interpret
months of supervised release than logged months. I also graphed offense severity score and
number of counts with the binary dependent variable – the decision to impose lifetime supervised
release. The graph for offense severity score show the first score of 16 yields a slightly longer
sentence than a score of 17 through 23 (see Figure 5.1). But at score 24, the predicted value of
the supervised release sentence length increases as offense severity increases. Likewise, the

54

Although I calculate age as a dichotomous variable in my data analyses, as a preliminary strategy I examined the
linearity of age.
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graph for the predicted probability of lifetime supervised release showed a similar curve, except
that the curve was more dramatic for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release (see
Figures 5.2). Here, offenders with the lowest offense severity scores (15-23) have a greater
predicted probability of lifetime supervised release than those with scores between 24 through
28. At approximately score 29, the predicted probability of life increases dramatically as the
offense severity score increases.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 about here
The graphs for the number of counts of conviction appear quite different from the graphs
for offense severity. Here, the graphs for both the predicted value of supervised release length
and the predicted probability of lifetime supervised release look like arches (see Figures 5.3 and
5.4). Specifically, the graphs for both supervised release length and decision to impose lifetime
supervised release indicate that as the number of counts of conviction increase through 14, the
supervised release sentence length increases steadily. From about 15 counts of conviction
onward, sentence length decreases.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 about here
Now that I have described the data used in these analyses and discussed the preliminary
analyses and bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables, Section II
presents results of multilevel models for supervised sentence length measured in months
(logged).
SECTION II: Supervised Release Length
This section presents the results of multilevel models examining the correlates of
supervised release length, beginning with the null model and culminating into a final mixed
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multilevel model that explores the individual-level and district-level factors associated with
supervised release sentence length.
Partitioning of Variability in Supervised Release Sentence Length at Individual and
District-Level: The Null or Unconditional Model
The multilevel analysis begins with an unconditional hierarchical model, which includes
supervised release sentence length as the dependent variable, and no covariates at either level-1
(individual-level) or level-2 (district-level). Table 5.11 presents the results from the
unconditional model examining supervised release sentence length for child pornography
offenders nested within U.S. district courts. The results are broken into two parts, one for the
fixed effects, which reports the unstandardized regression coefficients, and one for the random
effects, which reports the variance components for the model. The overall intercept is 5.17
logged months or 175.91 unlogged months. The level 1 variance provides a measure of withindistrict variation in sentence lengths and the level 2 variance captures between-district variation.
The significance tests associated with the level 2 variance component indicates there is
significant between district variations in sentences – supervised sentence lengths vary
significantly across federal district courts. In other words, the significance test provides
preliminary evidence that districts matter in federal punishment.
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was calculated to determine the magnitude of
the inter-district variation in supervised release length. 55 The ICC indicates that 27.3% of the
variance in supervised release sentence length is at the federal district-level and the remaining
72.7% is at the individual-level.56 The standard deviation for the between group variance
component can be added and subtracted to the model intercept to provide a range of plausible
55

ICC = .17940/(.17940 +.47705) = 0.273 or 27.3%.
I also calculated the ICC for the sentence of imprisonment to gauge the level of interdistrict variability that would
appear normal for child pornography offenses. The ICC for the sentence of imprisonment length is 21.3%.
Accordingly, while the 27.3% interdistrict variability discovered for sentence of supervised release appears large,
this figure is consistent with the level of interdistrict variability found generally for this offense type.
56
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values for average supervised release sentences among districts. Accordingly, adding and
subtracting .42 gives a range between 4.74 logged months (111.76 unlogged months) and 5.59
logged months (268.69 unlogged months). To conclude, there is a great deal of variability of
supervised releases sentences of child pornography offenders. The following sections report
which individual-level and district-level contextual factors account for this variability.
Table 5.11 about here
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors and Supervised Release Sentence Length
To identify the individual-level (legal and extralegal) variables that account for
variability in supervised release sentences hierarchical linear regression was used. First,
supervised release length was regressed on individual-level legal variables. Next, I added
individual-level extralegal variables to the model to see if they explain supervised release
sentence length above and beyond the effect of the legally relevant variables.
With the natural log of supervised release length as the outcome and level-2 representing
federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only level-1 legal variables [see
Table 5.12 (Model 1)]. Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity score were
included in the model because exploratory analyses (described earlier) indicated the relationship
between these variables and supervised release sentence length is non-linear. The level-2 error
term represents the random effect of federal district court on the natural log of supervised release
length.
As indicated in Table 5.12 (Model 1), several legal variables have statistically significant
coefficients, controlling for all other variables included in the model. There is a non-linear
relationship between number of counts and length of supervised release as indicated by the
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significant quadratic term for this variable (see Figure 5.5). The criminal history score is also
statistically significant, indicating that a one unit increase in the criminal history score results in
a 7.2% increase in months of supervised release. Offenders who received a downward
departure/variance received sentences that were 19.9% shorter than those who were sentenced
within the guidelines range. Compared to those who were released on bond, child pornography
offenders who were detained had supervised release sentences that were 19.1% longer. Those
who pled guilty also had supervised release sentences that were 24.7% longer than offenders
who went to trial.
The deviance statistic is reduced from the unconditional model (deviance= 4014.78) to
the conditional model (deviance = 3618.61), indicating increased model fit. To better quantify
the model fit, I calculated the approximate R 2 statistics at each level of the analysis. The
explained variance at level 1 is computed as the reduction in level 1 variance relative to the total
variance from the unconditional model reported in Table 5.11. 57 Legal factors explain 22.4% of
the variance across cases in supervised release length (logged) among child pornography
offenders. The inclusion of level-1 predictors can also explain between-district variation at
level-2 of the analysis. Explained variance at level-2 is calculated by examining the reduction in
level-2 variance from the unconditional to the conditional model. 58 Thus, 12.3% of inter-district
variation in sentences is due to compositional differences in individual-level legal factors among
district courts.
Table 5.12 (Model 1) and Figure 5.5 about here

57

Computed as (unconditional estimate of level 1 variance - the conditional estimate)/total unconditional variance =
Explained level 1 variance = (.47705 - .37020. )/(.47705) = .2239.
58
The unconditional estimate for between district variation was .17940 and the conditional estimate is .15729. The
difference (.02211) divided by the total (.1794) provides an estimate of explained variance at level 2 equal to .1232.
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Next, I added level-1 extralegal factors to the random intercept model to see if these
variables have an effect on supervised release sentence length above and beyond legal
characteristics [see Table 5.12 (Model 2)]. As shown in Table 5.12 (Model 2), legal variables
including number of counts, criminal history score, plea, detained, and downward
departure/variance remain statistically significant predictors of sentence length when extralegal
factors are included. Extralegal factors including race, citizenship status, dependents, and
education are significantly associated with the length of supervised release. Specifically, whites
receive supervised release terms that are 8.2% shorter than non-whites, while U.S. citizens
receive supervised release terms that are 19.7% longer than non-citizens. Those with dependents
receive supervised release terms that are 6.6% shorter than those without dependents. Offenders
with less than a high school education receive supervised release sentences that are 13.1% longer
than the reference category of high school graduate. Surprisingly, compared to the reference
group of high school diploma, those with a college degree received a term that is 10.6% longer. 59
Combined, extralegal factors and legally relevant case characteristics explain 23.1% of
individual variation in supervised release length and 12.4% of district-level variation in
supervised release length. 60 With less than a 1% change in explained individual variation in
supervised release length compared to the preceding model only containing legal variables, this
indicates that supervised release sentence length is primarily driven by legal factors.
Table 5.12 (Model 2) about here

59

I also estimated regression models using alternate measures of age including age squared and age as a continuous
measure. Neither of these age measures were statistically significant predictors of supervised release length.
60
Level 1 variance computed as (.47705-. 36648)/.47705=.2317 or 23.1%. Level 2 variance is computed as
(.17940-.15712)/.17940=.1241 or 12.4%.
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Relationship between Case-Level Factors and Cross Product Interaction Terms
To assess whether the effects of legal and extralegal variables differ depending on the
severity of the offense, I created a series of multiplicative interaction terms between the offense
severity score and each of the legal and extralegal variables. These two-way interaction terms
were added one at a time into the model containing legal and extralegal variables. None of the
interaction terms are statistically significant indicating that the effects of legal and extralegal
factors on supervised release sentence length are similar regardless of the seriousness of the
offense.
Variability in the Effects of Case-Level Variables on Sentence Length across Courts
To determine whether the effects of legal and extralegal predictors on supervised release
sentence length vary across district courts, a random coefficient model was estimated. To begin,
one at a time the coefficient for each level-1 variable was allowed to vary across courts. The
results indicate that the effects of offense severity score (linear and quadratic terms), upward
departure/variance, and downward departure/variance (although weak at p=.08) on supervised
release sentence length differ across district courts [see Table 5.13 (Models 1 through 4,
respectively)]. The statistical significance of both offense severity and offense severity squared
means that the main effect and the shape of the relationship between the two variables vary
across courts. To quantify this effect for downward departure/variance, the standard deviation
for the random effect (.16) can be added or subtracted from the coefficient for downward
departure/variance. This suggests that compared to the reference category of within guideline
sentence, a downward departure/variance decreases the logged supervised release sentence
months between -0.354011 (.70 month unlogged) and -0.036711 (.96 month unlogged). In
comparison, child pornography offenders with upward departure/variance have sentences that are

133

between -.59926 (.54 month unlogged) and .81428 (2.25 months unlogged) longer than
comparable offenders who did not receive departures.
Table 5.13 (Models 1-4) about here
Next, the effects of offense severity, upward departure/variance and downward
departure/variance were all allowed to vary in the same model. 61 Only the error term for offense
severity score and upward departure/variance remained statistically significant (see Table 5.14).
None of the error terms for the extralegal variables was statistically significant. Thus, extralegal
predictors of supervised release length have similar effects across all districts.
Table 5.14 about here
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on Supervised Release Sentence Length
To further investigate the variation in supervised release sentencing severity across
federal districts, I next add level-2 explanatory variables as predictors of mean sentencing
differences across federal district courts. I first modeled only the district-level covariates without
any of the level-1 factors. Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level
covariates with t values less than 1 from the model, leaving court size, districts situated within
states with mandatory minimum state-level penalties for possession of child pornography,
percent Republican, and region. In this model (see Table 5.15), court size, state mandatory
minimums for possession of child pornography, and region are statistically associated with
supervised release length.62 A one unit increase in the number of authorized judgeships results in
a 1.6% reduction in average months of logged supervised release length. Mean sentences in
districts situated within states with a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of
61

The model cannot be estimated when both offense level severity and offense level severity squared are included.
Accordingly, I removed offense severity squared.
62
East was used as the reference category as this region had the shortest average supervised release sentence
lengths. The eastern region also had the smallest percentage of supervised release sentences compared to the other
three regions.
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child pornography are on average 27.5% longer than those without a minimum state level
penalty. Likewise, supervised release sentences in districts situated in the western region of the
United States are on average 37.3% longer than those in the eastern region (reference category).
When only district-level variables are in the model, they explain 14.4% of the between-court
variance in supervised release sentences. 63
Table 5.15 about here
Individual and District-Level Effects on Supervised Release Length - Best Fitting Model
Next, I modeled the fully conditional hierarchical model including all of the individual
level covariates from the previous version of the model. Following Raudenbush and Bryk
(2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from the model, leaving only
state mandatory minimum and region at level 2. In this model (see Table 5.16), all the previous
legal and extralegal factors that were significant in the initial model without the level 2 factors
remain significant except race. The magnitude of the coefficient drops from -.08 to -.07 and the
effect is significant only using alpha = .10.
Of the level-2 factors, only West remains statistically significant at the alpha=.05 level.
The coefficient for state-level mandatory minimums is significant using a less restrictive criteria
of alpha=.10 and the magnitude of this coefficient changes from .28 to .18 The level-2
predictors reduce the level-2 variance from .16 to .15. This is a reduction in variance of 7.4%. 64
Thus, region and state-level mandatory minimums for possession of child pornography account
for just over 7.4% of the residual level-2 variance, after controlling for legal and extralegal
factors.

63
64

(.17940-.15343)/.17940=0.1447
.14552-.15712/.15712 * 100 = 7.38
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Comparing the random effects in the Null and Random Intercepts Models indicates that

65

when legal, extralegal factors, and district-level contextual factors are added to the model they
explain 23.1% of individual variation and 18.8% of district-level variation in supervised release
length.
Table 5.16 about here
Next, the effects of offense severity, upward departure/variance and downward
departure/variance were all allowed to vary in the same model (see Table 5.17). 66 Only the error
term for offense severity score and upward departure/variance remained statistically significant.
None of the error terms for the extralegal variables was statistically significant. Thus, extralegal
predictors of supervised release length have similar effects across all districts.
Table 5.17 about here
Individual, District-Level, and Cross-Level Effects on Supervised Release Length - Best
Fitting Final Model
Finally, I assessed whether there are significant cross-level interactions between the
district-level variables and the two individual-level variables with significant random effects.
First, district-level contextual factors were added one at a time to the random coefficient for
offense severity. None of the district-level factors individually are significantly associated with
the effects of offense severity varying across courts. However, when all of the district-level
factors with t-values greater than 1 are added together with the random coefficients for offense
severity, the results show that caseload (p=.07), West (p=.08) and Midwest (p=.002) are
significantly associated with these effects varying across courts (see Table 5.18). Offense
65

Level 1 explained variance computed as (.47705-. 36656)/.47705=.2316 or 23.1%. Level 2 explained variance is
computed as (.17940-.14552)/.17940= .1888 or 18.8%.
66
The model cannot be estimated when both offense level severity and offense level severity squared are included.
Accordingly, I removed offense severity squared.
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severity has a stronger effect on sentence length in districts with larger child pornography
caseloads and a weaker effect on sentence lengths in districts situated in the Midwest than in the
East. Likewise, offense severity has a weaker effect on sentence lengths in districts situated in
the West than in the East. None of the district-level variables had a significant interaction with
upward departure/variance.
The results of this final “mixed model” further indicate that districts situated in the
western region of the United States have average supervised release sentences that are 28.7%
longer than those in the east. Legal factors including number of counts, criminal history score,
plea, detained, downward departure/variance, and offense severity are significantly associated
with supervised release length. Extralegal factors are less relevant for this outcome.
Table 5.18 about here
In sum, results indicate that both individual-level legal and extralegal factors as well as
district-level contextual factors are significantly associated with supervised sentence length, but
legally relevant factors are far more important than extra-legal factors. In addition, this section
showed that the effects of offense severity and upward departure vary across courts. Finally,
district location and child pornography caseload condition the effects of offense severity across
courts.
SECTION III: The Decision to Impose Lifetime Supervised Release
This section examines the factors that are related to the binary outcome of the supervised
release sentence – the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. I explore this binary
outcome because I am interested in discovering factors associated with this most severe outcome.
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There are important ramifications for those who receive the life term including never being
discharged from supervision and the possibility of life incarceration if revoked.
First, I present the results from generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLM) that
examine the influence of individual-level legal and extralegal factors, followed by results from
district-level and full two-level models. An unconditional model was not run because there is no
level-1 variance component included in the multilevel logistic model. According to Johnson
(2010), this is because the level 1 variance is heteroskedastic and completely determined by the
value of p where p is the predicted probability for the level-1 model. Johnson (2010) notes that
the standard formulas for the intraclass correlation and explained variance at level-1 cannot be
directly applied to the case of a binary dependent variable.
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors and the Decision to Impose Lifetime
Supervised Release
With the decision to impose lifetime supervised release (yes/no) as the outcome variable,
and level-2 representing federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only
level-1 legal predictors [see Table 5.19 (Model 1)]. When individual-level covariates
corresponding to legal factors are added to the model, several variables have statistically
significant coefficients. Criminal history score, downward departure/variance, plea, and
detention, are statistically significant predictors of the decision to impose lifetime supervised
release sentence for child pornography offenders. Offenders who accept a guilty plea are over
two times more likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised release compared to those offenders
who go to trial (OR = 2.1), as are those offenders who are in custody at the time of sentencing
compared to those on bond (OR = 1.97). As anticipated, receiving a downward
departure/variance decreased the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release by a factor of .41.
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Upward departure/variance was not statistically significant. In addition, there is a non-linear
relationship between offense severity and the decision to impose lifetime supervised release as
indicated by the significant quadratic term for this variable (see Figure 5.6). There is also a nonlinear relationship for number of counts as indicated by the significant quadratic term (see Figure
5.7).
Table 5.19 (Model 1) and Figures 5.6 and 5.7 about here
Next, extralegal variables were added to the model to see if they explain lifetime
supervised release above and beyond the effects of legally relevant variables [see Table 5.19
(Model 2)]. Of the extralegal factors, only age is significant at alpha =.05. Offenders age 50 and
older are 1.45 times more likely than those under age 50 to be sentenced to lifetime supervised
release.67 Recall, age is not a significant predictor of supervised release length.
Table 5.19 (Model 2) about here
To assess whether the effects of legal and extralegal variables differed depending on the
severity of the offense, I created a series of multiplicative interaction terms between the offense
severity score and each of the legal and extralegal variables. These two-way interaction terms
were added one at a time into the model containing legal and extralegal variables. The
interaction term of offense severity and upward departure is the only two-way interaction that is
statistically significant; however, there are very few cases with less serious offenses that received
an upward departure. Using offense type as a proxy for seriousness, of the ten offenders with
production offenses who received an upward departure/variance, seven (70.0%) received lifetime

67

Alternate measure of age including age squared and age as a continuous measure were not statistically significant
predictors of the decision to impose lifetime supervised release.
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supervised release. By comparison, of the thirty offenders convicted of non-production offenses
and who received and upward departure/variance, only ten (33.3%) were sentenced to lifetime
supervised release.
Variability in the Effects of Individual-Level Variables on the Decision to Impose Lifetime
Supervised Release across Courts
To determine whether the effects of legal and extralegal factors on the decision to impose
lifetime supervised release vary significantly across district courts, I estimated a random
coefficient model allowing one at a time, the coefficients for each of my variables to vary across
courts. The results indicate that none of the effects of legal and extralegal factors vary
significantly across courts.
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on the Decision to Impose Lifetime
Supervised Release
Next, I investigated whether the decision to impose lifetime supervised release is related
to court context. First, district-level factors were added one at a time to the model without any of
the level-1 factors (see Table 5.20). As in the models for length of supervised release, the
likelihood of receiving lifetime supervised release is related to whether the state in which the
district is located has a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child pornography and
whether the district is located in the West versus the East. These variables remain statistically
significant predictors of lifetime supervised release when all the contextual measures were added
to the model at once. Again, only region and state are retained in the final model because the
other contextual factors have t-values less than 1 (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Offenders
sentenced in districts situated in states with a mandatory minimum state-level penalty for
possession of child pornography are two times (OR=2.00) more likely to receive lifetime
supervised release than those districts situated within states without a state-level mandatory
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minimum. Similarly, districts situated in West were two times more likely than those in the East
to sentence offenders to lifetime supervised release.
Table 5.20 about here
Individual and District-Level Effects on the Decision to Impose Lifetime Supervised
Release - Best Fitting Model
Next, I modeled the fully conditional hierarchical logistic model including all of the
individual-level covariates from the previous version of the model (see Table 5.21). Following
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from
the model and therefore, state and region were the only district-level factors included at level-2.
In this model, all of the previous legal factors that were found in the initial model for the
decision to impose lifetime supervised release without the level-2 factors remain significant.
Similarly, the previous extralegal factor of age found to be statistically significant when only
level-1 factors are included in the model continues to be statistically significant. Only the
district-level contextual factor for West was found to be statistically significant. Using this full
random intercept model, I employed random coefficient model to ascertain if the predictors in
this full random intercept model differed across courts. None of the predictors differed across
courts.
Table 5.21 about here
SECTION IV: Four-Category Ordinal Measure of the Supervised Release Sentence
Here, I present the results of my research questions using my four-category ordinal
measure of the supervised release sentence. In this section, I estimated my models using
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hierarchical ordinal regression. Again, a null model was not estimated because there is no level
1 variance component included in the multilevel ordinal model.
Relationship between Individual-Level Factors on the Four-Category Measure of the
Supervised Release Sentence
With the four categories representing my ordinal outcome variable, and level-2
representing federal district courts, I estimate a random intercept model with only level-1 legal
and extralegal predictors. Several level-1 legal predictors have statistically significant
coefficients. From this model [see Table 5.22 (Model 1)], I can conclude that criminal history
score, method of conviction (plea vs, trial), being held in pretrial detention and downward
departure/variance are significantly related to the log odds of being sentenced to a higher
supervised release term category. A one unit increase in the criminal history score increases the
odds of being sentenced to the higher supervised release category by a factor of 1.3, controlling
for all other factors in the model. Offenders who receive an upward departure/variance are 2.4
times more likely to receive a sentence in the higher supervised release category than those
sentenced within the guidelines. Offenders who are detained are 1.57 times more likely to be
sentenced to the higher supervised release category compared to those released before
sentencing. There are non-linear relationships between the ordinal measure of supervised release
and number of counts as well as the offense severity. As a side note, the legal factors that are
related to this ordinal measure of supervised release length are the same as those associated with
the continuous measure.
Table 5.22 (Model 1) about here
Next, extralegal variables were added to the model along with legal variables [see Table
5.22 (Model 2)]. Of the extralegal factors, citizenship, race (white) and dependents are
statistically significant predictors of supervised release category. U.S. citizens are almost two

142

times more likely (OR= 1.87) than non-citizens to be sentenced in the higher supervised release
category, controlling for all other factors in the model. Non-whites are 1.3 times more likely
than whites to be sentenced to a higher supervised release category, while not having dependent
increases the log odds of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category by a factor of
1.25.68 The effects of legal variables remain relatively unchanged by the addition of extralegal
variables.
Table 5.22 (Model 2) about here
Variability in the Effects of Individual-Level Variables on the Four-Category Measure of
the Supervised Release Sentence
Next, I assessed whether the effects of legal and extralegal predictors on the fourcategory measure of supervised release vary significantly across district courts using a random
coefficient model. The coefficients for each of the independent variables were allowed to vary
across courts one at a time. The results showed that none of the effects of the legal and
extralegal factors varied significantly across courts.
Effects of District-Level Contextual Variables on the Four-Category Measure of the
Supervised Release Sentence
With the term of supervised release divided into four categories: short-term, intermediate,
long-term, and lifetime as the outcome variable, I first modeled only the district-level covariates
without any of the level-1 factors (see Table 5.23). In this model, only the contextual factors of
state and region (West) was statistically significant in predicting the category of supervised

68

To aid in interpretation, since the odds ratio of dependents was less than 1, I chose to invert the value. For
example, for the odds ratio for dependents, 1 divided by .795 equals 1.257.
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release.69 District courts situated within states with a mandatory minimum state level penalty for
possession of child pornography are 2.03 times more likely to sentence offenders to the higher
supervised release category compared to districts situated in states without a mandatory
minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography. Districts situated in the
Western region of the U.S., are 2.45 times more likely than those in the East to sentence
offenders to the higher supervised release category.
Table 5.23 about here
Individual and District-Level Effects on the Four-Category Ordinal Measure of the
Supervised Release Sentence - Best Fitting Final Model
Next, both level-1 and level-2 factors are entered into the model using the four-category
ordinal measure of supervised release and contextual factors with t values greater than 1 are
retained in the model (see Table 5.24). 70 Region (west) is the only district-level contextual
factor that is significant at alpha =.05. The variable measuring whether the district court is
situated within a state that has a mandatory minimum penalty for possession of child
pornography is marginally significant (alpha = .10). The effects of legal and extra-legal
individual level factors are relatively unchanged except race (white) is only marginally
significant (alpha = .10).
Table 5.24 about here

69

I also modeled each district-level factor one at a time without any level 1 factors and only the variable state was
statistically significant.
70
Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), I excluded district-level variables with t values less than 1 from the
model and therefore state and region were the only district-level factors included at level 2.
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Using this full random intercept model, I employed a random coefficient model to
ascertain if the effects of the predictors in this full random intercept model differed across courts.
None of them indicated that legal and extralegal factors matter the same across courts.
Summary
In sum, most of the variation of supervised release sentences for child pornography
offenses exists at the individual-level, and most of variance in sentencing outcomes is explained
by individual-level factors. Specifically, examination of the fixed effects reveal results that are
largely consistent with prior research on individual-level legal sentencing factors (see Spohn,
2000). Across all models, individual-level legal factors exhibit stronger influences on supervised
release sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and a four-category
measure of supervised release. For example, criminal history score and offense severity both
increase supervised release sentence length, the likelihood of lifetime supervised release, and the
likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category. But some extralegal
individual-level factors also explain some of the variance in supervised release sentences, albeit a
very small portion. For instance, being white and having dependents both decreased supervised
release length and the likelihood of being sentenced to the higher supervised release category.
These extralegal findings are consistent with federal sentencing literature, which generally finds
that, despite the advent of the federal guidelines, extralegal factors in sentencing outcomes have
not been eliminated.
Consistent with other multilevel sentencing studies, some of the effects of individuallevel factors varied significantly across district courts, but only for the sentence of supervised
release sentence length. Finally, there is significant between-district variation in sentencing that
was not explained by individual-level case factors, but rather by district-level contextual factors.
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Across most of the models court location (region) and the existence of state-level mandatory
minimum penalties for the state offense of possession of child pornography are related to the
supervised release sentence. Finally, the effects offense severity across courts was conditioned
by district location and child pornography caseload.
The main overarching finding of the data analyses is that the effects of many individuallevel legal and extralegal factors as well as district-level contextual factors of the sentence of
supervised release mirror those found generally for the sentence of imprisonment. There are,
however, a few exceptions such as the effect of plea and the effect of education (i.e., those with
high level education are in some cases sentenced more harshly). Table 5.25 summarizes my
hypotheses and how they fared in this investigation.
Table 5.25 about here
The next chapter which is the discussion chapter of this dissertation explains these results
in detail in light of moral panic, the focal concerns and the court communities’ perspectives as
well as the social/group threat perspective.
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Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics (Mean or Percentages) for Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables

Mean/Percent

SD

Min

Max

Dependent variables
Supervised Release Sentence length (capped at 470 months)

242.03

Lifetime Supervised Release

Yes

33.2%

No

66.8%

Four-Category Ordinal Measure

170.78

12

470

0.902

1

6

32

5.49

16

43

1.49

1.66

1

26

4589

0

100000

Short-term

20.1%

Intermediate

28.2%

Long-term

18.6%

Lifetime

33.2%

Independent variables: Case / Inidvidual (N=1900)
Legal Factors
Plea

Guilty Plea/Nolo Contendere
Trial

4.3%

Within guidelines
Departure

Upward depart/variance
Downward depart/variance

Criminal History Score
Sex Offender Enhancement

2.2%
63.3%
1.37
5.2%

No

94.8%

Number of Counts of Conviction

Offense Type

34.5%

Yes

Offense Severity Score

Detained

95.7%

Yes

61.3%

No

38.7%

Nonproduction

87.5%

Production

12.5%

Age (19-49)

72.7%

Age (50 and over)

27.3%

White

86.5%

Nonwhite

13.5%

Extralegal Factors
Age
Race

Education

Less than HS

9.2%

HS Graduate

36.2%

Some College

36.7%

College Graduate

17.9%
808.0

US Citizen

96.9%

Fine
Citizenship
Dependents

Non US Citizen
Yes

3.1%
29.6%

No

70.4%
District Level variables (N=89)

District Size
Child Porn Caseload Rate
Guidelines Compliance Rate
Mandatory Minimum State-level Penalty
Kimbrough -based Policy Disagreement

Region

No

7

5.60

1

28

3.7%

2.4%

0.2%

13.1%

51.1%

13.4%

22.8%

81.0%

73%

50.6%

Yes

49.4%

Reject

75.3%

Do not reject

24.7%

West

19.1%

South

42.7%

East

15.7%

Midwest

22.5%

Percent Republican

50.4%

9.6%

28%

District Mean Supervised Release Sentence Length

240.11

101.4

60

470

District Mean Percent Lifetime Supervised Release

33.2%

26.03%

0%

100%
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Table 5.2
Descriptive Statistics by Offense Type
Nonproduction
(N= 1663)
Mean /
Percentage

Variables

SD

Production
(N=237)

Min

Mean /
Percentage

Max

SD

Min

Max

Dependent variables
Supervised Release Sentence length (capped at 470 months)

229.09

Lifetime Supervised Release

Yes

29.7%

167.35

12

470

332.79
57.4%

No

70.3%

42.6%

Four-category Ordinal Measure

Short-term

20.6%

9.3%

Intermediate

29.8%

16.9%

Long-term

18.9%

16.5%

Lifetime

29.7%

57.4%

96.5%

90.3%

167.37

36

470

1.263

1

6

Independent variables: Case / Individual (N=1900)
Legal Factors
Plea

Guilty Plea/Nolo Contendere
Trial
Within guideline

Departure

Upward departure/variance
Downward departure/variance

Criminal History Score
Sex Offender Enhancement

3.5%

9.7%

34.5%

48.5%

2.1%

4.2%

63.4%

47.3%

1.33
Yes

0.7%

No

99.3%

0.831

1

6

1.67
36.4%
63.6%

Offense Severity Score

30.90

4.90

16

43

39.13

3.8

24

43

Number of Counts of Conviction

1.30

1.40

1

26

2.28

2.5

1

21

4027.0

0

50000

Detained

Yes

56.7%

93.7%

No

43.3%

6.3%

Age (19-49)

72.2%

76.4%

Age (50 and over)

27.8%

23.6%

White

87.3%

81.0%

Nonwhite

12.7%

19.0%

Less than HS

8.6%

13.2%

HS Graduate

36.1%

36.3%

Some College

37.1%

33.8%

College Graduate

18.1%

Extralegal Factors
Age
Race

Education

817.07

Fine
Citizenship
Dependents

US Citizen
Non US Citizen

97.1%

16.7%
4665.0

0

100000

745.99
95.8%

2.9%

4.2%

Yes

27.9%

41.0%

No

72.1%

59.0%
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Table 5.3
Bivariate Correlation Matrix – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal Factors
Supervised
Release in
Months

Fine
Fine

Pearson
Correlation

1

Supervised
Release in
Months
Number of
Counts

Pearson
Correlation

-.007

Pearson
Correlation

-.005

.167

Sex Offender
Enhancement

Pearson
Correlation

.020

.178

Criminal
History Score

Pearson
Correlation

-.027

.146

Offense
Pearson
Severity Score Correlation

-.001

.338

Race

Offense Type

Plea

Detained

Citizenship

Dependents

Age > 50

Pearson
Correlation

.025

Pearson
Correlation

.005

Pearson
Correlation

.008

Number
Criminal Offense
of
Sex Offender History Severity
Counts Enhancement Score
Score

**

**

**

**

-.033

**

Detained Citizenship Dependents

Age > 50

**

.022

.157

**

.392

.277

-.004

**

-.180

-.007

-.155

**

.128

-.201

1

.184

**

-.027

**

-.533

**

-.092

**

.161

1
**

1

-.007

-.015

.065

**

-.124

**

-.491

**

-.086

**

-.194

**

.252

**

.310

*

Pearson
Correlation

-.052

*

.010

.008

-.042

.018

-.019

-.023

.041

.052

**

.012

-.025

-.020

-.056

.120

Plea

1

-.052

Pearson
Correlation

Race

1

Pearson
Correlation

Pearson
Correlation

Lifetime
Offense Supervised
Type
Release

.276

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**

**

1

.061

**

.031

.102

**

**

-.015

-.251

**

.036

-.010

*

.005

*

1

**

-.078

**

.270

.004

**

.114

-.012

**

.240

1

*

.026

.008

.008

**

-.012

.012

.031

.040

-.028

-.096

1

-.054

**

1

.023

-.022

1

*

.026

-.031

-.078

-.050

1
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Table 5.4
Bivariate Correlation Matrix – District-Level Factors
Child
Mean
Pornography
Kimbrough Supervised
District Caseload
Guidelines
based Policy
Release Length Size
Rate
Compliance Rate Disagreement
Mean Supervised
Release Length
District Size

Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Child Pornography Pearson
Caseload Rate
Correlation

Percent
Republican in
2012
Presidential
Election

Mandatory
Minimum
State-level
Penalty

Percent
Lifetime
Supervised
Release

1
-.155
.010

1
-.245

*

Guidelines
Pearson
*
.117
-.267
Compliance Rate Correlation
Kimbrough -based Pearson
Policy
Correlation
.103
-.152
Disagreement
Mandatory
Pearson
**
Minimum StateCorrelation
-.084
.282
level Penalty
Percent
Pearson
Republican in
Correlation
.052 -.312**
2012 Presidential
Election
Percent Lifetime Pearson
**
-.113
.957
Supervise Release Correlation
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

1
-.129

1

*

.288

**

1

-.090

.421

**

.202

-.078

.465

**

-.238

-.001

.087

1

**

.337

**

1

.072

.272

**

.030

.518

1
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Table 5.5
89 Districts with Percentage of Cases Sentence to Short-term, Intermediate, Long-term and
Lifetime Supervised Release
District

Short-term

Intermediate Longterm

Lifetime

Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South
Texas West

33.2%
57.1%
0.0%
0.0%
15.0%
32.0%
10.4%
57.1%
24.4%
28.6%
71.4%
77.3%
23.8%
17.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
52.9%
15.4%
25.0%
25.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
12.2%
33.3%
0.0%
70.8%
12.2%
12.8%
20.4%

33.2%
42.9%
20.0%
60.0%
50.0%
52.0%
6.9%
42.9%
17.8%
42.9%
14.3%
18.2%
57.1%
47.5%
39.4%
23.1%
0.0%
46.4%
34.7%
5.9%
30.8%
25.0%
33.3%
16.7%
33.3%
100.0%
19.5%
33.3%
0.0%
8.3%
39.1%
21.2%
25.9%

0.0%
0.0%
80.0%
40.0%
30.0%
16.0%
44.8%
0.0%
11.1%
14.2%
14.3%
4.5%
14.3%
15.0%
42.8%
64.1%
100.0%
17.9%
56.5%
41.2%
28.8%
37.5%
25.0%
16.6%
16.7%
0.0%
51.2%
33.4%
80.0%
8.4%
41.4%
44.8%
33.3%

33.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5.0%
0.0%
37.9%
0.0%
46.7%
14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
4.8%
20.0%
17.8%
12.8%
0.0%
35.7%
8.7%
0.0%
25.0%
12.5%
16.7%
66.7%
0.0%
0.0%
17.1%
0.0%
20.0%
12.5%
7.3%
21.2%
20.4%
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Kentucky East
Kentucky West
Michigan East
Michigan West
Ohio North
Ohio South
Tennessee East
Tennessee Middle
Tennessee West
Illinois Central
Illinois North
Illinois South
Indiana North
Indiana South
Wisconsin East
Wisconsin West
Arkansas East
Arkansas West
Iowa North
Iowa South
Minnesota
Missouri East
Missouri West
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Alaska
Arizona
California Central
California East
California North
California South
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Washington East
Washington West
Colorado

0.0%
18.1%
81.3%
21.7%
44.4%
19.2%
15.8%
27.3%
0.0%
3.1%
37.5%
19.2%
38.9%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
17.6%
27.3%
41.2%
62.9%
10.0%
0.0%
21.1%
43.3%
38.5%
60.0%
0.0%
6.3%
3.7%
3.6%
56.3%
23.5%
20.0%
18.2%
5.3%
4.2%
30.0%
18.2%
6.7%
0.0%

0.0%
36.4%
15.6%
21.7%
27.8%
30.8%
15.8%
36.4%
71.4%
21.9%
6.3%
38.5%
11.1%
11.1%
43.8%
0.0%
58.8%
27.3%
41.2%
34.3%
20.0%
4.8%
34.2%
23.3%
15.4%
20.0%
25.0%
6.3%
18.5%
45.5%
25.0%
58.8%
20.0%
9.1%
21.1%
4.2%
20.0%
0.0%
13.3%
33.3%

55.6%
18.2%
0.0%
4.3%
5.6%
17.3%
31.6%
36.4%
28.6%
12.5%
25.0%
15.4%
22.2%
8.3%
6.3%
22.2%
0.0%
18.2%
5.9%
2.9%
55.0%
7.1%
15.8%
10.0%
0.0%
20.0%
50.0%
6.3%
18.5%
43.6%
0.0%
9.8%
40.0%
54.5%
31.6%
16.7%
0.0%
9.1%
20.0%
16.7%

44.4%
27.3%
3.1%
52.2%
22.2%
32.7%
36.8%
0.0%
0.0%
62.5%
31.3%
26.9%
27.8%
80.6%
25.0%
77.8%
23.5%
27.3%
11.8%
0.0%
15.0%
88.1%
28.9%
23.3%
46.2%
0.0%
25.0%
81.3%
59.3%
7.3%
18.8%
7.8%
20.0%
18.2%
42.1%
75.0%
50.0%
72.7%
60.0%
50.0%
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Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

70.0%
23.1%
100.0%
0.0%
41.7%
16.7%
4.8%
0.0%
7.7%
0.0%
5.6%
0.0%
11.4%
0.0%
12.5%
20.0%

25.0%
46.2%
0.0%
83.3%
25.0%
16.7%
38.1%
0.0%
30.8%
0.0%
39.4%
44.4%
27.3%
0.0%
43.8%
0.0%

5.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
16.7%
36.7%
38.1%
0.0%
7.7%
0.0%
38.0%
33.3%
34.1%
77.8%
12.5%
20.0%

0.0%
30.8%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
30.0%
19.0%
100.0%
53.8%
100.0%
16.9%
22.9%
27.3%
22.2%
31.3%
60.0%
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Table 5.6
89 Districts with Percentage of the Total sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography
Cases in Each District
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South
Texas West
Kentucky East
Kentucky West

0.3%
0.7%
0.3%
0.5%
1.1%
1.3%
1.5%
0.7%
2.4%
0.7%
0.4%
1.2%
1.1%
1.5%
2.0%
2.1%
0.7%
1.5%
1.2%
0.9%
2.7%
0.4%
0.6%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
2.2%
0.2%
0.3%
1.3%
2.2%
2.5%
2.8%
0.5%
0.6%

Michigan East
1.7%
Michigan West
1.2%
Ohio North
0.9%
Ohio South
2.7%
Tennessee East 1.0%
Tennessee Middle 0.6%
Tennessee West 0.7%
Illinois Central
1.7%
Illinois North
0.8%
Illinois South
1.4%
Indiana North
0.9%
Indiana South
1.9%
Wisconsin East
0.8%
Wisconsin West 0.5%
Arkansas East
0.9%
Arkansas West 0.6%
Iowa North
0.9%
Iowa South
1.8%
Minnesota
1.1%
Missouri East
2.2%
Missouri West
2.0%
Nebraska
1.6%
North Dakota
0.7%
South Dakota
0.3%
Alaska
0.2%
Arizona
0.8%
California Central 2.8%
California East
2.9%
California North 0.8%
California South 2.7%
Hawaii
0.3%
Idaho
0.6%
Montana
1.0%
Nevada
2.5%
Oregon
1.1%

Washington East
Washington West
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

0.6%
0.8%
0.3%
1.1%
0.7%
0.2%
0.3%
0.6%
1.6%
1.1%
0.2%
0.7%
0.1%
3.7%
0.5%
2.3%
0.5%
0.8%
0.3%
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Table 5.7
89 Districts with Percentage Sentenced to Short-Term, Intermediate, Long-term, Lifetime
Supervised Release (Non-production Cases Only)
District

Shortterm

Intermediate

Longterm

Lifetime

Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina
Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South

40.0%
57.1%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
34.8%
12.5%
57.1%
27.5%
28.6%
71.4%
77.3%
27.7%
18.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

40.0%
42.9%
33.3%
0.0%
50.0%
52.2%
8.3%
42.9%
17.5%
42.9%
14.6%
18.2%
61.1%
51.4%
45.8%
29.0%
0.0%
50.0%

20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
60.0%
5.5%
0.0%
41.7%
0.0%
52.5%
14.2%
0.0%
0.0%
5.6%
21.6%
20.8%
16.1%
0.0%
45.5%

0.0%
0.0%
66.7%
40.0%
27.8%
13.0%
37.5%
0.0%
2.5%
14.3%
14.5%
4.5%
5.6%
8.1%
33.3%
54.9%
100.0%
4.5%

0.0%
60.0%
17.5%
28.6%
27.0%
0.0%
60.0%
0.0%
13.9%
50.0%
0.0%
80.0%
13.2%
11.9%

38.1%
6.7%
35.0%
28.6%
36.4%
16.7%
20.0%
100.0%
22.2%
50.0%
0.0%
10.0%
36.8%
23.8%

9.5%
0.0%
27.5%
14.3%
18.2%
66.7%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
20.0%
5.0%
7.9%
23.8%

52.4%
33.3%
20.0%
28.6%
18.4%
16.7%
20.0%
0.0%
47.2%
0.0%
80.0%
5.0%
42.1%
40.5%
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Texas West
Kentucky East
Kentucky West
Michigan East
Michigan West
Ohio North
Ohio South
Tennessee East
Tennessee Middle
Tennessee West
Illinois Central
Illinois North
Illinois South
Indiana North
Indiana South
Wisconsin East
Wisconsin West
Arkansas East
Arkansas West
Iowa North
Iowa South
Minnesota
Missouri East
Missouri West
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Alaska
Arizona
California Central
California East
California North
California South
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Washington East
Washington West

22.0%
0.0%
18.2%
81.3%
22.2%
44.4%
19.6%
17.7%
37.5%
0.0%
3.8%
35.7%
18.2%
43.8%
0.0%
30.8%
0.0%
20.0%
42.9%
55.6%
66.7%
14.3%
0.0%
19.2%
50.0%
38.5%
60.0%
0.0%
6.7%
3.8%
3.7%
64.3%
20.8%
25.0%
25.0%
6.7%
4.3%
35.3%
25.0%
7.1%

28.0%
0.0%
36.4%
15.6%
27.8%
27.8%
34.8%
17.6%
37.5%
100.0%
26.9%
0.0%
45.5%
12.5%
12.1%
38.5%
0.0%
60.0%
14.3%
44.4%
30.3%
28.6%
5.6%
42.3%
29.2%
15.4%
20.0%
25.0%
6.7%
18.9%
46.3%
28.6%
62.5%
25.0%
12.5%
20.0%
4.3%
17.6%
0.0%
14.3%

20.0%
57.1%
18.1%
0.0%
5.6%
5.6%
17.4%
35.3%
25.0%
0.0%
15.4%
28.6%
18.2%
25.0%
9.1%
0.0%
22.0%
0.0%
28.6%
0.0%
3.0%
50.0%
8.3%
15.4%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
50.0%
6.7%
18.9%
42.6%
0.0%
8.3%
50.0%
62.5%
40.0%
17.0%
0.0%
0.0%
21.4%

30.0%
42.9%
27.3%
3.1%
44.4%
22.2%
28.3%
29.4%
0.0%
0.0%
53.9%
35.7%
18.2%
18.7%
78.8%
30.8%
77.8%
20.0%
14.3%
0.0%
0.0%
7.1%
86.1%
23.1%
20.8%
46.2%
0.0%
25.0%
80.0%
58.5%
7.4%
7.1%
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
74.5%
47.1%
75.0%
57.1%
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Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

0.0%
78.6%
18.2%
100.0%
0.0%
30.0%
22.7%
4.8%
0.0%
11.1%
0.0%
4.4%
0.0%
11.6%
0.0%
13.3%
50.0%

40.0%
14.3%
45.5%
0.0%
83.3%
30.0%
18.2%
38.1%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
38.4%
42.9%
27.9%
0.0%
46.7%
0.0%

20.0%
7.1%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
20.0%
31.8%
31.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
41.3%
28.6%
34.9%
87.5%
6.7%
50.0%

40.0%
0.0%
36.4%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
27.3%
19.0%
100.0%
55.6%
100.0%
15.9%
28.6%
25.6%
12.5%
33.3%
0.0%
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Table 5.8
89 Districts with Percentage of the Total Sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography
Cases (Non-production Offenses)
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South
Texas West
Kentucky East
Kentucky West

0.3%
0.8%
0.2%
0.6%
1.1%
1.4%
1.4%
0.8%
2.4%
0.8%
0.4%
1.3%
1.2%
2.2%
1.4%
1.9%
0.7%
1.3%
1.3%
0.9%
2.4%
0.4%
0.7%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
2.2%
10.0%
0.3%
1.2%
2.3%
2.5%
3.0%
0.4%
0.7%

Michigan East
1.9%
Michigan West
1.1%
Ohio North
1.1%
Ohio South
2.8%
Tennessee East 1.0%
Tennessee Middle 0.5%
Tennessee West 0.5%
Illinois Central
1.6%
Illinois North
0.8%
Illinois South
1.3%
Indiana North
1.0%
Indiana South
2.0%
Wisconsin East
0.8%
Wisconsin West 0.5%
Arkansas East
0.9%
Arkansas West 0.4%
Iowa North
0.5%
Iowa South
2.0%
Minnesota
0.8%
Missouri East
2.2%
Missouri West
1.6%
Nebraska
1.4%
North Dakota
0.8%
South Dakota
0.3%
Alaska
0.2%
Arizona
0.9%
California Central 3.2%
California East
3.2%
California North 0.8%
California South 2.9%
Hawaii
0.2%
Idaho
0.5%
Montana
0.9%
Nevada
2.8%
Oregon
1.0%

Washington East
Washington West
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

0.5%
0.8%
0.3%
0.8%
0.7%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
1.3%
1.3%
0.2%
0.5%
0.1%
3.8%
0.4%
2.6%
0.5%
0.9%
0.1%
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Table 5.9
89 Districts with Percentage Sentenced to Short-term, Intermediate, Long-term and Lifetime
Supervised Release (Production Offenses)
District

Short-term

Intermediate

Long-term

Lifetime

Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South
Texas West

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
66.7%
0.0%
0.0%

100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%

0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
80.0%
0.0%
80.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
66.7%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
66.7%
100.0%
100.0%
58.3%
100.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
80.0%
100.0%
0.0%
25.0%
33.3%
80.0%
75.0%
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Kentucky East
Kentucky West
Michigan East
Michigan West
Ohio North
Ohio South
Tennessee East
Tennessee Middle
Tennessee West
Illinois Central
Illinois North
Illinois South
Indiana North
Indiana South
Wisconsin East
Wisconsin West
Arkansas East
Arkansas West
Iowa North
Iowa South
Minnesota
Missouri East
Missouri West
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Alaska
Arizona
California Central
California East
California North
California South
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Washington East
Washington West
Colorado

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
66.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
20.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
66.7%
0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
37.5%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
16.7%
0.0%
66.7%
80.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
12.5%
0.0%
66.7%
0.0%
16.7%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%

50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
80.0%
0.0%
66.7%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
75.0%
100.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
25.0%
0.0%
33.3%
100.0%
41.7%
33.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
100.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
100.0%
66.7%
75.0%
100.0%
66.7%
66.7%
100.0%
100.0%

160

Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
12.5%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
50.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
12.5%
50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
37.5%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
100.0%
100.0%
0.0%
100.0%
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Table 5.10
89 Districts with Percentage of Total Sample (N=1,900) of Child Pornography Cases
(Production Cases)
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York East
New York North
New York South
New York West
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Pennsylvania East
Pennsylvania West
Pennsylvania Middle
Maryland
North Carolina East
North Carolina Middle
North Carolina West
South Carolina
Virginia East
Virginia West
West Virginia North
West Virginia South
Louisiana East
Louisiana Middle
Louisiana West
Mississippi North
Mississippi South
Texas East
Texas North
Texas South
Texas West
Kentucky East
Kentucky West

0.4%
0.0%
0.8%
0.0%
0.8%
0.8%
2.1%
0.0%
2.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.3%
1.3%
1.7%
3.4%
0.8%
2.5%
0.8%
0.8%
5.1%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
2.1%
0.4%
0.0%
1.7%
1.3%
2.1%
1.7%
0.8%
0.0%

Michigan East
Michigan West
Ohio North
Ohio South
Tennessee East
Tennessee Middle
Tennessee West
Illinois Central
Illinois North
Illinois South
Indiana North
Indiana South
Wisconsin East
Wisconsin West
Arkansas East
Arkansas West
Iowa North
Iowa South
Minnesota
Missouri East
Missouri West
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Alaska
Arizona
California Central
California East
California North
California South
Hawaii
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
Oregon

0.0%
2.1%
0.0%
2.5%
0.8%
1.3%
2.1%
2.5%
0.8%
1.7%
0.8%
1.3%
1.3%
0.0%
0.8%
1.7%
3.4%
0.8%
2.5%
2.5%
5.1%
2.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0.8%
1.3%
0.4%
1.3%
1.7%
0.4%
1.3%

Washington East
Washington West
Colorado
Kansas
New Mexico
Oklahoma East
Oklahoma North
Oklahoma West
Utah
Wyoming
Alabama Middle
Alabama North
Alabama South
Florida Middle
Florida North
Florida South
Georgia Middle
Georgia North
Georgia South

1.3%
0.4%
0.4%
2.5%
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.8%
3.4%
0.0%
0.0%
1.7%
0.0%
3.4%
0.8%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
1.3%
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Table 5.11
Unconditional Model of Supervised Release Sentence Length (logged)
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
b
Intercept (y00)
Random Effects
Level 1 (rij)
Level 2 (uoj)
Deviance= 4014.780504

Parameters = 2

5.17
Var. Comp
0.47705
0.1794

SE

df

p-value

0.04

88

<.001

df

X2

88

745.1877

SD
0.69069
0.42356

p-value Intraclass Coeff.
<.001

0.273
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Table 5.12
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal
Factors
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Model 1
Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History Score
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50

b
5.166614
0.062707
0.004863
0.072678
-0.005698
0.247289
0.190964
0.083659
-0.199277
0.000813
-0.003218

Model 2
SE
0.0456***
0.023286**
0.067152
0.020072***
0.02955
0.080055**
0.033532***
0.168175
0.042142***
0.000454*
0.001121**

b
5.166998
0.064545
0.007328
0.068885
-0.0051
0.24852
0.202326
0.101386
-0.19933
0.000799
-0.00337
0.00000
-0.08211
0.197196
-0.06612
0.131794
-0.0238
0.106518
0.01511
2

Random Effects
Var.Comp.
SD
X
Level 1
0.3702 0.60844
Level 2
0.15729
0.3966 861.00
Deviance=3618.619741
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

df
88

SE
0.045543***
0.023080 **
0.066417
0.020618 ***
0.029516
0.079246 **
0.034275 ***
0.166063
0.041927 ***
0.000451 *
0.001103 ***
0.000002
0.042731**
0.078998**
0.033867**
0.048219**
0.036533
0.04747**
0.031491
2

p-value Random Effects Var.Comp. SD
X
Level 1
0.36648 0.60538
<0.001
Level 2
0.15712 0.39638 864.39
Deviance= 3647.556054
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

df

p-value

88

<0.001
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Table 5.13
Random Intercepts Models (Supervised Release Length) – Random Coefficients
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Model 1
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Overall mean (intercept)
5.169145 0.044673***
Number of Counts
0.066182 0.021477 **
Sex Offender Enhancement
-0.00488 0.057689
Criminal History
0.067512 0.020708 **
Offense Severity
-0.005305 0.026864
Plea
0.25114 0.077912 ***
Detained
0.208376 0.035154 ***
Upward Depart/Variance
0.090955 0.161198
Downward Depart/Variance
-0.19194 0.041625 ***
Offense Severity Sq.
0.000821 0.000412 **
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.00335 0.001012 ***
Fine
0.000001 0.000002
White
-0.07657 0.041752 *
Citizen
0.206717 0.078060 **
Dependents
-0.05809 0.033680 *
Less than HS
0.12149 0.046879 **
Some College
-0.02458 0.036624
College Grad
0.098524 0.045696 **
Age > 50
0.02435 0.030333
Random Effects
Offense severity
Level 1
Level 2

Var.Comp.
SD
0.0003
0.01719
0.35840
0.59867
0.15072
0.38823

2

df
87

X
p-value
120.64 0.01

87

714.72 <0.001

Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History Score
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50

Model 2
b
5.169772
0.067254
-0.00565
0.067699
-0.00532
0.252164
0.208443
0.085261
-0.19145
0.000822
-0.0034
0.000001
-0.07661
0.205251
-0.05868
0.122972
-0.02342
0.099492
0.024302

Random Effects
Offense severity sq.
Level 1
Level 2

Var.Comp.
0.00000
0.3591
0.15009

S.E.
0.044608
0.021420 **
0.057579
0.020685 **
0.027009
0.078288***
0.035098***
0.160686
0.041625 ***
0.000413 **
0.001004 ***
0.000002
0.041527*
0.078091 **
0.033688 *
0.046982 **
0.036723
0.045838**
0.030404

Deviance= 3596.240545
Number of estimated parameters = 4

Deviance= 3596.461386
Number of estimated parameters = 4

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50

Model 3
b
5.171204
0.067348
0.1359
0.073128
-0.01245
0.260418
0.202816
0.10751
-0.19605
0.000908
-0.00376
0.000001
-0.07193
0.221043
-0.06945
0.133851
-0.01709
0.10335
0.017964

Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50

SE
0.045759***
0.022215**
0.064583
0.019058 ***
0.028126
0.079743***
0.034140***
0.16047
0.041539***
0.000427**
0.001010 **
0.000002
0.043046*
0.078555**
0.035034**
0.048653 **
0.037021
0.046956 **
0.03109

Random Effects
Upward depart/variance
Level 1
Level 2

Var.Comp.
0.49953
0.35709
0.15933

SD
0.70677
0.59797
0.39916

2

df
23

X
70.8

p-value
<0.001

23

422.34 <0.001

Model 4
b
5.170887
0.068259
-0.00599
0.069234
-0.0039
0.259201
0.199533
0.098677
-0.19536
0.000788
-0.00352
0.000001
-0.08383
0.208066
-0.06587
0.131401
-0.02408
0.105387
0.017213

S.D.
df
0.00026 85
0.59925
0.38741 85

2

X
117.53

p-value
0.01

702.34 <0.001

SE
0.045529***
0.022301**
0.065188
0.020822 ***
0.029109
0.079412***
0.034802***
0.169031
0.041369***
0.000444*
0.001044 ***
0.000002
0.041404**
0.078848 **
0.034174**
0.048339**
0.03601
0.046577**
0.031535

Random Effects
Downward Depart/Variance
Level 1
Level 2

Deviance= 3588.772427
Number of estimated parameters = 4

Deviance= 3609.857352
Number of estimated parameters = 4

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Var.Comp. SD
0.02517 0.15865
0.36155 0.60129
0.15597 0.39493

2

df
78

X
95.85

p-value
0.083

78

719.98

<0.001
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Table 5.14
Random Intercepts Models (Supervised Release Length) with Random Coefficients (Offense
Severity Score, Upward Depart/Variance, Downward Depart/Variance)
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50
Random Effects
Offense Severity
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Level 1
Level 2

b
5.161073
0.064721
0.017308
0.076992
-0.0074
0.239185
0.208994
0.116842
-0.185477
0.000824
-0.003288
0.00001
-0.076882
0.227406
-0.057935
0.124978
-0.01703
0.098922
0.017097
Var.Comp.
0.0003
0.57052
0.0278
0.34292
0.15463

Deviance= 3594.817997
Number of estimated parameters = 11
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SE
0.045127***
0.022131 **
0.058281
0.019169 ***
0.026599
0.076748 **
0.035137 ***
0.159121
0.039595 ***
0.000406* *
0.001085 **
0.000002
0.039001**
0.078471**
0.033102*
0.047314**
0.036324
0.046403**
0.029872
SD
0.01735
0.75532
0.16672
0.5856
0.39324

df
22
22
22

X2
47.41952
76.18816
28.00957

22

311.9662 <0.001

p-value
0.002
<0.001
0.175
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Table 5.15
Random Intercepts Model (Supervise Release Length) – District-Level Factors
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
b
Overall mean (intercept)
5.178009
Court Size
-0.01639
State w/mandatory min.
0.27573
Percent Republican
-0.00809
South
0.191631
West
0.373547
Midwest
0.04871
Random Effects
Level 1
Level 2

Var.Comp.
0.47702
0.15343

Deviance= 4023.308187
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SE
0.044021
0.008417**
0.093898**
0.005351
0.171789
0.162108 **
0.16684
SD
0.69067
0.3917

df
82

X

2

p-value

617.16 <0.001
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Table 5.16
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level and District-Level
Factors
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
b
Overall mean (intercept)
5.169091
Number of Counts
0.065207
Sex Offender Enhancement
0.009573
Criminal History
0.069323
Offense Severity
-0.00454
Plea
0.24883
Detained
0.202326
Upward Depart/Variance
0.103053
Downward Depart/Variance
-0.19643
Offense Severity Sq.
0.000789
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.0034
Fine
0.00
White
-0.07934
Citizen
0.195087
Dependents
-0.0664
Less than HS
0.131436
Some College
-0.02477
College Grad
0.106252
Age > 50
0.013428
State w/mandatory min.
0.178955
South
0.050419
West
0.287358
Midwest
-0.04037

Random Effects
Level 1
Level 2

Var.Comp.
0.36656
0.14552

Deviance=3648.449106
Number of estimated parameters = 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SE
0.042685
0.023125 **
0.06751
0.020611 ***
0.029461
0.079091 ***
0.034275 **
0.165379
0.042045 ***
0.000450 *
0.001101 **
0.000002
0.042393 *
0.078812 **
0.033780 **
0.048418**
0.036518
0.047428 **
0.031747
0.100544*
0.130736
0.128531 **
0.149012

SD
0.60544
0.38147

df

X2

p-value

84

742.77

<0.001
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Table 5.17
Random Intercepts Model (Supervised Release Length) – Individual-Level and District-Level
Factors with Random Coefficients (Offense Severity, Upward Depart/Variance and Downward
Depart/Variance)
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
Overall mean (intercept)
Number of Counts
Sex Offender Enhancement
Criminal History
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50
State w/mandatory min.
South
West
Midwest
Random Effects
Offense Severity
Upward Depart/Variance
Downward Depart/Variance
Level 1
Level 2

b
5.163487
0.06496
0.018295
0.07824
-0.007876
0.240138
0.206803
0.112204
-0.182936
0.000828
-0.003314
0.00000
-0.075188
0.225557
-0.057701
0.123432
-0.018312
0.099643
0.014426
0.142683
0.056783
0.198504
-0.054265
Var.Comp.
0.00031
0.60706
0.02853
0.34249
0.14438

Deviance=3599.173498
Number of estimated parameters = 11
p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SE
0.042511
0.022203 **
0.059114
0.019375 ***
0.026532
0.076561**
0.035140***
0.165773
0.039898 ***
0.000405**
0.001083 **
0.000002
0.039011**
0.078533**
0.032997*
0.047494**
0.036413
0.046620**
0.030414
0.09193
0.132012
0.122265*
0.15147
SD
0.01761
0.77914
0.1689
0.58523
0.37997

df
22
22
22

X2
47.37891
76.37784
28.21638

p-value
0.002
<0.001
0.168

18

280.79

<0.001
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Table 5.18
Fully Specified Final Mixed Model
Supervised release length in months (logged)
Fixed Effects
b
Overall mean (intercept)
5.165338
Number of Counts
0.063736
Sex Offender Enhancement
0.03456
Criminal History
0.076964
Offense Severity
-0.01961
Plea
0.254613
Detained
0.209417
Upward Depart/Variance
-0.01328
Downward Depart/Variance
-0.1825
Offense Severity Sq.
0.000992
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.00318
Fine
0.00000
White
-0.06703
Citizen
0.215621
Dependents
-0.05612
Less than HS
0.122634
Some College
-0.019
College Grad
0.095717
Age > 50
0.019945
State w/mandatory min.
0.166827
South
0.058606
West
0.286706
Midwest
-0.03561
Offense severity * Caseload 0.002692
Offense severity*West
-0.02473
Offense severity*Midwest
-0.02793

Random Effects
Level 1
Level 2
Offense Severity
Upward depart/variance

Var.Comp.
0.34838
0.14442
0.00029
0.70269

Deviance= 3699.001471
Number of estimated parameters = 7
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SE
0.042235***
0.021843 **
0.058619
0.019256 ***
0.027078
0.078970 ***
0.034519 ***
0.153134
0.040919 ***
0.000411**
0.001083 **
0.000002
0.041075*
0.080109**
0.033354*
0.047791**
0.038355
0.046272**
0.031781
0.100051*
0.13053
0.125272**
0.146859
0.001474*
0.014225*
0.008650**

SD
0.59024
0.38002
0.0169
0.83826

df
19
14
14

X2

p-value

297.31 <0.001
44.15 <0.001
52.43 <0.001
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Table 5.19
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – Individual-Level Legal and Extralegal
Factors
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Model 1
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Odds Ratio
Intercept
-1.09001 0.174483 0.336214
Number of Counts
0.292001 0.100211 1.339104 **
Sex Enhancement
-0.04857 0.303718 0.952594
Criminal History Score
0.236221 0.067703 1.266455 ***
Offense Severity
-0.18765 0.125876 0.828904
Plea
1.047625
0.3357 2.850874 **
Detained
0.64714 0.139089 1.91007***
Upward depart/variance
0.416416 0.414755 1.516516
Downward depart/variance
-0.84979 0.174797 0.427506***
Offense Severity Sq.
0.00547 0.001962 1.005485**
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.01487 0.005168 0.985240 **
Fine
White
Citizen
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50
Random Effects
Level 2

Var.Comp.
1.92127

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

b
-1.10071
0.30105
-0.02724
0.237137
-0.18186
1.071597
0.661879
0.533225
-0.84892
0.005431
-0.01548
-2.3E-05
-0.18749
0.456467
-0.15369
0.191291
-0.22524
0.258616
0.375938
SD
1.3861

df
88

2

X
p-value
550.33 <0.001

Model 2
SE
0.176452
0.100647
0.310984
0.069837
0.124733
0.345338
0.144278
0.409604
0.175341
0.001942
0.005052
0.000014
0.174942
0.315215
0.139297
0.217469
0.159928
0.217384
Model

Odds Ratio
0.332637
1.351277 **
0.973124
1.26715 ***
0.833717
2.920039 **
1.983431***
1.704421
0.427877***
1.005445**
0.984635 **
0.999977 *
0.829042
1.578488
0.857541
1.210812
0.798324
1.191989
1.456357**

Random Effects
Level 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Var.Comp. SD
1.96792 1.40283

df
88

2

X
553.72

p-value
<0.001
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Table 5.20
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – District-Level
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Intercept
-0.85553
0.128885
State w/mandatory min.
0.693842
0.279242
South
0.304935
0.39368
West
0.864391
0.426675
Midwest
0.341851
0.46135

Random Effects
Level 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Var.Comp.
SD
1.5807 1.0714

df
84

Odds Ratio
0.425058***
2.00139**
1.356537
2.373561**
1.407551

x2
p-value
390.77 <0.001
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Table 5.21
Random Intercepts Model (Decision to Impose Life) – Individual-Level and District-Level
Life vs. No life (Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors)
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Intercept
-1.110187
0.169329
Number of Counts
0.307216
0.102768
Sex Enhancement
-0.03560
0.314982
Criminal History Score
0.239456
0.070137
Offense Severity
-0.182759
0.125893
Plea
1.085541
0.347343
Detained
0.652361
0.143867
Upward depart/variance
0.534923
0.409049
Downward depart/variance -0.841068
0.177751
Offense Severity Sq.
0.005457
0.001962
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.0158
0.005134
Fine
-0.00003
0.000014
White
-0.18078
0.17386
Citizenship
0.450924
0.315524
Dependents
-0.15971
0.139722
Less than HS
0.193024
0.218473
Some College
-0.232507
0.161362
College Graduate
0.269642
0.220201
Age > 50
0.368442
0.130297
State w/mandatory min.
0.567482
0.373226
South
0.23436
0.505579
West
0.986079
0.510137
Midwest
0.219051
0.571548

Random Effects
Level 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Var.Comp. SD
1.92956 1.38909

df
84

Odds Ratio
0.329497 ***
1.359635 **
0.965024
1.270557 ***
0.832969
2.961043 **
1.920069 ***
1.707316
0.431250 ***
1.005472 **
0.984339 **
0.999975 *
0.834616
1.569762
0.852394
1.212911
0.792544
1.309496
1.445481 **
1.76382
1.2641
2.680704**
1.244895

x2
p-value
494.38 <0.001
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Table 5.22
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – Individual Level Legal Factors and Extralegal
Factors
Four-Category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate, long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
Model 1
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Odds Ratio
b
Intercept
-1.13388 0.169423 0.321782
-1.13388
Number of Counts
0.243829 0.091892 1.276127 **
0.249856
Sex Enhancement
0.187025 0.26793 1.205658
0.227554
Criminal History Score
0.275078 0.061006 1.316633 ***
0.265078
Offense Severity
-0.10724 0.085299 0.898312
-0.09853
Plea
0.863811 0.279916 2.372184 **
0.891422
Detained
0.452034 0.099234 1.571506 ***
0.504841
Upward depart/variance
0.878246 0.501014 2.406674 *
0.952345
Downward depart/variance
-0.65726 0.138507 0.518270 ***
-0.66562
Offense Severity Sq.
0.004073 0.001362 1.004081 **
0.003935
Number of Counts Sq.
-0.01218 0.004285 0.987895 **
-0.01271
Fine
0.000009
White
-0.25034
Citizenship
0.631136
Dependents
-0.22878
Less than HS
0.23222
Some College
-0.11331
College Grad
0.259648
Age > 50
0.120766
Random Effects
Level 2

Var.Comp.
SD
1.8391 1.35614

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

df
88

2

X
782.27

p-value
<0.001

Model 2
SE
0.169423
0.091968
0.269938
0.062614
0.086565
0.282482
0.100968
0.498652
0.139585
0.001375
0.004291
0.000008
0.132167
0.252194
0.104596
0.177117
0.112935
0.14185
0.109498

Random Effects
Level 2

Odds Ratio
0.321782
1.283841 **
1.255525
1.303533 ***
0.906166
2.438596 **
1.656722 ***
2.591781 *
0.513957 ***
1.003943 **
0.987367 **
1.000009
0.778539**
1.879744 **
0.795503**
1.261397
0.892871
1.296474 *
1.128361
Var.Comp.
1.87154

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

SD
1.36804

df
88

2

X
786.23

p-value
<0.001

174

Table 5.23
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – District-Level Factors
Four-category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate, long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
Fixed Effects
b
SE
Odds Ratio
Intercept
-0.945451
0.138856
0.388504***
State w/mandatory min.
0.718897
0.282896
2.052169**
South
0.264673
0.390874
1.303005
West
0.987948
0.388078
2.685718**
Midwest
0.038535
0.456363
1.039287

Random Effects
Level 2

Var.Comp.
SD
1.27977 1.13127

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

df
84

p-value
<0.001
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Table 5.24
Random Intercepts (Four-Category Ordinal) – Individual-Level and District-Level
Four-category Ordinal (short-term, intermediate,
Fixed Effects
Intercept
Number of Counts
Sex Enhancement
Criminal History
Offense Severity
Plea
Detained
Upward depart/variance
Downward depart/variance
Offense Severity Sq.
Number of Counts Sq.
Fine
White
Citizenship
Dependents
Less than HS
Some College
College Grad
Age > 50
State w/mandatory min.
South
West
Midwest

Random Effects
Level 2
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

long-term or life) [Unit-Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors]
b
SE
Odds Ratio
-1.14670
0.158049
0.317684
0.251026
0.092425
1.285344 **
0.231912
0.271882
1.261009
0.266511
0.062468
1.305402 ***
-0.097896
0.086814
0.906743
0.891659
0.28098
2.439172 **
0.497248
0.100992
1.644190 ***
0.958763
0.491341
2.608467 *
-0.65850
0.140195
0.517628 ***
0.003929
0.001378
1.003936 **
-0.012737
0.004303
0.987344 **
0.00001
0.000009
1.00001
-0.24039
0.131207
0.786318 *
0.625814
0.252179
1.869768 **
-0.22965
0.11461
0.794810 **
0.23739
0.159021
1.267935
-0.11688
0.115757
0.889691
0.258137
0.15449
1.294516 *
0.116192
0.108533
1.123212
0.57815
0.343704
1.782738 *
0.131562
0.434575
1.140608
0.987897
0.400683
2.685581 **
-0.234292
0.496885
0.791131

Var.Comp.
SD
1.74167 1.31972

df
84

x2
690.48

p-value
<0.001
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Table 5.25
Hypothesized Predictions of Individual-Level Legal, Extralegal, and District-level Effects
(Supported or Not Supported)
Table 6.1 Results for Theoretical Predictions of Individual-Level Legal, Extalegal, and District-level Effects

Description of Hypotheses
Length Life/No life

4-Category

1 Sentence length will vary significantly across courts.

Yes

N/A

N/A

2 Legally relevant factors will explain the majority of variation in supervised release outcomes, but extralegal factors will also matter.

Yes

Yes

Yes

3 The seriousness of the offense will moderate the effect of legal and extralegal variables such that these factors will have less of
an effect when the offense of the charge is more serious.

No

N/A

N/A

4 The effects of individual-level sentencing factors will vary across courts.

Yes

No

No

5 Above and beyond individual-level factors, district-level factors will have an effect on supervised release sentences.

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Graph of Predicted Value of Supervised Release Length (unlogged) and Offense Severity

Figure 5.1 Graph of Predicted Value
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Graph of Predicted Probability of Lifetime Supervised Release and Offense Severity

Figure 5.2 Graph of Predicted Probability
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Graph of Predicted Value Supervised Release Length (unlogged) and Number of Counts

Figure 5.3 Graph of Predicted Value
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Graph of Predicted Probability of Lifetime Supervised Release and Number of Counts

Figure 5.4 Graph of Predicted Probability
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship Between Number of Counts Squared and
Supervised Release Length

S
upervisedReleaseLength

5.47
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4.79
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5. 69

11. 88

18. 06

Number of Counts Squared

Figure 5.5 Graph of HLM Equation

24.25
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship Between Offense Severity Squared and
Lifetime Supervised Release

Lifetime Supervised Release

1.56

1.14
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0.29

-0.14
-16.01

-9.32

-2.64
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Offense Severity Squared

Figure 5.6 Graph of HLM Equation

10.73
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Graph of HLM Equation of the Relationship between Number of Counts Squared and
Lifetime Supervised Release

Lifetime Supervised Release

0.549

0.418

0.286

0.154

0.023
-0.50

5.69

11.88

18.06

Number of Counts Squared

Figure 5.7 Graph of HLM Equation

24.25
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I used multilevel modeling techniques to explore the effects of
individual-level legal and extralegal factors, as well as district-level contextual factors on
supervised release sentence length, the decision to impose life, and a four-category measure of
the supervised release sentence. Generally, I found that supervised release sentences vary
significantly across courts and that legal factors are the primary determinants of the supervised
release sentence. Extralegal factors play a role, but minimally. I also found disparities in
sentences based on the region of the district court. In this chapter, I systematically review and
discuss my findings in the context of sentencing theory, the empirical sentencing literature, and
moral panic.
Variation of Supervised Release Sentence Lengths across Courts
At the heart of this dissertation, and from which all the research questions arise, is the
policy within the guidelines for lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.
The policy covers all child pornography offenses enumerated under 18 U.S.C 3583(k) and
explicitly applies to every offender convicted and sentenced in each of the 94 judicial districts.
As much as Congress intended the lifetime policy to be a uniform outcome for all child
pornography offenders, the results from the null model indicate supervised release sentences are
not uniform. As a matter of fact, supervised release sentence length varies significantly across
the 89 district courts included in the analyses.
This finding it not surprising and is consistent with prior multilevel federal sentencing
studies that find imprisonment length differs significantly across courts (Kautt, 2002; Johnson,
2005, Ulmer, Eisentein and Johnson, 2010). What is surprising though, is the magnitude of the
variability across courts for supervised release length for child pornography offenses.
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Comparatively speaking, the 27% cross-court variability found in this dissertation is
considerably larger than the typical 3% to 6% found in multilevel studies examining
imprisonment length for the average federal offender (Kautt, 2002; Ulmer, Eisentein and
Johnson, 2010). To gauge whether the large percent variability was due to the difference in
outcome measure or perhaps a function of the offense of child pornography, I ran a null model
for imprisonment length. This model also showed a relatively large percent (18%) of cross-court
variability. The relatively large cross-court variability found in both the sentence of
imprisonment and the sentence of supervised release seems to imply what legal scholars have
long held – that there is judicial dissonance in the sentencing of child pornography offenders and
a lack of congruence within the federal judiciary on how to sentence these individuals (Krohel,
2011, Rigsby, 2010).
Beyond the lack of consensus, there may also be other issues at play that account for this
variability. One possible explanation may lie in the court communities perspective. The court
communities perspective explains that variations in sentencing outcomes could be explained by
the fact that each court community has its own case processing and sentencing norms. Thus, in
the case at hand, we have 89 different district courts that conceivably have 89 different norms or
“going rates” in how they sentence child pornography offenders within the statutory supervised
release range. The descriptive statistics of the district courts found in Tables 5.5 through 5.10,
allude to these “going rates.”
Indeed, one of the most intriguing findings to discuss are the descriptive statistics of
districts that almost always sentence to lifetime supervised release compared to districts that
almost never sentence their cases to lifetime supervised release. Take for example the Eastern
District of Missouri (ED/MO). According to the district descriptive statistics, ED/MO sentenced
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nearly 90% of its cases in fiscal year 2012 to lifetime supervised release. When delineated by
offense type, ED/MO sentenced 100% of its production cases to lifetime supervised release, and
86.1% of non-production cases to lifetime supervised release. In general, the judges of ED/MO
follow the policy in the federal guidelines for lifetime supervised release. 71 In other words, the
policy for lifetime supervised release is the “going rate” or “routine sentencing norm.” Because
of this, defense counsel in ED/MO rarely if ever, argue for a sentence other than lifetime
supervised release. In other words, there exists in the ED/MO a “certainty” or expectation that
the term of supervised release for all child pornography offenders is life.
In striking contrast, some districts do not routinely sentence all child pornography
offenders to lifetime supervised release. Take for instance, the Middle District of Florida which
has a slightly higher percentage of the total sample (3.7%) than Eastern Missouri (see Table 5.6).
Florida Middle sentenced only 16.9% of its child pornography offenders to lifetime supervision,
sentencing the majority of their cases to intermediate and long-term supervision (see Table 5.5).
These statistics imply that the “norm” or “going rate” in Florida Middle are intermediate and
long-term supervised release sentences. 72
Indeed, the USSC in their 2012 report on child pornography offenses, confirm the
existence of variation in sentencing outcomes across district courts explaining “differences
primarily appear to be a function of local charging and sentencing practices and policies.”

71

As a former employee of the ED/MO court workgroup, this statement comes from six years of experience writing
presentence reports for child pornography offenders and attending sentencing hearings of these cases. It is the
policy of the ED/MO to follow the policy statement in the guidelines and recommend lifetime supervised release for
all child pornography offenders.
72
On March 7, 2017, the author spoke with a Supervisory U.S. Probation Officer from the Middle District of Florida
to discuss child pornography sentencing practices in Middle Florida. The supervisor explained that from about 2007
onward, at the direction of the court executive, they stopped recommending lifetime supervised release for all child
pornography offenders, reserving the life recommendation for production cases or non-production cases with serious
risk indicators (criminal history, prior hands on offense). This was done because of limited resources of the U.S.
Probation Office to supervise child pornography offenders for life. The supervisor indicated that most sentencing
recommendations for non-production cases range between 10 to 15 years, depending on specifics of the case.
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(p.237). And while the USSC stipulates that variation in sentencing outcomes across district
courts is a function of local court sentencing practices, they fail to offer a tangible district-level
variable to account for this. One possibility I surmise is “local court rules.” Local court rules are
a formal written set of rules that govern/describe case processing procedures for each individual
court (“Current Rules of Practice and Procedure,” n.d). Each district court has a copy of their
local rules posted on their website. By comparing local rules from one district court to the next,
one can see the variations in case processing.
One example of a “local court rule” that may account for variation in sentences is the
format and content of presentence reports. The standard presentence report format as approved
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) include the following components: Face
sheet; Part A: The Offense; Part B: The Defendant’s Criminal History; Part C: Offender
Characteristics; Part D: Sentencing Options; Part E: Factors that May Warrant Departure; and
Part F: Factors that May Warrant a Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline System (see
Appendix B). However, at the direction of individual courts, some presentence reports deviate
from the standard format. For example, presentence reports in the Southern District of California
adds a subsection in Part F called Probation Officer’s Analysis/Justification and Sentencing
Recommendation. In this subsection, the probation officer summarizes the case and makes a
sentencing recommendation within the body of the presentence report.
Slightly different from the Southern District of California are presentence reports in the
District of Nevada. The District of Nevada adds a “Part G” to their presentence reports. “Part
G” is a section called Sentence Justification wherein the probation office analyzes the case and
provides a sentencing recommendation. In another example, presentence reports in the Eastern
District of New York do not have a “Part F,” concluding instead with “Part E.” “Part E” is a
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section called Mitigating and Aggravating Factors wherein any mitigating or aggravating factors
are identified which may impact the final sentencing outcome. In addition, presentence reports
in Eastern New York deviate from the standard presentence report with a subsection in “Part C”
called Family Ties, Responsibilities, and Community Ties. The point of the preceding examples
is to demonstrate district deviations from the standard presentence report approved by the AO.
The inclusion or exclusion of content may contribute to sentencing variations across courts.
Another explanation for the variation could be an external event that causes a district or
districts to alter the way they sentence. Consider for example the following headlines taken from
a 2014 news article, “Renz Case had Drastic Impact on Handling of Syracuse Child Porn
Cases” (O’Brien, 2014). This article discusses a child pornography case in New York that
turned deadly after David Renz, who was on pretrial bond supervision for a child pornography
offense, dismantled his electronic global positioning system (GPS) ankle bracelet and raped a
ten-year-old girl. He also murdered her mother who had attempted to prevent the rape. 73 The
article discusses how this case did not specifically result in new national policy for pretrial
detention for all child pornography offenders, but it did change the way prosecutors and judges
in the Northern District of New York consider pretrial detention in these cases. Specifically, the
article highlighted that in the fourteen months before the Renz attacks, eight of twelve child
pornography offenders in the Northern District of New York were released from jail to await
trial. But out of the ten child pornography defendants who could have been released at the time
the article was written in 2014, only one defendant had been released. The point of this example
is that a sensational case could change the way a district court sentences.

73

The sexual assault and murder occurred in March 2013.
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While there is a great deal of variability across courts in supervised release sentences, the
majority, 73%, is at the individual-level. I turn next to a discussion of the individual-level factors
that influence supervised release sentencing outcomes of child pornography offenders.
Individual-Level Legal Factors
An examination of the individual-level legal and extralegal factors that are related to the
supervised release sentence indicate that the best predictors of supervised release sentence
length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and the four-category ordinal measure
of supervised release are legal factors. These factors include number of counts, offense severity
score, detention, pleading guilty, criminal history score, and downward departure/variance. All
these legal factors exerted significant effects in the expected direction across all models, except
for plea. In the next section, I separately discuss these significant predictors.
Curvilinear effect – Number of Counts.
The results indicate that the relationship between the number of counts of conviction and
supervised release length is curvilinear. Specifically, there is a positive relationship between the
number of counts and sentence length until the number of counts hits a threshold of 11 counts
(see Figure 5.5). Thereafter, sentence length decreases as the number of counts increases such
that a person with 20 counts of child pornography has a shorter supervised release length than
someone convicted of 10 counts. As mentioned in earlier chapters, legal researchers contend that
some judges believe that non-producers are less culpable than producers, so one explanation
could be that those cases that had more than 15 counts were predominantly counts for nonproduction offenses. For example, a judge may perceive a non-producer convicted of 25 counts
of possession of child pornography less culpable than an offender convicted of production
regardless of the number of counts of conviction. This line of reasoning is supported by the data.
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Specifically, I examined separate crosstabulations of the relationship between supervised release
length and number of counts for non-production and production. A visual inspection of the
crosstabulation between supervised release length and production shows that offenders with at
least 8 or more counts of conviction all received lifetime supervised release. 74 A visual
inspection of the crosstabulation of the relationship between supervised release length and nonproduction showed that some cases with greater than 15 counts received shorter supervised
release terms than some cases with less than 15 counts. 75 When you compare both
crosstabulations, non-producers with increasing counts of conviction after 15 counts had shorter
supervised release sentences than comparable producers.
Curvilinear effect – Offense Severity.
Analyses also showed that there is a curvilinear or U-shaped relationship between offense
severity and supervised release length (see Figure 5.1). Specifically, an offense severity score
beginning with 16 has a slightly higher supervised release length than those offenders with
offense severity scores of 17 through 23. Those with offense severity scores of 17 through 23
have a similar supervised release length. After an offense score of 23, supervise release length
increases steadily.
The U-shaped relationship between offense severity and supervised release length may be
explained by judges departing or varying downward from the advisory guideline range calculated
(the offense level plus the criminal history score) in the presentence report. To explain, before
imposing the sentence, the court must first properly calculate and consider the guidelines and
make a determination if the findings of the presentence report is adopted without change. If

74
75

There were no offenders with greater than 21 counts of conviction.
The greatest number of counts of conviction was 26 counts.
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adopted without change, the offense score calculated in presentence report is the offense score
used in determining the sentence. Next, the court considers any departure options outlined in the
federal sentencing guidelines, followed by consideration of factors in 18 USC 3553(a) for a
variance. If the court downward departs or varies, this is how one can have a higher offense
severity score and receive a shorter sentence than someone with a lower offense score.
In any event, the positive parabolic relationship between offense severity and supervised
release sentence length does not come as a surprise. Work by Kautt (2002) also revealed a Ushaped relationship between offense severity score and sentence length.
Detention.
Of all the legal factors included in this study, detention is the closest variable to
mimicking the dynamics of supervised release. This is because at its foundation, pretrial
detention in the federal system assesses risk and focuses on issues of community safety. In
striking similarity, public safety and risk are the same types of considerations for the sentence of
supervised release. Prior research shows that detention is associated with increased likelihood of
receiving a prison sentence and longer sentences (Phillips, 2012; Williams, 2003). In the present
study, detention is associated increased supervised release length, a greater likelihood of being
sentenced to lifetime supervised release, and a greater likelihood of being sentenced to a higher
supervised release category. This is consistent with the focal concerns perspective, particularly as
it relates to blameworthiness and protection of the public. For instance, judges may perceive a
child pornography offender on bond as less dangerous than a detained counterpart. Williams
(2003) notes that a person who is on bond can use their time to demonstrate to a judge that they
are not a danger to the community (i.e., incurring no pretrial bond violations; compliant with
bond conditions). Likewise, a child pornography offender on bond has time to enter sex offender
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treatment to further demonstrate to a judge that they are somehow less dangerous, something that
a person who is detained is not able to do. Williams (2003) maintains that it is this rationale that
may lead a sentencing judge to think that a person who behaved well on bond may be a good
candidate for less post-conviction supervised release.
Plea.
While research typically finds that pleading guilty results in more lenient sentences, for
child pornography offenders pleading guilty resulted in a longer term of supervised release as
well as a higher probability of receiving lifetime supervised release and a greater likelihood of
being sentenced to the higher supervised release category. While this result is counterintuitive, it
is possible this finding may also be explained by the focal concerns notion of blameworthiness.
At the federal level, when the court accepts a guilty plea of a child pornography offender, the
assistant U.S. Attorney describes the evidence that would have been presented if the case had
proceeded to trial. The evidence includes graphic descriptions of the child pornographic images
and/or videos. In addition, the defendant also must advise the judge in his or her own words what
he or she did and describe the images he or she possessed, distributed, received, or produced. It
is plausible that the graphic and heinous nature of the evidence coupled with the defendant
admitting guilt and describing his or her offense conduct may magnify the defendant’s
culpability in the eyes of the court. Another possibility could also be how the defendant admits
his guilt. For example, if a defendant minimizes the seriousness of the offense this could lead
the judge to perceive that the offender is not accepting responsibility. In contrast, in a trial, a
defendant is not likely to admit guilt or take the stand, perhaps minimizing culpability. It is also
possible that this finding is just noise due to the small number of cases that had trials.
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Another likely scenario is the role that the impact of the plea agreement may play. For
instance, child pornography offenses are unique in that the offense of possession of child
pornography is a lesser included offense in distribution, transportation, receipt and production of
child pornography. So, in the case of someone charged with the more onerous offense of
distribution of child pornography, the government could theoretically stipulate to the lesser
included offense of possession of child pornography and plea away the more serious charge.
Consider for example the following language taken from a plea agreement of an offender
charged with possession and distribution of child pornography:
“In exchange for the defendant’s plea of guilty to count one of the four-count indictment, which
charges possession of child pornography, the government agrees to dismiss counts two through
four, each charging distribution of child pornography at the time of sentencing.” 76
Having considered the above example, there is a section in Part D of the presentence report
called the Impact of Plea (see Appendix B), which highlights for the sentencing court, the range
of punishment and the guideline sentence had the defendant been found guilty or pled guilty to
all counts charged in the indictment. This information can be used for consideration of the final
sentence. Per Section 1B1.4 of the federal sentencing guidelines – Information to be Used in
Imposing Sentence, in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether
a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any
information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless
otherwise prohibited by law.

76

Sample excerpt taken from a plea agreement of an offender convicted of possession of child pornography in the
Eastern District of Missouri in 2009.
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The commentary of Section 1B1.4 of the federal sentencing guidelines more specifically
lays out that a court is not precluded from considering information that the guidelines do not
consider in determining a sentence within the guideline range or from considering that
information in determining whether and to what extent to depart from the guidelines. For
example, if the defendant committed two robberies, but as part of a plea negotiation entered a
guilty plea to one count, the robbery that was not taken into account by the guidelines would
provide a reason for sentencing at the top of the guideline range and may provide a reason for an
upward departure (2012 USSC Federal Guidelines Manual). Accordingly, it may be that counts
that are dismissed as part of plea agreement may speak to the ultimate culpability of the
defendant and/or the dangerousness which may account for longer supervised release sentences
or the likelihood of lifetime supervised release. Unfortunately, we cannot test this theory
because the USSC does not collect data on dismissed counts.
Criminal History.
My finding that a child pornography offender’s criminal history significantly and
positively effects the supervised release sentence on all three derivations of the outcome is
consistent with theory and prior research. Consistently, sentencing research using both state and
federal data has found criminal history to be a statistically significant predictor of sentence
length and/or the decision to impose imprisonment. The federal sentencing guidelines state that
an offender’s past criminal conduct is directly relevant to the four purposes of sentencing: (1)
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
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effective manner. The introductory commentary in Section 4A1.1 of the guidelines state that an
offender with a prior criminal history is more culpable than a first-time offender and thus
deserving of greater punishment.77
While the four goals of sentencing described above appear to be for the sentence of
imprisonment, these goals can also be extended to the sentence of supervised release. Consider
for example the purposes of sentencing as described in sentencing purpose #2 (to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct) and #3 (to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant). Some judges may perceive that an offender with a lengthy criminal history having
not been previously deterred by past punishment may be deterred under a long period of
supervision especially, while under the supervision of the U.S. Probation Office. Likewise, some
judges may consider child pornography offenders with a lengthier criminal history, a threat to
public safety thereby warranting an extended term of supervised release. Or perhaps judges
perceive those child pornography offenders with longer criminal histories as needing extended
time on supervised release to provide necessary correctional and rehabilitative treatment.
All the foregoing possibilities I use to explain why criminal history positively affects the
sentence of supervised release point to the theoretical underpinnings of the focal concerns
perspective, specifically blameworthiness and protection of the community. Most of what judges
know about the offenders they sentence comes from the presentence report. At present, there is
no section of the presentence report that includes information on future risk. 78 Therefore, in the
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The commentary indicates that the factors included in calculating the criminal history are consistent with the
extant research assessing correlates of recidivism and patterns of career criminal behavior.
78
The U.S. Probation Office utilizes risk tools including the Risk Prediction Index (RPI) and the Post-Conviction
Risk Assessment (PCRA) to assess risk for those offenders under active supervision. This information is not
disclosed in the presentence report.
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absence of full information on risk to assess dangerousness to the public, judges resort to what
information they do have – the prior criminal history.
Downward Departure/Variance.
Prior sentencing research has found that downward departures/variances are significantly
related to sentencing outcomes such that those who receive a downward departure/variance have
shorter sentence lengths than those who do not receive a downward departure/variance.
Consistent with prior research on the effects of downward departures on sentence length, I found
that downward departure/variance shortens supervised release length, decreases the odds of
being sentenced to lifetime supervised release, and decreases the probability of being sentenced
to a supervised release term in the higher supervised release category. Kaiser and Spohn (2014)
contend that as it relates specifically to the offense of child pornography, judges may be more
likely to use downward departures to mitigate what they perceive as disproportionately severe
sentences. Legal scholars argue that now that the guidelines area advisory in nature, the basis for
many of these departures are extralegal factors such as family and community ties (Hamilton,
2011; Krohel, 2011). Conversely though, one of the main provisions of the Protect Act of 2003
was to prevent judges from granting downward departures for child pornography offenders from
the then-mandatory guidelines based on family and community ties.
In the case at hand, I surmise a downward departure/variance is indicative of offenders
being less culpable. In a similar vein, Kaiser and Spohn (2014) make note of departures being
used for child pornography offenders labeled salvageable or sympathetic. This notion of
salvageability and less culpability is consistent with the focal concerns perspective of
blameworthiness. In other words, child pornography offenders granted downward
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departure/variances may be deemed less dangerous or risky on the basis of extralegal factors that
mitigate judicial perceptions of dangerousness such as family ties. My findings suggest that
those with the benefit of a downward departure/variance were perceived as less dangerous,
thereby sentenced to shorter supervised release terms.
Effects of Individual-level Factors Across Districts
In the model for supervised release length, I found that the effects for offense severity
score, offense severity score squared, upward departure/variance, and downward
departure/variance differed across district courts (see Table 5.13 – Models 1 though 4). This
finding is consistent with other sentencing studies that found the effects of individual-level
factors vary by district court (Kautt, 2002; Johnson, 2006). This suggests that judicial officers in
different districts weigh the importance of some individual-level legal factors differently.
Johnson, Ulmer and Kramer (2008) explain this is because the focal concerns of courts vary
because they are embedded in local court communities’ organizational and cultural milieus.
One explanation to account for why the effect of offense severity differed across courts
could be that some courts consider all relevant conduct when calculating the offense severity
score. As noted in Section 1B1.3 in the federal sentencing guidelines, relevant conduct refers to
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant. This means that courts can consider all relevant conduct in
establishing the offense severity score regardless of how the score is calculated in the plea
agreement. Thus, in some districts, courts accept and agree with the offense severity score
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calculated in the plea agreement. On the other hand, some courts independently calculate the
offense severity score and include relevant conduct in their calculations.79
Another explanation for the effect of offense severity differing across courts could be due
to variation in how the offense conduct is investigated in the presentence report (Bowman,
1996). As shown in Appendix B, there is a section in the presentence report called the “Offense
Conduct.” This section includes all pertinent information regarding the offense as established by
the probation officer’s investigation. In some districts, probation officers conduct independent
investigations, even interviewing witnesses (i.e., case agent, victims) and examining evidence or
laboratory reports. In other districts, probation officers rely solely on the U.S. Attorney’s Office
version of the offense conduct, even using the government’s written version of the offense from
the plea agreement directly into the “Offense Conduct” section of the presentence report. These
types of differences in the offense conduct sections of presentence reports could directly impact
judicial findings of some chapter two, three, and four enhancements or deductions in calculating
the total offense severity score.
The varying effects of upward and downward departure/variances may have a different
explanation. There are sections in Part F of the presentence report called “Factors That May
Warrant Departure” and “Factors that May Warrant a Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline
System” (see Appendix B) wherein the probation office is to identify and include factors for
consideration for an upward departure/variance or downward departure/variance. The degree to
which a probation office investigates opportunities for courts to vary/depart upward or
downward is likely to differ from one district court to the next. For example, since
79

In my tenure with the United States Probation system and my position as a Supervising U.S. Probation Officer, I
have reviewed many presentence reports from different districts and have observed calculations consistent with the
plea agreement as well as calculations based upon the independent calculations of the court.
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approximately 2006 or 2007, it has been the practice of the presentence unit in Eastern Missouri
to make concerted efforts to identify potential factors for downward departures/variances. 80 This
is because judges in Eastern Missouri grew weary of the probation office seemingly only able to
identify factors to vary/depart upward. At the behest of the then Chief Judge, the probation
office was directed to identify and provide more ways in which the court could depart/vary
downward. Although this may be true in practice in Eastern Missouri, a different occurrence
may be the case elsewhere. Meaning, the emphasis or de-emphasis of certain factors could yield
varying effects of these factors across courts. Theoretically speaking, this is consistent with
Johnson et al.’s (2008) notion that focal concerns vary across courts because they are embedded
in the local court communities organizational and cultural milieus. In similar fashion, my
findings follow the tradition of the court communities perspective. In the example given, Eastern
Missouri appears to have its own presentencing norms afforded via “local court rules” such as
the inclusion of certain information in the presentence report that may or may not be operating in
other districts which may produce variation in sentencing outcomes.
Summary of Individual-Level Legal Factors
To summarize, all the individual-level legal factors except the variable for the
enhancement for having a prior sex offense, demonstrated direct meaningful effects on all three
outcome measures of the supervised release sentence, and the effects of some of these factors
varied across courts. In line with expectations, a series of extralegal factors also influenced
supervised release sentences and are discussed next.
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During approximately 2006 and 2007, the author was a Senior U.S. Probation Officer assigned to the presentence
unit in the Eastern District of Missouri wherein the district court’s desire for the identification of downward
departures/variances in the presentence reports was disseminated to the probation office as policy.
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Individual-level Extralegal Effects
While legal factors have been shown to be the primary determinants of supervised release
sentences, extralegal factors, although minimally have also been shown to effect supervised
release sentencing outcomes. Before beginning the discussion of the results of extralegal factors,
it is important to reference and address the sentencing guidelines and the policy statements
contained therein relative to offender characteristics. This is because the guidelines provide
specific guidance for the consideration or relevance of these characteristics for child
pornography offenders. For instance, Section 5K2.22 (Specific Offender Characteristics as
Grounds for Downward Departure in Child Crimes and Sexual Offenses) provides a policy
statement for specific offender characteristics that, while not ordinarily relevant, may be
considered for a downward departure for child pornography offenders under the appropriate
mitigating circumstances. Section 5K2.22 of the guidelines is recreated here and specifically
states:
In sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense involving a minor victim under section
1201, an offense under section 1591, or an offense under chapter 71, 110, 117 of tile 18,
United States Code:
(1) Age may be a reason to depart downward only if and to the extent permitted by
Section 5H1.1.
(2) An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward only if
and to the extent permitted in Section 5H1.4.
(3) Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse is not a reason to depart.

For a court to use either age or physical impairment as a basis for a departure, the
guidelines require the following criteria be met: (1) affirmatively and specifically identified; and
(2) the mitigating circumstances forming the basis for the departure must be of a kind or degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the USSC.
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As a precursor to Section 5K2.22, Section 5K2.0 notes that the standard for a departure
for a child pornography offender differs from the standard for other departures in that it includes
a requirement that any mitigating circumstance that forms the basis for such a departure be
affirmatively and specifically identified as a ground for a departure in Chapter 5, Part K. Age
and physical impairment are the only offender characteristics that have been affirmatively
identified as a ground for departure in Chapter 5, Part K.
Notwithstanding the guidance in 5K2.22, the Protect Act of 2003 further constrains
judicial discretion by specifying that judges are not to depart based on family or community ties.
In spite of Section 5K2.22 and the statutory prohibition of consideration of family or community
ties, this dissertation identified several extralegal factors including citizenship, race, education,
and family ties (dependents) that effect supervised release sentencing outcomes and are
discussed next.
Citizenship.
The findings indicate that U.S. citizenship is significantly related to supervised release
length and the likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category. While most
prior research on citizenship find that non-citizens are punished more harshly, it makes intuitive
sense for non-citizen child pornography offenders to receive more leniently supervised release
sentences. Generally, non-citizen offenders are deported after service of the sentence of
imprisonment. After deportation of the offender, the supervised release term is active, but the
offender is not being supervised. 81 Instead, the case is assigned to a specialized caseload where
it is monitored for any violations of the conditions of supervised release (i.e., illegal reentry into
81

Upon service of the sentence of imprisonment, deportable aliens are deported and the term of supervised release
begins and is active. The supervised release term is active in the event that the deported alien returns illegally into
the U.S. The active supervised release sentence allows the U.S. Probation Office to issue a supervised release
warrant in the event the offender returns to the U.S.
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the U.S.) until the term of supervised release expires. Therefore, it would be counterproductive
and not a good use of probation office resources to sentence non-citizen offenders to lengthy
periods of supervised release given these factors.
Application Note 5 of Section 5D1.1 in the federal guidelines manual indicate that in the
case of a deportable alien, if a term of supervised release is not required by statute, then the
Court should not ordinarily impose a term of supervised release (2012 Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual). It is plausible that judges may extend this reasoning to non-citizens
convicted of child pornography. The only difference is that in the case of child pornography
offenders, judges are mandated by statute to issue a supervised release term. It follows then, that
judges impose more lenient supervised release sentences because ordinarily they would not have
to impose a supervised release term on a non-citizen, but must because of statute.
Again, these findings appear to support the focal concerns perspective – practical
constraints and consequences. This concern refers to the impact that sentencing decisions have
on the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the individual defendants and their
families and communities. Organizational concerns include efficiency, flow of cases,
overcrowding of correctional organizations and maintaining positive working relationships
among courtroom actors (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Accordingly, judges may be considering
the resources of the U.S. Probation Office and the possible misuse of resources to monitor these
cases for any extended period of time.
Race.
According to Section 5H1.10 of the federal sentencing guidelines, race along with sex,
national origin, religion, and socioeconomic status are not relevant in determination of the
sentence. In fact, these considerations are expressly prohibited. The findings indicate that white
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child pornography offenders receive supervised release sentences that are 8.2% shorter than nonwhites and non-whites 1.3 times more likely to be sentenced to the higher supervised release
category than whites. This finding, which is consistent with research on race and sentencing that
finds non-whites are sentenced more harshly (Albonetti, 1997; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Everett
& Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Mustard, 2001), is somewhat unexpected because non-whites make up a
relatively small percentage of those convicted of child pornography offenses. Indeed, the
average child pornography offender is a white male.
One explanation for this finding could be the general criminal stereotypes of non-whites
as more dangerous and culpable (Barkan & Cohn, 2005; Beim & Fine, 2007). More specifically
and in accordance with the Albonetti’s (1991) uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution and the
focal concerns perspective, judges’ assessments of dangerousness and protection of the
community from child pornography offenders may be influenced by racial stereotypes. Both
these perspectives predict that some judges perceive non-whites as particularly dangerous and
lacking much potential for rehabilitation compared to other offenders. Stated differently, nonwhite child pornography offenders may appear more dangerous, more crime prone, and more
likely to recidivate based on negative stereotypes attached to non-whites. Judges may be using
race as a proxy for culpability and recidivism.
Nonetheless, my findings contradicts work by Kaiser and Spohn (2014), the only
published federal study that specifically examines the offense of child pornography. Their study
found that race was not significantly related to the likelihood that a person convicted of a child
pornography charge receives a downward departure. Likewise, my finding on race is also
contradictory with research by Patrick and Marsh (2011) who found that race does not affect the
sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex offenders (not specifically child pornography
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offenders). The differences in race findings between the current dissertation and work by Kaiser
and Spohn (2014) and Patrick and Marsh (2011) could be a function of the difference in the
outcome variable. Nonetheless, race is a prohibited consideration in determining the sentence.
This finding that race matters in supervised release sentences appears to be an unwarranted
sentencing disparity.
Education.
The results of this dissertation provide evidence that educational attainment (i.e., college
graduate) or lack thereof (i.e., less than high school education), has a direct, though limited effect
on supervised release sentence length. Specifically, offenders with less than a high school
education received a 13.6% increase in months of supervised release, controlling for all other
variables in the model. Surprisingly, those offenders with a college degree in comparison to
those without a high school diploma face an 11.2% increase in months of supervised release.
According to the federal sentencing guidelines, educational and vocational skills are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted.
However, the guidelines add that education and vocational skills might be relevant in
determining the conditions of probation or supervised release for rehabilitative purposes or
public protection by restricting activities that allow for the utilization of a certain skill, or in
determining the appropriate type of community service (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual). My
hypothesis that those with less education would be subject to longer supervised release terms was
supported by the analyses. This finding was also consistent with some of the extant sentencing
literature that finds offenders who are poorly educated are sanctioned more harshly (Clarke &
Koch, 1976; Kruttschnitt, 1980/1981; Mustard, 2001). Perhaps judges view poorly educated
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child pornography offenders as more culpable, more likely to recidivate and less amenable to
rehabilitation.
However, contrary to my hypothesis and unlike previous research that finds offenders
with college degrees receive shorter sentences (Albonetti, 1997), I find that a college education is
not a buffer or protective factor for leniency. This finding is also unexpected as several studies
find offenders who have completed a higher level of education are less likely to recidivate once
they return to the community (Huebner, DeJong & Cobbina, 2010; Bellair & Kowalski, 2011).
This unexpected finding may have to do with the nature of this offense and its tie to
educated offenders. The average federal offender has less than a high school education. But as
shown in the descriptive statistics of this dissertation, only 9.2% of child pornography offenders
had less than a high school education and 17.9% were college graduates. It may follow then that
persons holding a college degree may be more likely to hold positions of public trust (i.e.,
teacher, physician). Thus, child pornography offenders who hold positions of public trust may
be deemed more culpable, perhaps due to a sentiment of betrayal or broken trust. This is because
public trust positions are characterized by professional or managerial discretion and such persons
ordinarily are subject to less supervision than those whose responsibilities are non-discretionary
in nature (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual). Per the policy statement in the guidelines manual,
“such persons generally are viewed as more culpable.” (p.345). So, it seems offenders with
higher levels of education are viewed as risky since they possess skills and aptitude to conceal
their crimes.82 This notion too, is consistent with focal concerns, but in the opposite direction of
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My semi-formal interview conducted with an active U.S. District judge for the Eastern District of Missouri
supported this notion. The judge advised he views many child pornography offenders like “white collar” offenders
in terms of sophistication and cleverness. He added that due to the level of sophistication required of this crime (i.e.,
computer use), those with college degrees are less sympathetic.
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my hypothesis. It seems court actors are concerned with potential dangerousness of educated
offenders because they may be stereotyped as calculating or sophisticated. I surmise that in
addition to factors typically linked to perceptions of dangerousness such as race, ethnicity, age,
gender, and detention status, educational status may also be linked to dangerousness.
A different pattern emerged for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release and the
four-category ordinal measure of the supervised release sentence. In these models, education has
no influence on the decision to impose life or the likelihood of being sentenced to a higher
supervised release category.83 Since my education finding was not robust across all derivations
of the dependent variable, this may need to be replicated. My finding for the relationship
between education and length of supervised release conflicts with work by Kaiser and Spohn
(2014), who find that education was not related to the likelihood of downward departures. My
findings also contradict with research on sentencing outcomes of convicted child sex offenders
by Patrick and Marsh (2011), who found a null effect for education.
Family Ties (Dependents).
Pursuant to Section 5H1.6 (Family Ties and Responsibility) in the federal sentencing
guidelines, in sentencing an offender convicted of an offense involving a minor victim, family
ties are not relevant in determining whether a sentence should be below the applicable guideline
range (2012 USSC Guidelines Manual). In addition, the Protect Act of 2003 prohibits the
consideration of family ties for child pornography offenders. Despite these explicit statements in
the guidelines and the Protect Act of 2003, family ties appear to permeate judicial decisionmaking. Specifically, I found that those offenders with dependents received supervised release
83

Having a college degree was a significant predictor at alpha level p=.09 level. Offenders with college degrees
were just over one time more likely (OR=1.29) than high school graduates to be sentenced to a higher supervised
release category.
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terms that were 6.6% shorter than those without dependents. Likewise, I found that offenders
without children are 1.25 times more likely to be sentenced to a higher supervised release
category.
Indeed, family ties appears to have an insulating effect for sentence severity. For
example, in Hamilton’s (2011) review of judges’ consideration of family ties before they
imposed below guideline sentences, she quoted one judge as saying: “From my experience, most
of these men have no prior criminal history. They usually have healthy family lives and
productive careers” (p.561-562). She quoted another judge who stated: “Aside from this offense,
the defendant has led a law-abiding life, and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout,
he raised a good family and has been a mainstay in his community” (p.562). The line of
reasoning displayed in these two examples appear to align with the focal concerns notion of
practical constraints and consequences, which is based on the idea that judges consider how
sentencing decisions impact the functioning of the criminal justice system as well as the
individual offender and their families and communities. Judges may be concerned that a
lengthier term of supervised release may interfere with family ties and may blemish or intrude
upon the offender’s family life. Indeed, long-term or lifelong supervised release may have
collateral consequences for families – that is, a family may suffer embarrassment from having a
probation officer in the home twice monthly. This in turn, could lead to emotional costs, such
that the family cannot move forward. In short, perhaps judges are concerned with the collateral
consequences to the family and consider shorter supervised release terms as less traumatic or
intrusive.
On the other hand, judges may also consider the focal concern of blameworthiness when
considering family ties. Blameworthiness refers to the culpability of the offender. If we
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consider blameworthiness in view of the results, perhaps judges believe that offenders with
dependents are less dangerous or are more likely to be deterred. In other words, judges may find
that family ties serve as informal social control to mitigate future risk of the offender. Likewise,
those without dependents may be perceived as riskier (i.e., sitting at home alone and tempted to
view child pornography) in that they lack a built-in mechanism of informal social control. Ulmer
et al. (2010) echoed this sentiment indicating dependents might reduce defendants’ perceived
threat. Regardless, family ties are expressly prohibited for child pornography offenders by
statute (see Table 2.1 – Protect Act of 2003) and the guidelines. The fact that family ties matters
in supervised release sentences of child pornography offenders appears to be an unwarranted
sentencing disparity.
Age.
Unlike the previous extralegal variables discussed thus far, age was not a significant
predictor for supervised release length or the four-category measure of supervised release, but it
was for the decision to impose lifetime supervised release. It is possible that this finding
represents noise in the data since it was not observed with all specification of the dependent
variable. In addition, the results are contradictory to findings in recent sentencing literature,
which finds that those offenders who are younger are more likely than those who are older to be
punished more harshly. One might suggest that the effect of age may be influenced by the
criminal history of the older offender being greater than that of a younger offender (the older
offender having had more time to offend than a younger offender). While this seems plausible, I
suspect that criminal history has little to no bearing on the effect of age. 84 Instead, I surmise that
it is based on the focal concerns notion of protection of the community. Protection of the
84

The effect of age remained significant using the alternate measure of criminal history (criminal history points)
provided in the dataset.
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community draws on similar attributions as blameworthiness but is distinct in that it focuses on
the need to incapacitate or control the offender or to deter would-be offenders (Steffensmeier et
al., 1998). This also includes assessments about dangerousness or recidivism. Predictions about
dangerousness and risk of recidivism are based on attributions predicated on the nature of the
offense, case information, criminal history, and demographic characteristics of the offender such
as employment, education, age or family history (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). For example,
Kimball (2011) reviewed a sentencing opinion where the judge cited the defendant’s youthful
age and immaturity as reason for a downward variance [see U.S. v Polito (2007)]. This
justification for a downward variance based on youthfulness suggests that younger offenders
may be perceived as “getting caught up” in child pornography based on their immaturity or that
their entanglement may have more innocent origins.85 It has also been suggested that those who
are youthful or young, do not understand the magnitude of the crime they committed. In other
words, younger offenders fail to appreciate the harm that viewing child pornography inflicts
upon the victims. Indeed, in U.S. v Polito, the court in justifying a below guideline sentence said
Polito “was only 18” at the time of the offense.
The flip side of this argument may be the perception that older and mature offenders
“know better.” That is, someone age sixty may be less likely to be perceived as accidently
“getting caught up” and their entanglement in child pornography may have less than innocent
origins. In other words, “ignorance of the law” may be a tougher argument to believe for older
offenders.
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A news article highlighted nineteen year old Neil Geckle who was charged with child pornography offenses after
he downloaded photos of high school girls he “friended” from Facebook then took pictures of his penis next to the
photos. He then uploaded the defiled photos to the victims’ Facebook pages. When confronted with the charges the
nineteen year old pleaded ignorance, telling police he “didn’t think it was a big deal.” (Moraff, 2012).
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The notion that older age may be viewed as a greater threat may also be due to the age
discrepancy between older offenders and the depicted minors. According to the USSC
Sourcebook 2010, virtually all child pornography offenders (96.3%) possessed images of minors
who were prepubescent or under the age of twelve. The idea of an offender over age 50
receiving sexual gratification from images depicting the sexual assault of children under the age
of twelve including infants and toddlers, may be unsettling for judges. Another possible
rationale for this finding is that the average age of child pornography offenders sentenced in
fiscal year 2012 was age 41.41. If judges on average are seeing this age offender in the court
room, then it may play in their focal concerns that older child pornography offenders may be at
more risk to re-offend.
Fine.
Of all the extralegal factors included in this dissertation, fine was the only variable that
was not statistically significant in predicting supervised release length, the decision to impose
lifetime supervised release, and/or the four-category ordinal measure of supervised release. It is
possible that there was no effect because this variable is not a good indicator of socioeconomic
status. Better measures of socioeconomic status include income or employment status.
Information for both these factors are included in the presentence reports. However, the USSC
does not collect data on these measures so there is no way to examine this with these data
without access to the presentence reports.
Non-production vs. Production
One of the inquiries of this dissertation was whether the effects of individual-level legal
and extralegal factors differed by offense type. As mentioned in Chapter Four, I had to use
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offense severity score as my indicator of offense type due to the high correlation between offense
type and offense severity. Data analysis revealed that none of the effects of legal and extralegal
factors differed by offense seriousness. But descriptive statistics do show that production
offenses, which by statute are more serious than non-production cases, on average receive
harsher supervised release sentences, 332.79 months compared to 229 months for non-producers,
a difference of 103.79 months or 8.53 years. Likewise, a low end of 36 months supervised
release was imposed for producers compared to 12 months for non-producers. More than half
(57.4%) of the sample was sentenced to the most severe term (life) in contrast to 29.7% of nonproducers who were sentenced to the most severe term. These statistics seems to support what
legal scholars have argued, that judges consider producers more culpable than non-producers.
District-level Effects
When legal, extralegal factors, and district-level contextual factors are added to the
supervised release length model, these factors explain 18.8% of district-level variation. Many of
the theoretically relevant district-level factors did not have a discernable direct effect on
supervised release sentence length, decision to impose lifetime supervised release, or the fourcategory ordinal measure of supervised release in my full hierarchical models. According to Wu
and D’Angelo (2014), this is not unusual. They point out that few multilevel federal sentencing
studies find significant contextual factors or contextual effects that are strong in magnitude [see
for example, Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer (2008) and Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011)]. Even in
their own study, Wu and D’Angelo (2014) did not find any of their district-level contextual
variables to be significant.
Notwithstanding the above, I did find two district-level contextual factors that were
significantly related to supervised release sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime
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supervised release and the four-category ordinal measure of supervised release – region (west)
and mandatory minimum state-level penalty for the charge of possession of child pornography. I
begin my discussion of these variables first, followed by a discussion of the null district-level
findings.
Region.
Results indicate that supervised release length varies across regions and more
specifically, cases sentenced in the West versus the East received longer sentences (using a
continuous and ordinal outcome) and were more likely to be sentenced to lifetime supervised
release. This finding that region influences sentencing outcomes is consistent with prior research;
however, most work finds harsher sentences in the southern region of the country (Chiricos and
Crawford, 1995). Out of the seventeen district courts situated in the West, seven districts
sentenced greater than 50% of cases to lifetime supervised release. 86 It is possible that districts
like Arizona and Nevada are driving these numbers: Arizona has the one of the highest child
pornography caseloads in the federal system (DSS Report, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, 2014). Arizona sentenced 81.3% of its cases to lifetime supervised release (see Table
5.9). When Arizona’s child pornography cases are delineated by offense type (see Tables 5.14
and 5.19), 80% of non-production cases are sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 100% of
production cases are sentenced to lifetime supervised release. These figures seem to suggest the
sentence of lifetime supervised release is a “norm” or “going rate” in Arizona. Similarly, the
District of Nevada sentenced 75% of its cases to lifetime supervised (see Table 5.9). Supervised
release sentences in Nevada delineated by offense type mimicked Arizona, with 74.5% of non86

The seventeen western districts include: Washington East, Washington West, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming,
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Oregon, California Central, California East, California North, California
South, Alaska, and Hawaii. The seven districts that sentenced over 50% of cases to lifetime supervised release
include: Arizona, California Central, Nevada, Oregon, Washington East, Washington West, Colorado.
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production cases sentenced to lifetime supervised release and 100% of production cases
sentenced to lifetime supervised release.
In contrast, out of fourteen district courts situated in the East, three districts did not
sentence any of its cases to lifetime supervised release. 87 In fact, only one district in the East
(New Hampshire) sentenced more than 50% of its cases to lifetime supervised release. These
figures suggest sentences other than lifetime supervised release are the norms in the East. The
only obvious difference between district courts situated in the East and district courts situated in
the West is that eastern districts comprise the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd circuits, while the western districts
comprise the 9th and 10th circuits. Notwithstanding the difference in circuits, both the eastern
and western districts were situated in circuits that allow policy disagreements for non-production
offenses based upon the legal argument in Kimbrough.
Looking beyond the data for an explanation, another possibility for regional differences
between western and eastern districts may be the surrounding social environment with respect to
funding and investigations of child exploitation offenses. For example, each district court is
located within a state that has an Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force (see Table
6.1). ICAC is tasked primarily with the investigation of child pornography offenses (U.S.
Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress). As shown in Table 6.1, the amount of
funding for each ICAC task force varies across the states. In examining Table 6.1, in fiscal year
2012, western states received in excess of 5.1 million dollars in funding, in contrast to eastern
states that received approximately 2.1 million dollars. It may be possible that judges in western
districts are influenced by the amount of funding committed to the child exploitation crimes. In
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The three districts that did not sentence any cases to lifetime supervised release include Maine, Massachusetts,
and New York South.
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other words, the court communities perspective which views courts as distinctive social worlds
says that outlying conditions such as the current example, may influence courts and that these
factors may exert differential influence (Ulmer, 1997).
Table 6.1 about here
Similarly, recent prioritization by the U.S. Department of Justice of child exploitation in
Indian reservations (U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress) may also be a
reason for longer sentences in the West. Specifically, in 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice
created the Indian Country Initiative, declaring the investigation and prosecution of child
exploitation in Indian reservations a top priority. A map of Indian territories shows Western
districts having greater number of Indian territories than those in the East (see Figure 6.1).
Drawing again from the court communities perspective, perhaps judges in Western districts are
influenced by the surrounding prioritization of child sex exploitation offenses, such that it
permeates their sentencing decisions and results in longer sentences.
Figure 6.1 about here
Mandatory Minimum State-Level Penalty.
Mandatory minimum state-level penalty for possession of child pornography was also a
significant district-level predictor of supervised release sentences of child pornography
offenders. It appears district courts may be cognizant of state court sentencing practices,
particularly in the state in which the district court is located. According to Lopez, Allenbaugh,
and Ellis (2012), district courts are not precluded from considering state sentencing practices [see
U.S. v. Ringgold, (2009)]. Thus, it seems plausible that a district court may be aware of the state
penalties for child pornography and may be influenced by any mandatory minimum penalties for
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possession of child pornography as it may speak to how serious this crime is considered in the
state legislature. Indeed, the court communities and social worlds perspectives says that outlying
conditions may influence courts such as state penalties for the same type of crime and that these
factors may exert differential influence (Nardulli, Eisentein, & Fleming, 1988; Ulmer, 1997).
Null District-level Findings
Like other multilevel sentencing studies, many of my district-level contextual factors
failed to be statistically significant in predicting supervised release sentences of child
pornography offenders. In this section, I try to explain why this may be the case and start with
guidelines compliance rate. Contrary to the statistical significance of guideline compliance rates
found by Kautt (2002), this district-level factor did not influence supervised release sentencing
outcomes. This may be because the supervised release sentence is less likely to be impacted by
the federal guidelines because there are no enhancements or adjustments upward or downward
for the supervised release sentence other than the policy recommendation for lifetime supervised
release. Because of this, perhaps judges are less likely to consider them. Or perhaps as legal
scholars have pointed out, some judges believe the child pornography guidelines in and of
themselves are too harsh and/or congressionally manipulated and not subject to deference.
Political context also has no influence on supervised release sentencing outcomes, which
is consistent with many multilevel studies (Fearn 2005; Johnson 2005; Ulmer and Johnson 2004;
Weidner, Frase, and Schultz 2005). It was hypothesized that districts situated within a state
characterized as Republican based on the percent of people that voted Republican in the 2012
presidential election would be more punitive and more likely to sentence more severely. While
empirical findings on the link between punishment and political context have been mixed, my
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work falls alongside other researchers who found no effect for political context and sentencing
outcomes. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) argue the null findings regarding the direct effect of
percent Republican could indicate that a district’s political context has very little to do with
sentencing, once you control for other significant sentencing predictors. Indeed, it is possible
that district judges, who are appointed for life pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not
feel pressure from political influences. In addition, percent Republican may be too crude a
measure to capture political influence or it could be a lack of a real difference between
Republicans and Democrats regarding their stance on criminal justice issues, particularly sex
offenses (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).
In similar fashion, child pornography caseload rate did not have an effect on supervised
release sentencing outcomes. Initially, I hypothesized that districts with larger child
pornography caseloads would sentence more severely based upon the social/group threat
perspective. According to the social/group threat perspective, as a subordinate group increases
in size, the dominant group will feel threatened and, in turn, use methods of social control to
maintain their superior status. The child pornography caseload rate, however, was not related to
supervised release outcomes, suggesting that judges do not feel threatened by increasing child
pornography populations.
Finally, the Kimbrough-based policy disagreement did not influence supervised release
sentence length above and beyond the effects of legal and extralegal factors. Recall from
Kimbrough that the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a sentencing judge’s policy
disagreement with the crack cocaine guidelines was permissible to impose a below-guideline
sentence. The Supreme Court upheld a district court’s decision to sentence below the guideline
range for crack cocaine offenses based upon a policy disagreement with the crack cocaine
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guideline. Legal scholars argue that an increasing number of courts rely on Kimbrough when
sentencing child pornography offenders below the recommended guideline range (Basbaum,
2010; Hamilton, 2014). Based upon the apparent disconnect between the Congressional policy
for lifetime supervised release and the actual sentences imposed, I hypothesized that if some
districts apply the rationale in Kimbrough to categorically reject child pornography guidelines
because of a policy disagreement that they may also apply Kimbrough to reject the policy for
lifetime supervised release. But the data did not support this finding using the Kimbrough
decision as a predictor of supervised release. Perhaps the application of the rationale in
Kimbrough does not carry over to the sentence of supervised release.
As just described, many of my district-level contextual measures did not impact the
supervised release sentence. This could be attributed to the difference in outcome measures –
supervised release as opposed to the sentence of imprisonment. But a more plausible possibility
may be an omitted district-level factor(s). Additional theorizing leads me to hypothesize that
“local court rules” discussed earlier in this chapter, may be the missing district-level variable.
As alluded earlier, differences of local rules and practices by district courts may include the
presentence report. While the basic structure of a presentence report is the same across districts
[see Appendix B], emphasis on and/or the inclusion or exclusion of information may differ by
district courts.88 For example, in the Eastern District of Missouri, Part B of the presentence
report only includes information for juvenile and adult convictions. In contrast, in the Southern
District of Illinois, Part B of the presentence report not only includes juvenile and adult
convictions, but all arrests. Likewise, presentence reports in the Eastern District of Missouri
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The basic structure of a federal presentence report includes the following parts: Part A – Charges, Stipulation of
Facts and Offense Conduct; Part B – Criminal History; Part C – Offender History and Characteristics; and Part D –
Sentencing Options.
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provide additional information relative to the employment section of the presentence report that
other districts do not. For example, in the Eastern District of Missouri in addition to the standard
chronological employment history, the Eastern District of Missouri also provides information on
employment barriers, outcomes of employment assessments, and information of the offender’s
preferred career.
In essence, more or less information available to the court at sentencing by way of local
court rules and practices could very well influence sentencing variation from one district to the
next and ultimately impact the supervised release sentence imposed. Local rules appear
indicative of the court communities perspective in that local rules reflect the culture, attitudes,
values, traditions, and case processing procedures of a particular district court. The difficulty is
determining how to measure local court rules to test empirically. One way this could be done is
by a review of sample child pornography presentence reports from each district to determine the
extent to which the presentence report deviates in information from the standard/basic structure
of a presentence report as outlined by the AO. This could be done by counting up the number of
ways the district presentence report deviates from the standard report. For example, if a district
includes all arrests in the criminal history and includes a sentencing justification section, this
would be equivalent to two deviations from the standard structure of a presentence report. I
would hypothesize that more deviations from the standard/base presentence report yields greater
sentencing variations.
In summary, the many null district-level contextual findings reinforce the need to study
and fully consider district-level contextual factors that may be theoretically related to districtlevel supervised release outcomes. This is important because ICC notes that 27% of the
variability of supervised release sentences is at the district-level.
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Moral Panic and Supervised Release Sentences
Before closing this discussion chapter, it is important to revisit the notion of moral panic
in the context of my findings. Recall from Chapter Two that legal scholarship has interpreted
sex offender laws as the manifestation of moral panic (Adler, 2001; Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton,
2011). Few if any, would argue against the policy for lifetime supervised release as a
representation of the most severe manifestation of moral panic of child pornography offenders.
An implied question woven throughout this dissertation is whether judicial officers respond to
this panic by executing lifetime supervised release sentencing for all child pornography
offenders. While many courts are sentencing a majority of their cases to lifetime supervised
release, there is no evidence in this dissertation to suggest that judges are responding to moral
panic in their decision-making. On the contrary, the fact that only 33% of all child pornography
offenders were sentenced to lifetime supervised release in fiscal year 2012 suggest that judges
are insulated from moral panic. As an illustration, 57% of production cases, which by statutory
definition are more serious, received lifetime supervised release. So, if not moral panic, what are
judges responding to?
The answer to the preceding question is not easily answered, but one possibility is the
purported disagreement of some judges with the child pornography guidelines. Some judges
may believe the policy for lifetime supervision is a by-product of congressional manipulation
and perhaps too severe for some offenders (Basbaum, 2010; Rogers, 2013). Therefore, they may
be unwilling to abide by Congress’ directive. Another possibility is that judges have educated
themselves on child pornography recidivism research. Current recidivism research generally
finds that the rate of sexual recidivism for child pornography offenders is lower than commonly
assumed. Because of this, judges may not think lifetime supervised release is necessarily
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warranted in every case. This is not to say that judges are necessarily sympathetic to child
pornography offenders. On the contrary, evidence from this dissertation shows average
supervised release sentences of approximately 242 months, an average term more than fifteen
years above the mandatory minimum of 5 years. These longer average sentences imply that
judges are likely considering risk and public protection.
A more likely scenario though, is proportionality in sentencing. According to Hamilton
(2011), the culpability continuum for child pornography offenses portrays possessors as least
culpable, followed by distributors and then producers. Hamilton (2011) goes on to add that
many judges place offenders before them on this continuum and sentence accordingly. Findings
from this dissertation corroborate this statement. Specifically, average supervised release
sentences for non-production offenses (possession, receipt, transportation and distribution) were
almost eight years less than for production offenses. 89
Summary
This dissertation explored several theoretical hypotheses regarding the influence of legal,
extralegal, and district-level contextual factors on supervised release sentences. Overall, the
findings demonstrate that sentence length varies significantly across courts and supervised
release decision-making process is jointly influenced by individual-level legal and extralegal
factors as well as district-level contextual factors. Findings show that legal factors are the
strongest predictors of criminal sentencing. Results from this study also suggest the wide
discretion “built into” the statute, coupled with the advisory nature of the guidelines appears to
89

This was confirmed by a judge in Eastern Missouri. The judge indicated that he does in fact distinguish amongst
offense types, finding producers more culpable than non-producers. He added that because producers are more
culpable, they thus deserve longer supervised release terms than their counterparts.

221

have opened the door, ever so slightly to extralegal considerations. Indeed, race and family ties,
both of which are expressly irrelevant are significant predictors of supervised release outcomes,
suggesting unwarranted disparities. Age, citizenship, and education while not ordinarily
relevant, are also significant extralegal predictors of either supervised release length, the decision
to impose lifetime supervised release, and/or the four-category measure of supervised release.
This demonstrates that the sentence of supervised release is not immune to sentencing disparities.
Turning to district-level contextual factors, some district-level variation was explained
by two of my district-level factors when the full model was specified. These include region and
district courts situated within states with mandatory minimum penalties for possession of child
pornography. Presumably, there is much more involved in district-level jurisdictional
differences than these two variables. As I noted, other contextual factors such as local court
rules may be at work.
The final chapter is presented next wherein I discuss implications, limitations of my
study, and avenues for future research.
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Table 6.1

ICAC TASK FORCE FUNDING AMOUNTS
Fiscal Years
State
AK
AL
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
FL
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MO
MS
MT
NC
NC
ND

Task Force Agency
Anchorage Police Department
Alabama Department of Public Safety
Alabama Law Enforcement Agency
Arkansas State Police
Phoenix Police Department
Fresno County Sheriff's Office
Los Angeles Police Department
Sacramento County Sheriff's Office
San Diego Police Department
San Jose Police Department
Colorado Springs Police Department
Connecticut State Police
Delaware Department of Justice
Broward County Sheriff's Office
Gainesville Police Department
Polk County Sheriff's Office
Georgia Bureau of Investigation
Hawaii Department of Attorney General
Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation
Idaho Office of Attorney General
Cook County State's Attorney's Office
Illinois Office of Attorney General
Indiana State Police
Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office
Kentucky State Police
Louisiana Department of Justice
Massachusetts State Police
Maryland State Police
Maine State Police
Michigan State Police
Minnesota Department of Public Safety
Glendale Police Department
St. Charles County Sherrif's Department
Mississippi Office of Attorney General
Billings Police Department
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
North Carolina Department of Public Safety
North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation

2010

2011

2012

2013

219,103
295,777

222,663
317,848

227,522
310,090

241,641
327,407

292,419
357,900
268,353
575,051
315,925
320,403
355,102
317,604
268,353
214,625
379,168
318,164
380,287
409,390
223,580
279,547
226,378
296,897
388,682
341,670
255,481
305,292
292,979
341,670
301,374
231,415
459,200
320,000
332,715

297,127
362,527
293,890
622,829
340,511
354,109
392,960
328,856
278,997
224,606
391,665
330,799
393,608
447,352
233,023
284,177
233,671
319,143
386,485
359,289
271,874
317,848
310,078
362,527
318,496
233,023
494,621
326,913

305,086
350,122
296,329
582,812
326,979
356,378
360,756
345,744
274,436
221,893
388,279
357,751
366,386
450,830
238,156
299,456
235,654
311,341
378,896
369,513
273,810
325,102
333,859
353,875
302,584
227,522
471,471
320,098

339,477
392,207
312,159
614,561
347,736
368,066
399,655
371,877
301,359
241,006
414,442
353,454
412,537
476,066
256,253
330,583
254,983
343,924
414,442
410,631
298,183
362,348
360,442
390,936
342,654
246,724
482,419
347,101

247,646
220,782
388,682

335,000
267,989
255,253
403,968

372,015
278,814
230,650
405,793

404,913
296,277
256,253
447,478

204,551

216,188

241,909

247,359
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Table 6.1 continued

ICAC TASK FORCE FUNDING AMOUNTS
Fiscal Years
State
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT
VA
VA
VT
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Task Force Agency
Nebraska State Patrol
Portsmouth Police Department
New Jersey State Police
New Mexico Attorney General's Office
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
New York State Police
New York City Police Department
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation
Oregon Department of Justice
Delaware County District Attorney's Office
Rhode Island State Police
South Carolina Attorney General's Office
South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation
Knoxville Police Department
Pasadena Independent School District Police Dept.
Houston Metro Police Department
Dallas Police Department
Office of Attorney General of Texas
Utah Office of Attorney General
Bedford County Sheriff's Office
Virginia State Police
Burlington Police Department
Vermont Office of Attorney General
Seattle Police Department
Wisconsin Department of Justice
West Virginia State Police
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation

2010

2011

244,288
226,938
379,727
256,041
261,078
431,217
371,332
446,887
286,823
301,374
450,805
216,304
305,851
215,185
341,670
364,616

249,858
234,318
396,197
254,391
273,817
458,360
381,305
477,138
293,243
319,190
466,130
224,606
315,258
218,130
361,879
405,911

390,921
351,184
263,316
305,292
277,868
214,061
355,662
342,230
238,691
212,387

2012

2013

250,041
237,531
382,649
272,559
276,938
435,817
363,884
477,101
296,329
312,592
587,718
233,152
318,847
219,391
364,509

276,583
256,253
425,242
298,183
312,795
494,490
422,066
508,467
314,065
349,577
645,761
247,359
339,477
239,100
402,372

433,106
387,780
271,874
325,618
296,480
222,016

349,719
427,686
428,311
303,209
333,859
290,699
224,395

394,113
477,337
491,313
328,677
350,913
317,242
242,912

384,543
373,535
251,154
222,016

375,143
355,752
275,687
234,291

429,690
383,313
386,747
258,159

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress.
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice, April 2016 Report to Congress

Figure 6.1 Indian Reservations
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CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RSEARCH, AND
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation adds to the body of federal sentencing research by focusing on a
sentencing outcome not previously studied, coupled with an offense type that is arguably one of
the most serious in the federal criminal justice system. This dissertation discovered variation in
supervised release sentences across district courts and sentencing disparities at both the
individual and district levels. More importantly, the dissertation demonstrates that the
supervised release sentencing schemata for child pornography offenses is as equally problematic
as legal scholars have argued the guidelines are for the sentence of imprisonment.
This chapter closes the dissertation with a discussion of the implications for various
stakeholders involved in federal sentencing including defense counsel, the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, the U.S. Probation Office, the USSC, Congress, child pornography offenders, and federal
judges. I also include a discussion of the potential for evidenced-based sentencing in the federal
judiciary. Afterwards, I highlight limitations of the dissertation, followed a brief discussion of
avenues for future research as well as consideration for where the current study sits within the
broader sentencing literature.
Implications
Defense counsel.
One of the primary objectives of defense counsel is to argue for the best possible
sentences for their clients. Arguably, the best possible sentence is one that is at the low end of
the guideline range (Etienne, 2004). In the case of child pornography offenders, the low end of
the supervised release statutory range is the mandatory minimum of five years. It is in the
interests of the offender for counsel to argue for the low end of the range considering the
implications for longer sentences. The longer the sentence of supervised release, the longer the
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offender is subject to formal social control and the restrictive conditions of supervised release.
Moreover, there is also greater opportunity for revocation the longer an individual remains on
supervised release. And revocations sentences carry their own implications (Shockley, 2010).
For example, if a child pornography offender serving lifetime supervised release for possession
of child pornography commits another possession of child pornography offense, they would face
a revocation sentence of life. The revocation sentence would entail an even greater punishment
than if the offender were prosecuted for committing a second offense for possession of child
pornography, which carries a sentence of imprisonment of ten to twenty years.
In consideration of these implications, as well as the supervised release sentencing
disparities revealed in this dissertation, we may begin to see defense counsel arguing at
allocation for supervised release sentences at the low end of the range. Defense counsel may use
findings from this dissertation to inform sentencing courts of the implications of a life term
including life imprisonment if revoked. Defense counsel may also disclose to sentencing courts
the sentencing disparities or differences in supervised release sentences by region, to sway the
court in imposing the low end of the statute.
We may also begin to see more sentencing memorandums filed by defense counsel. A
sentencing memorandum is akin to a defense counsel conducted presentence report, wherein the
personal background and the social history of the defendant is presented in favor of the
defendant (Weintraub, 1987). Through this memorandum, counsel may focus on extralegal
offender characteristics shown in this dissertation that produce shorter sentences. For example,
this dissertation found that offenders with dependents receive shorter sentences than those
without children. Accordingly, we may see counsel highlighting family ties at sentencing.
Likewise, this dissertation found that those with a college degree received longer sentences
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compared to those with a high school diploma. As such, we could see defense counsel
minimizing the education of those with college degrees.
Another implication we may see is defense counsel focusing on mitigating perceived risk
of their defendants. For example, defense counsel may encourage offenders on pretrial bond
supervision to begin the rehabilitation process, specifically directing them to engage in sex
offender treatment. According to Weintraub (1987), if a client, at the early stage in a case, is
referred to and successfully completes a treatment program, they will be in better standing when
sentencing is imposed. This is because counsel can present evidence that the offender has
responded well to treatment and is a low risk to re-offend. We may also see counsel calling
witnesses such as sex therapists to testify at sentencing hearings to the likelihood of recidivism
post-conviction.
U.S. Attorney’s Office.
As shown in the results section of this dissertation, legal factors such as offense
seriousness, detention, and criminal history are the strongest predictors of supervised release
sentence length, the decision to impose lifetime supervised release, and the likelihood of being
sentenced to a higher supervised release category. It follows then, that if one of the sentencing
goals for defense counsel is the shortest possible supervised release sentence, then for U.S.
Attorneys it is the longest possible sentence. With this being said, they may think twice about
offenders pleading guilty to a lesser included offense, particularly if they desire a longer
supervised release term. For example, given what we know from this dissertation, we may find
that U.S. Attorneys are less inclined to allow offenders to plea to the lesser included offense of
possession of child pornography, particularly if they have evidence to convict on more serious
charges.
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The only alternative to the scenario above is a push by U.S. Attorneys for “real offense
sentencing” for the supervised release sentence. This term refers to the actual conduct in which
the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted (2012
USSC, p.5). Real offense sentencing is synonymous to relevant conduct and would require the
sentencing court to sentence on the basis of all identified conduct. In drug offenses, for example,
a court following relevant conduct rules must aggregate all drugs trafficked by the defendant that
were "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
conviction." This means, for example, that a defendant convicted of selling drugs to an
undercover officer on one occasion is sentenced for the amount of drugs involved in all the drug
trafficking known to the court. Even conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted could
be considered, if a preponderance of the evidence established it. Thus, U.S. Attorneys can
influence this process through the evidence they introduce as relevant conduct.
U.S. Probation.
U.S. Probation Offices play an integral role in the federal sentencing process via the
preparation of the presentence reports and recommendations for sentencing. In as much as U.S.
Probation Officers are recognized as guidelines specialists, sentencing courts rely upon their
expertise in their application of the guidelines, sentencing options, and recommendations
(Campbell, McCoy, and Osigweh, 1990). Astonishingly though, training on sentencing
disparities is not a segment of the initial or continuing training of presentence writers.
Sentencing disparities may be addressed at the annual USSC guidelines training or provided via
USSC reports available online, but not all presentence writers attend this yearly training or
review these reports.90 As one of the key players in the federal sentencing process, U.S.
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Each year the USSC provides a seminar to U.S. Probation staff for training on sentencing matters including
guideline applications, amendments, and case law, etc.
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Probation Offices should be informed of sentencing disparities as sentencing court rely on their
knowledge of guideline sentencing issues.
As far as the current study is concerned, whether the findings contained herein will
influence presentence writers to consider supervised release sentencing disparities or informing
the court of supervised release disparities remains to be seen. But it is the duty of the U.S.
Probation Office to provide the sentencing court with all available information to consider when
imposing sentencing. This should include issues of sentencing disparities.
In recognizing that this study is the first of its kind and has not yet been replicated
empirically by the USSC or other scholars, the current state of child pornography supervised
release sentencing remains status quo. However, should subsequent studies confirm the
existence of supervised release sentencing disparities, it may be a best practice to modify the
components of the standard presentence report to include a section informing the court of
supervised release sentencing disparities. This way, U.S. Probation Offices will have done their
due diligence in providing sentencing courts with all available information prior to the
imposition of sentence.
In addition to the above, if U.S. Probation Offices are better informed about supervised
release disparities, it may result in more specific justifications for supervised release sentences.
As it stands now, the language for the justification of the supervised release sentence for child
pornography offenders is general. For example, in a review of child pornography supervised
release recommendations in Eastern Missouri, the only justification for the length of the
supervised sentence is the reliance upon Section 5D1.2(b)(2) in the federal guidelines, which
says if the instant offense is a sex offense, the statutory maximum term is recommended. It is
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possible that we may see more specific justification such as seriousness of the offense, or
criminal history to justify the supervised release term.
USSC.
In their 2012 study of child pornography sentencing, the USSC included a brief section
on supervised release sentences and acknowledged the problematic nature of the blanket policy
statement for lifetime supervised release. One problem in their view, is that the policy was
promulgated before the Protect Act of 2003 raised the maximum term in child pornography cases
from three years to lifetime supervised release. Another problem they highlight, is the
guideline’s categorical recommendation of a life term which fails to distinguish among offenders
with respect to their levels of risk and corresponding need for lifetime supervision (USSC, 2012).
In 2012, USSC promised to study the supervised release guideline to determine whether the
guideline should be amended in response to these criticisms.
It has been nearly five years since the USSC’s promise and as of this writing, there is no
published report addressing the issue of lifetime supervised release. The policy for lifetime
supervised release for all child pornography offenders remains in effect. This dissertation
provides notification to the USSC that there is in fact supervised release sentencing disparities,
and reinforces the USSC’s recommendation to study supervised release sentences. By way of
recommendations to the USSC to mitigate the disparities created by the statute and the blanket
policy statement, I recommend the USSC first inform Congress. Depending on Congress’s
position, this could involve revising Section 5D1.2(b)(2) and the policy statement in the federal
sentencing guidelines which says if the instant offense of conviction is a sex offense, the
statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.
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The first step the USSC should take may be to define “sex offense.” By their own
admission, the USSC defined “sex offense” not by attempting to classify various types of sex
offenders with respect to their relative risks of recidivism or their needs for ongoing supervision
and treatment, but by adopting Congress’s definition (USSC, 2012). By classifying the term sex
offense into the various types of sex offenders with respect to risk and recidivism, this could
quell judicial concern that the lifetime policy fails to distinguish among offenders with respect to
their levels of risk and corresponding need for lifetime supervision.
Alternatively, another recommendation involves developing guideline calculations for
the sentence of supervised release, like those used for the sentence of imprisonment. In this
sense, the sentence of supervised release would be based on legal factors such as offense
seriousness and criminal history. While this idea may not necessarily eliminate disparities, at the
very least it may reduce the wide spread variability of sentences.
It may be time that the USSC make good on their vow to study the supervised release
guideline if they have not done so already. As shown in this dissertation, there is wide variation
in supervised release sentences. This issue is too important to linger unabated given the serious
implications for those disproportionately impacted. Action by the USSC could result in a report
to Congress describing recommendations for modifications of substantive criminal law and
sentencing procedures for supervised release.
Congress.
A salient theme presented throughout this dissertation has been Congress’ desire for
severe sentences for all child pornography offenders. Clearly, the courts are not universally
abiding by this desire as only approximately 33% of child pornography offenders receive the
most severe term. Short of the Supreme Court repealing the decisions in Booker, Rita, Gall, and
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Kimbrough, it appears unlikely Congress can effectuate its will regarding severe supervised
release sentences. The only potential solution is to amend the child pornography supervised
release statute - 18 USC 3583(k).
As it stands, the statute covers all child pornography offenses including the least serious
(non-production) to the most serious (production). The range of 5 years to life creates broad
discretion. For example, judges who focus on future risk may take into consideration that longterm recidivism studies (greater than 10 years) are unavailable. This may lead some judges to,
out of an abundance of caution, to impose lifetime supervised release under the guise of “better
safe than sorry.” Or judges who focus on offense seriousness and culpability, may view nonproduction as less serious by virtue of the statutory penalties in comparison to production.
Accordingly, they may sentence these offenders to the low end of the statutory supervised
release range. Hence, supervised release sentencing disparities.
It is the argument of this dissertation that the broad range encompassed in the supervised
release statute leads to unpredictability, non-uniformity of sentences, and sentencing disparities.
This is contrary to the SRA of 1984 which sought to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities.
More specifically, the SRA was created by Congress with two main objectives: uniformity and
proportionality. Congress aimed to narrow the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similarly
situated offenders. Congress also sought proportionality in sentencing - a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity. But the USSC tells
us that there is a clash between these two factors and they describe it this way:
Simple uniformity – sentencing every offender to five years – destroys proportionality.
Having only a few simple categories of crimes would make the guidelines uniform and
easy to administer, but might lump together offenses that are different in important
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aspects. For example, a single category for robbery that included armed and unarmed
robberies, robberies with and without injuries, robberies of a few dollars and robberies of
millions, would be far too broad. (2012 USSC Sentencing Guidelines Manual, p.3)
Hence, the likely problem with the policy for lifetime supervised release for all child
pornography offenders. Sentencing everyone to life destroys proportionality. We know from
this dissertation, judges are not sentencing everyone to life, suggesting two things. First, some
judges are interested in proportionality; and second, little deference to the policy statement.
To this end, I suggest that Congress revisit 18 USC 3583(k). In doing so, they must
determine which objective is more important – uniformity or proportionality. So, for example, if
Congress desires lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders, then they
should set the statutory sentence of supervised release as life. In doing so, this will effectively
set the guideline sentence to life because per the guidelines, the supervised release term cannot
be less than the statutorily authorized mandatory minimum term. This will alleviate disparity of
supervised release sentences and promote uniformity.
The problem if Congress amends the statute and mandates supervised release for child
pornography offenses is that proportionality is destroyed. Alternatively, as mentioned in the last
chapter, the USSC could develop guideline calculations for the sentence of supervised release
wherein offense seriousness and the criminal history score is calculated to provide the advisory
supervised release sentencing range. This route brings back proportionality, but then effectively
eliminates Congressional aim for lifetime supervised release for all child pornography offenders.
To this end, there appears no completely satisfying solution to this enigma.
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The Child Pornography Offender.
Based upon the findings presented in this dissertation, a child pornography offender
pending supervised release sentencing can expect that legal factors will likely drive the length of
the sentence, as it should. However, the findings from this dissertation also show that where one
is sentenced also matters. As such, a child pornography offender pending sentencing in a
Western district can likely expect a longer sentence than if he would have been sentenced in an
Eastern district. Moreover and to a lesser extent, a child pornography offender pending
sentencing with the following characteristics can likely expect a longer sentence: nonwhite,
poorly educated, college educated, older than age 50, a U.S. citizen, and no family ties.
If the supervised release term was more bark than bite, perhaps these disparities in
sentences would not matter as much. But for those facing the longer terms, there are many
implications. One of the more obvious is being under a form of formal social control longer.
Longer terms of supervised release create longer or greater opportunity to potentially violate the
terms, risk revocation and face life imprisonment.
The Federal Judge.
Pursuant to 18 USC 3553(a)(6), in addition to consideration of the nature and
circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant, the court is to also
consider other factors including the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
offenders with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Prior to my
previous work on this topic (Vinyard, 2016), there was no information on supervised release
sentencing disparities for judges to consider. This dissertation provides more information to the
federal court regarding the nature and extent of disparate supervised release sentences for child
pornography offenders. This information can be used as courts deliberate on supervised release
sentences and consider all factors before imposing sentencing.
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Summary of Implications
The previous section discussed the implications of this research for the offender and the
various stakeholders involved in sentencing and identified ways in which supervised release
sentencing disparities could be mitigated by either congressional changes or changes by the
USSC. Another option gaining traction for mitigating sentencing disparities is evidenced-based
sentencing which is discussed next.
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the use of Actuarial Risk Assessments
In the absence of congressional changes to 18 USC 3583(k) and/or the guideline policy
for lifetime supervised release as noted in the preceding section, evidenced-based sentencing
could provide a solution. Social scientists and legal scholars refer to the use of risk assessments
in sentencing as evidence-based sentencing or informed sentencing (Hyatt, Bergstrom, and
Chaneson, 2011; Ruback, Kempinen, Tinik and Knoth, 2016). Currently, risk assessments are
not used in sentencing at the federal level, but scholars are pushing the USSC to explore the
integration of risk assessments into the guidelines (Hyatt et al., 2011). Hyatt et al. (2011) argue
that the use of risk assessments hardly would be a huge change as federal judges already consider
risk, although crudely, by way of focal concerns. They argue risk assessments could formalize
and standardize risk consideration making it fairer across the board. Proponents also argue the
use of risk assessments in sentencing is not meant to replace judicial discretion, but rather inform
judges about potential outcomes in sentencing. More specifically, they contend that as the
guidelines are not mandatory, the integration of risk assessments into the guidelines is consistent
with Booker. That is, the use of risk assessments within the guidelines will not alter the advisory
nature of the guidelines which is to inform sentencing decisions.
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Given the amount of variability and disparities in supervised release sentences, coupled
with the risk-focused nature of the supervised release sentence for child pornography offenders,
one can see the appeal of incorporating risk assessments into the supervised release guidelines.
However, one of the primary arguments against using risk assessments to inform sentencing
practice is the potential to punish individuals for crimes they have not committed (HannahMoffat, 2013). But when measured against the yardstick of risk assessment tools versus
professional judgment in the form of focal concerns and the court communities perspectives,
some argue the pros of actuarial risk assessment outweigh the cons (Skeem, 2013).
While risk assessments are not used in federal sentencing, they are used at the onset of
supervised release and periodically throughout the supervision term to re-assess risk. Federal
probation uses the Post-Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA) and the Risk Prediction Index
(RPI). These instruments use both static (i.e., criminal history) and dynamic factors--those
factors that are changeable such as social networks, education/employment, and cognitions--to
accurately predict and identify those at greatest risk to re-offend. The results from the risk
assessments are applied to formulate supervision strategies (i.e., referring an offender with a
dynamic risk factor for cognitions to a cognitive behavioral treatment program), which when
appropriately targeted should reduce risk.
It remains to be seen if the USSC and the federal courts will adopt an evidence-based
approach to sentencing and specifically integrate a risk assessment tool into the supervised
release guidelines specific to child pornography offenders. 91 If it is to work as suggested by
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The author contacted the USSC on February 9, 2017 and discussed the notion of evidenced-based sentencing.
According to the USSC, informal discussions of risk assessments have occurred within the USSC; however, at this
time, risk assessments are not a priority.
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Ruback et al. ( 2016), this should result in improved decision-making, limited discretion, and
increased accountability for the sentences of supervised release.
Limitations of the Dissertation
As with any research, this dissertation also has limitations that could have impacted the
results of the study. First, there is the issue of omitted individual-level extralegal factors
including those related to the offender’s character, physical and mental condition, marital status,
community ties, employment status, and history of drug and alcohol abuse. Like those extralegal
factors included in my analyses that did influence the sentence of supervised release, these other
factors may also influence the ultimate supervised release term imposed. Take for example
mental health. Research has shown that mental health conditions like schizophrenia have been
linked to stereotypes of dangerousness (Markowitz, 2011). Through the presentence report, the
sentencing court is made aware of any mental health and/or emotional conditions the offender
may suffer as well as any medications prescribed. Accordingly, a judge may consider the mental
health status of the offender as a focal concern in determining which individuals require
enhanced supervision to protect the public. In other words, it seems plausible that an offender
with a severe mental illness may be perceived as dangerous, and thus more likely to receive
lifetime supervised release than an offender with no mental health condition.
Legal scholars argue that extralegal factors such as marital status and employment
status, have become relevant for some judges particularly now that the guidelines are advisory
(Hamilton, 2011; Krohel, 2011). Hamilton (2011) and Krohel’s (2011) review of sentencing
decisions found that in cases where defendants received sentencing reductions, it was common
for judges to express that they were impressed by the defendant’s family support and/or career.
One judge was quoted as saying “aside from the offense, the defendant has led a law-abiding life,
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and with his wife, who has stood by his side throughout, he has raised a good family and been a
mainstay in his community.” (Hamilton, 2011, p.562). Other judges give weight to the
defendant’s career as a reason for non-guideline sentences. Examples of careers receiving nonguideline sentences include military personnel, physicians, and teachers (Hamilton, 2011).
Unfortunately, it is not possible to empirically test the influence of marital status and
employment because the USSC does not collect data on these variables. However, if researchers
are given access to presentence reports, this data could be collected.
In addition to potential individual-level omitted factors, there could be additional districtlevel factors that I may have failed to consider. As a result, this could potentially undermine the
conclusions drawn about district-level contextual factors. I did attempt to mitigate this
limitation, by exploring many of the district-level contextual factors used in the extant sentencing
literature.
Another limitation of the dissertation is that it does not consider the effects of judge-level
influences or judge-level characteristics on supervised release sentencing outcomes. This is
because the publicly available USSC dataset does not identify the judge who imposed the
sentence (Kautt, 2002). This information may have provided additional insight into supervised
release sentences outcomes of child pornography offenders, because judges may have different
views and opinions on child pornography offenses. Meaning, a female judge with children may
have a different view of the dangerousness of child pornography offenders than a male judge
without children, potentially sentencing differently.
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Future Research
Drawing from the findings of the present research, the following issues are critical
considerations for future research. First, an important next step for understanding the supervised
release sentences of child pornography offenders is a qualitative analysis of judges’ decisionmaking for child pornography offenses. In particular, in-depth interviews of judges from across
the nation should be explored to ascertain what factors are most important to judges when they
consider the sentences of supervised release. Information about judges’ perceptions of child
pornography offenders, public fear, recidivism, and fairness of the supervised release guidelines
should be collected in these interviews. Questions regarding specific district policies and local
rules for sentencing should also be asked, as well as why judges believe there are differences
across courts.
Another avenue for future research is to examine if and how high profile cases (e.g.,
Jacee Dugard case, David Renz case, etc.) affect supervised release sentences of child
pornography offenders. This is important because as mentioned in the previous chapter, in the
aftermath of the Renz case which happened in the Northern District of New York, judges in
Northern New York are now less likely to allow pretrial detention than before the case. A
potential research strategy to examine this scenario would be to conduct a time series analysis of
the probability of child pornography offenders sentenced to lifetime supervised release before
and after the scandals received intense public scrutiny. In this sense, it would be interesting to
see how these high profile cases influence lifetime supervised release imposed by the court.
Another possible avenue for research is to examine decision-making of U.S. Probation
Officers. As mentioned earlier, one of the primary functions of U.S. Probation Offices is to
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complete presentence investigation reports. Presentence investigations require probation officers
to investigate not only the instant offense and criminal history, but also report on extralegal
factors such as family ties, employment, education, substance abuse, military status, and
finances. In addition to writing the presentence investigation report, officers are also expected to
make sentencing recommendations for the sentence of imprisonment and the supervised release
term. Thus, it is possible that these extralegal statuses may play into the focal concerns of
probation officers, particularly the concerns of blameworthiness and protection of the public. As
illustrated by Weintraub (1987), “Although the presentence investigation report is intended to be
an objective document for review by the court, as mere mortals, probation officers necessarily
inject their subjective impression about the defendant and the offense into the report.” (p. 26).
Therefore, it is important to study the decision-making of U.S. Probation officers because judges
generally, but not always, follow the recommendations.
The Dissertation and the Broader Sentencing Literature
Given what we know from the findings of this dissertation, where does the current study
fit within the broader sentencing literature? There are four answers to this questions. First, the
dissertation extends federal sentencing research in an important way by examining a federal
sentencing outcome previously neglected by researchers – supervised release. Given the
significance of this second part of the federal sentence, it is hoped that this research is a stepping
stone for continued growth and research in this area. Second, the dissertation is consistent with
sentencing research in general that finds legal factors are the primary determinants of sentencing
outcomes and that extralegal and district-level factors also influence sentencing outcomes,
regardless of the difference in the outcome variable. Third, this study joins the legal literature
and the very limited empirical literature (Kaiser and Spohn, 2014), on child pornography

241

sentencing that finds wide disparities in sentencing child pornography offenders. And fourth,
from a multilevel standpoint, this dissertation adds to the growing body of multilevel research
showing a great deal of variation in supervised release sentences across courts. In other words,
this dissertation confirms Kautt’s (2002) notion that variation for differential sentencing patterns
by federal district (i.e., geographic location) is also a source of extralegal sentencing disparity.
CONCLUSION
As I close this dissertation, I reflect to Chapter One wherein I highlighted the 33%
variability of supervised release sentences. In doing so, I surmised the variability is suggestive
of two things: (1) a disconnect between Congress and the judiciary; and (2) the possibility of
supervised release sentencing disparities. The findings of my dissertation offer sound evidence
that there are in fact supervised release sentencing disparities for child pornography offenders.
In terms of the disconnect between Congress and the judiciary, I offer as evidence the testimony
of Chief U.S. District Judge M. Casey Rodgers (Northern District of Florida) before the USSC
on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Criminal Law (February 15,
2012):
“Child sex crimes are gravely serious offenses, involving unspeakable acts by offenders and
unimaginable harm to the child victims, and thus, are deserving of severe punishment. With
that understanding, it must also be recognized that within the spectrum of child sex crimes
there are many offenses, ranging from child sexual abuse offenses at one end to child
pornography offenses at the other, all representing varying degree of harm and levels of
culpability. Thus, the punishment for child sex crimes, while deservingly severe, must be
made between offenders and their conduct as judges attempt to mete out sentences that do
justice in each case considering the statutory range of penalties and the pertinent sentencing
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factors set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act which include consultation of the United
States Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual (Rodgers, 2012, pp. 1-2).
Judge Rodgers continues:
“The judiciary as a whole has divided perspectives regarding the reasonableness of child
pornography guidelines. While some judges often impose within-guideline sentences in
child pornography cases, trusting that the guidelines are the product of the Commission’s
traditional expertise and congressional policy, many are increasingly imposing belowguideline sentences based on a concern over the integrity and reliability of the guidelines.
There is a common sentiment among many trial judges that these sentencing guidelines fail
to provide the appropriate baseline or starting point for child pornography offenses which,
combined with numerous offense characteristics, restrictions on departures, and
congressionally mandated provisions not fully supported by the Commission’s empirical
study, produce guidelines ranges that are too high compared to the statutory range,
particularly in possession and receipt cases (pp. 3-4).
He adds:
“Applying the guidelines as drafted has produced conflict for judges, especially in
sentencing first-time receipt and possession offenders, because imposing a withinguidelines sentence often appears disproportionate to the harm and yet imposing a
sentence that varies in order to achieve a better sense of proportionality frustrates the goal
of uniformity in sentencing.” (p.7).
Judge Rodgers exposes the sentencing incongruence stating:
“A sentencing anomaly becomes apparent when the statutory range is compared with the
resulting sentencing guidelines range in the average case. On one hand, Congress has
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provided a broad statutory range for these offenses, spanning from zero to ten years for
possession and five to twenty years for receipt offenses, indicating that Congress
contemplated both a wide spectrum of culpable conduct as well as a broad range of
appropriate sentences for these two offenses. On the other hand, Congress has issued
directives and amendments to the guidelines that have the effect of ignoring this wide
range by placing all first-time offenders at the high end of the statutory range. A
guideline that consistently produced a range for the mine-run first-time offender that far
exceeds the statutory minimum is an indication of a serious imbalance and calculation.”
(p. 10-11).
Judge Rodgers’ statements, while focused on the sentence of imprisonment, would likely
be the same for the sentence of supervised release. Let’s juxtapose the last statement to the
sentence of supervised release as an example:
(1) “Congress has provided a broad statutory range for these offenses…
indicating that Congress contemplated both a wide spectrum of culpable
conduct as well as a broad range of appropriate sentences for these two
offenses.”
Now juxtaposed to supervised release:
The statutory supervised release range for child pornography offenses as
found in 18 USC 3583(k) is 5 years to life, indicating a wide spectrum of
culpability for the offenses enumerated under the statute.

(2) “On the other hand, Congress has issued directives and amendments to the
guidelines that have the effect of ignoring this wide range… an indication
of a serious imbalance and calculation.”
Now juxtaposed to supervised release:
The policy statement in the guidelines for lifetime supervised release for all
child pornography offenders that in effect ignores the wide range of the
supervised release statute (5 years to life).
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Judge Rodgers’s testimony is nearly five years old, yet the state of child pornography
sentencing remains unchanged – that is, the imbalance remains. So long as the imbalance
remains, it is likely we will continue to witness disparate supervised release sentences of child
pornography offenders. I close with a statement from Basbaum (2010) whose words best capture
and characterize the findings of this dissertation, “The politicization of child pornography has
resulted in a flawed and irrational sentencing scheme.” (p.5). I would add to his statement by
saying this flawed and irrational scheme has resulted in supervised release sentencing disparities
and severe consequences for those disproportionately sentenced to the most severe terms
including: (1) lifelong formal social control; and (2) the possibility of revocation and life
imprisonment if revoked.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ANALYSES
In this appendix I present the results of supplemental analyses that assess the robustness
of my results. Specifically, I estimate ordinary least squares regression (OLS), logistic
regression, and ordinal regression models to determine if the correlates of supervised release
sentences differ by offense type. Recall from Chapter Four that I had to use offense seriousness
as a proxy for offense type to examine the effects of individual-level legal, extralegal, and
district-level contextual factors because the collinearity between offense seriousness and offense
type prohibited me from putting both variables in the model at the same time. Here, I use OLS
logistic regression, and ordinal regression as a robustness check to confirm consistency of
results.
Robustness checks: Use of OLS, Logistic Regression, and Ordinal Regression to Further
Compare Production and Non-Production Offenses
To begin, I conducted an independent samples t-test to compare the average sentence
length for those offenders convicted of non-production compared to those offenders who were
convicted of production of child pornography. The average sentence length for non-producers
(M=229.09, SD=167.35) is less than the mean average sentence length for producers (M=332.79;
167.39) and this difference is statistically significant t(1898) = -103.69403, p=.000, two-tailed.
The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 103.7, 95% CI: -126.48 to
80.90492) was small to moderate (eta squared =.04). I also conducted a chi-square analysis to
compare the decision to impose lifetime supervised release as well as the four-category ordinal
measure of sentence length for non-production compared to production cases. A chi-square test
for independence indicated a significant association between lifetime supervised release and
offense type, x2 (1, n=1900) =70.46, p=.000, phi = - .194. The effect size for the correlation
coefficient is very small using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of .10 for small effect, .30 for medium
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effect, and .50 for large effect. Likewise, there was a significant association between the fourcategory ordinal measure of supervised release length and offense type, x2 (1, n=1900) = 76.59,
p=.000, Cramer’s V =.201. The effect size for the correlation coefficient is medium to large.
OLS Regression
I first started with production cases using OLS regression to assess the impact of legal
and extralegal factors on supervised release length (log). First, legal factors were added to the
model. Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity were included in the model
because exploratory analyses (described in Chapter 5), indicated the relationship between these
variables and supervised release length (log) is non-linear. A significant regression equation was
found (F(2,225)=5.711, p <.001). The model explained 20.2% of the variance in supervised
release sentence length. Few of the legal variables are statistically significant in predicting
supervised release length. Offenders who are detained receive sentences of supervised release
that are 55.2% longer than those received by offenders who were released, controlling for all
other factors in the model. Downward departure/variance, upward departure/variance and plea
are marginally significant (alpha=.10). These effects indicate that an upward departure/variance
increases length of supervised release by 40.7% while a downward departure/variance decreases
it by 17.1%. Offenders who plead guilty receive supervised release sentences that are 27.3%
longer than those who went to trial, controlling for all other factors in the model. Surprisingly,
legal factors such as criminal history, offense severity, and number of counts were not
statistically significant predictors of supervised release length (log).
Turing to non-production cases, a significant regression equation was found
(F(10,1646)=32.731, p <.001). This model explained 16.6% of the variance in supervised release
sentence length compared to the 20.2% of the variance in production cases. In contrast to the
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production model, several of the legal variables are statistically significant in predicting
supervised release length including number of counts, criminal history, plea, detention,
downward departure/variance, offense severity squared, and number of counts squared.
Specifically, non-producers who accept a guilty plea receive a 35.4% increase in months of
supervised release than those who went to trial. Non-producers who receive a downward
departure/variance receive a 26.3% decrease in months of supervised release compared to those
sentenced within the guidelines range. There is a non-linear relationship between offense
severity and supervised release length (log) as well as number of counts and supervised release
length (log) indicated by significant quadratic terms for these variables.
Next, extralegal factors were added to both the production and non-production models to
see if they explain supervised release sentence length above and beyond the effect of the legally
relevant variables. Significant regression equations were found for both models,
(F(18,212)=3.577, p <.001) and (F(18,1579)=18.462, p <.001), respectively. The models
explained 23.3% and 17.4% of the variance of supervised release sentence length, respectively. 92
None of the extralegal factors added to the production model were significant predictors of
supervised release length, but several of the extralegal factors for the non-production model were
including citizenship, less than high school, college graduates, and race (white). Specifically,
U.S. citizens receive a 22.5% increase in months of supervised release compared to non-citizens,
controlling for all other factors. Compared to high school graduates, offenders with less than a
high school education receive a 14.4% increase in months of supervised release. College
graduates similarly faced an increase of 10.8% in months of supervised release compared to high
school graduates. Whites receive a 15.4% decrease in months of supervised release compared to
92

The amount of variance explained when adding extralegal factors to the production model only accounts for an
additional 3% and less than 1% (.8%) for non-production model. This indicates that legal factors are stronger at
predicting supervised release length (log) than extralegal factors.
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non-whites, controlling for all other factors. Having dependents was significant using a less
restrictive alpha of p=.10. All the legal factors for both production and non-production remained
statistically significant. In summary, compared to the production model, there were more
significant predictors in the non-production model. It is possible the difference is due to the
increase sample size in non-production.
Following model estimates, I used the Clogg equation to test the equality of all
coefficients across the two offense types. In other words, I tested the null hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients for the legal and extralegal factors for production and nonproduction were equal. Using the z table to determine if differences was significant (i.e., alpha =
.05 (two-tailed test), if z >1.96), I failed to reject the null hypotheses for all of the variables. This
means that the effects of the legal and extralegal variables do not differ by offense type.
Logistic Regression
Next, logistic regression was used to assess the impact of legal and extralegal factors on
the likelihood of an imposition of lifetime supervised release for production and non-production
cases.93 First, legal factors were included in both the production and non-production models.
Starting with production, the full model containing all the predictors was statistically significant,
x2(10,N=236) = 47.341, p<.001. The model explained 24.4% of the variance in imposition of
lifetime supervised release, and correctly classified 69.5 percent of cases. The full model
containing all the predictors for non-production offenses was statistically significant,
x2(10,N=1657) = 238.055, p<.001. The model explained 19% of the variance in imposition of
lifetime supervised release, and correctly classified 75 percent of cases

93

Quadratic terms for number of counts and offense severity squared were include in the model because exploratory
analyses (described in Chapter 5), indicated the relationship between the variables and the decision to impose
lifetime supervised release is non-linear.
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For both the production and non-production models, several of the legal factors made a
statistically significant contribution including detention, plea, and downward departure/variance.
For detained offenders, the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release increase by a factor of
5.3 and 1.4, respectively, controlling for all other variables in the model. Surprisingly, for
offenders who pled guilty, the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release was greater by a
factor of 2.8 and 3.1, respectively compared to those offenders who had a trial. As anticipated,
receiving a downward departure/variance decreased the odds of receiving lifetime supervised
release by a factor of .564 and .440 respectively. 94 Upward departure/variance (which is
expected to increase punishment) was not statistically significant for either model. There is a
non-linear relationship between offense severity and the decision to impose lifetime supervised
release for the non-production model as indicated by the significant quadratic term for this
variable. There is also a non-linear relationship for the number of counts for the non-production
model as indicated by the significant quadratic term.
Next, extralegal variables were added to both the production and non-production models
to see if they explain lifetime supervision above and beyond the effect of the legally relevant
variables. The production model explained 30.2% of the variance of the imposition of lifetime
supervised release, and correctly classified 72.7 percent of cases. Similarly, the non-production
model explained 19.9% of the variance of the imposition of lifetime supervised release, and
correctly classified 74.2 percent of cases.
None of the extralegal factors added to the models were significant predictors of the
decision to impose lifetime supervised release except the variable for age (offenders age 50). 95
This effect indicates that the odds of receiving lifetime supervised release is two times greater for

94
95

The coefficient for the production mode was only marginally significant (p=.06).
For the production model, the effect of age was marginally significant (p=.07).
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producers age 50 and older and 1.4 times greater for non-producers as compared to younger
offenders, controlling for all other factors. Being white decreased the log odds of non-producers
being sentenced to lifetime supervised release by a factor of .736. This variable was significant
at p=.09. The only legal factors that remained statistically significant is detention, plea, and
downward departure/variance.
I also used the Clogg equation to test the equality of coefficients for the logistic
regression coefficients on the decision to impose lifetime supervised release for both offense
types. I failed to reject the null hypotheses and can conclude that the effects of the legal and
extralegal variables do not differ by offense type.
Ordinal Regression
Finally, I examined the ordinal outcome of supervised release for both offense types to
assess the legal and extralegal factors that affect whether an offender would receive a short-term,
intermediate, long-term, or life sentence.96 First, legal factors were included in both the models
for production and non-production. The full model for producers containing all the predictors
was statistically significant, x2(10,N=236) = 54.430, p<.001. Likewise, the full model for nonproducers containing all the predictors was statistically significant, x2(10,N=1657) = 295.062,
p<.001. The models explained 23% and 17.4%, respectively of the variance in the categories of
supervised release. For the production model, the three statistically significant predictors of the
odds of being sentenced to the higher supervised release term category were plea, detained and
downward departure/variance. Detained offenders are 1.5 times more likely to receive a
sentence in the higher supervised release category than offenders on bond, controlling for all
other factors. Likewise, downward departure/variance recorded an odds ratio of .556, indicating
that those who received a downward departure are .556 times less likely to be sentenced to the
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higher supervised release category, compared to those who are sentenced within the guidelines
range, controlling for all other factors. Those offenders that pled guilty are .948 times more
likely to be sentenced to the higher supervised release category, than those who go to trial,
controlling for all other factors.
For the non-production model, all the legal factors were statistically significant predictors
except sex offender enhancement and upward departure/variance. Pleading guilty recorded an
odds ratio of .935, indicating that those who pled guilty were .935 times more likely to be
sentenced to the higher supervised release category than those who went to trial, controlling for
all other factors. Downward departure/variance recorded and odds ratio of .654, indicating that
receiving a downward departure/variance resulted in a .654 decrease in the log odds of being
sentenced to the higher supervised release category compared to those who were sentenced
within the guidelines range. Detention recorded an odds ratio of .387, indicating that those who
are detained were .387 times more likely to sentenced to the higher supervised release category
than those who were on bond, controlling for all other factors.
Next, extralegal factors were added to the models. The full model for producers
containing all the predictors was statistically significant, x2(18, N=236) = 63.645, p<.001.
Similarly, the full model for non-production containing all the predictors was statistically
significant, x2(18,N=1598) = 299.230, p<.001. The models explained 27% and 18.3%,
respectively of the variance in the categories of supervised release. None of the extralegal
factors for the production model are significantly associated with the ordinal measure of
supervised release at alpha level p=.05; however, citizenship was statistically significant at alpha
level p=.08. U.S. citizens had a 20% greater likelihood of being sentenced to a higher supervised
release category than non-citizens, controlling for all other factors. For the non-production
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model, only white was statistically significant at alpha level p=.05. Being white decreases the
odds of being sentenced to a higher supervised release category by a factor of .380. Using a less
restrictive alpha level (p=.10) for the non-production model showed that citizenship, having
dependents, having less than a high school education, and being a college graduate was
statistically significant. Accordingly, being a U.S. citizen increased the likelihood of being in a
higher supervised release category by a factor of .511 compared to non-citizens, controlling for
all other factors. Likewise, having less than a high school education and being a college
graduate increased the likelihood of being in higher supervised release category by a factor of
.294 and .244, respectively compared to those with a high school diploma.
I used the Clogg equation to test the equality of coefficients for the ordinal regression
coefficients for both offense types. I failed to reject the null hypotheses and can conclude that
the effects of the coefficients for these variables do not differ by offense type.
Summary
In conclusion, the supplemental analyses shown here confirm to an extent, the earlier
results of my multilevel models that the effects of individual-level legal and extralegal factors do
not differ by offense type. In addition, these analyses show that legal factors are the primary
determinants of supervised release sentences, but extralegal factors play a role but to a lesser
extent.
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APPENDIX B: CONTENT OF THE STANDARD PRESENTENCE REPORT

The Face Sheet
The face sheet contains significant court-related information provided for ease of reference. It
also contains demographic data provided for the use of the sentencing judge, probation officer,
U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Parole Commission, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons.

Part A: The Offense
Charges and Conviction(s)
This section provided a brief chronological history of the prosecution of the case from the filing
of the initial charges to the referral to the probation office for a presentence report.
The Offense Conduct
The Offense Conduct section provides all pertinent information regarding the offense to assist
the court in understanding the facts of the offense and the elements relevant to application of the
sentencing guidelines in accordance with the provisions of Chapter Two of the guidelines.
This section may also include information indicating whether the offense of conviction was part
of a larger scheme or plan that included other criminal conduct which may be relevant to the
determination of the appropriate guideline, the selection of a sentence within the guideline range,
and the decision to depart from the guidelines. It further describes the role of the defendant and
the conduct of codefendants and other participants during the offense, including planning,
preparation for the offense, and the circumstances leading to the arrest or summons of the
defendant. The objective of this section is to report what happened as established by the
probation officer’s investigation, using the officer’s best judgment to resolve factual
discrepancies among sources.
Custody Status
This section provides relevant details of the defendant’s custody status. The following should be
included at the very minimum: date of arrest; by whom and where; brief history of appearances
before judicial officers and decisions which have been reached; amount of bail and whether
made or not; conditions of release and degree to which the defendant has complied.
Victim Impact
While the Victim Impact section is actually part of the offense conduct for which the defendant
is responsible, this information is presented under a separate heading to emphasize its importance
and the fact that this section includes the impact on all victims of the offense, regardless of
whether the information affects guideline application. An assessment of the financial, social,
psychological, and medical impact upon any individual victim of the offense is presented, and
any financial losses caused by the conduct in the offense are reported.
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Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice
This section describes any efforts made by the defendant to impede the investigation or
prosecution of this case.
Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility
This section contains an assessment of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the
offense of conviction.
Offense Level Computation
This section presents the application and calculation of the sentencing guidelines and includes a
short synopsis of facts underlying each application, providing tentative findings for the court. For
each count, it identifies the applicable guideline and shows the base offense level and any
specific offense characteristics or adjustments that modify the base offense level. An explanation
indicating the reason for grouping or not grouping counts when a case involves multiple counts.
In all cases, the guideline application is displayed, resulting in the total offense level for the case.
The guidelines contain enhancements in Chapter IV of the Guidelines Manual that may override
the initial guideline calculation. For example, if the defendant is a career criminal or committed
the instant offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct form which he derived a substantial
portion of his income, the defendant’s total offense level may be increased. Any such increase is
set forth in this section, following the total offense level computation.
Offense Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct
This section describes criminal behavior that has not been reported in The Offense Conduct
section because it is not considered relevant conduct by the guidelines. This section may include
offense behavior described in dismissed counts that is not part of relevant conduct for guideline
calculations.
Part B: The Defendant’s Criminal History
Juvenile Adjudications
This section contains a report of the defendant’s record of juvenile adjudications of crime or
delinquency and diversionary dispositions based on a finding or admission of guilt.
Adjudications are included in chronological other, whether or not they are used in calculating the
criminal history category under the Guidelines. The value assigned to each sentence under
Chapter IV of the guidelines is also shown.
Criminal Convictions
This section contains a report of the defendant’s adult criminal convictions and those diversions
resulting from a guilty plea in a judicial proceeding. It includes a description of the defendant’s
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prior criminal convictions and dispositions in each case as well as the defendant’s adjustment
while incarcerated or under supervision.
Adult criminal convictions are included in chronological order, whether or not they are used in
calculating the criminal history score under the guidelines. The value assigned to each sentence
pursuant to Chapter IV of the guidelines is also shown.
Criminal History Computation
This section displays the calculation of the criminal history category and the basis for the
calculation.
Pending Charges
This section lists any pending charges against the defendant. This section is omitted if there are
no charges.
Other Criminal Conduct
This section reports reliable information regarding other past criminal conduct which may
indicate the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the
defendant’s past criminal conduct, or the defendant’s likelihood to commit future crimes. The
information is relevant in determining the adequacy of the defendant’s criminal history category.
Other Arrests
All other arrests of the defendant are reported in this section in order to provide information to
the court regarding the defendant’s contact with law enforcement authorities.

Part C: Offender Characteristics
This part sets forth information relative to the defendant’s personal background. Included is
information concerning: (1) personal and family data; (2) physical condition; (3) mental and
emotional health; (4) substance abuse; (5) education and vocational skills; (6) employment and
(7) financial condition, including an assessment of the defendant’s ability to make restitution or
pay a fine.

Part D: Sentencing Options
This part sets forth penalties authorized by statute along with the kinds of sentences available
under the guidelines. Included are the statutory and guideline provisions for custody, impact of
the plea agreement, supervised release, probation, fines, restitution, forfeitures, and for drug

268

offenses, denial of benefits. By presenting the statutory and guideline provisions, the parameters
of each may be compared. Guideline sentencing options are found in Chapter V of the Guideline
Manual.
Impact of the Plea Agreement
This part is included in presentence reports that are prepared when a plea agreement has been
tendered to the court. The probation officer assesses the impact of the plea agreement on the
guideline sentence by comparing the guidelines applicable under the plea agreement with the
guidelines that would apply if the defendant were to plead to all counts.
Part E: Factors That May Warrant Departure
This part contains the probation officer’s statement of “any factors that may indicate that a
sentence of a different kind or of a different length from the one within the applicable guideline
would be more appropriate under all the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (2) (B).
Inclusion of information in this section does not necessarily constitute a recommendation by the
probation officer for a departure.
Part F: Factors That May Warrant a Sentence Outside of the Advisory Guideline System
As a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), a system was
developed in which the sentencing courts are required to consider the sentencing options
recommended by the sentencing guidelines, but the judges are free to impose any sentence
authorized by Congress. This part contains information identified by the officer as any fact or
circumstance addressed in the report that may be relevant to sentencing that was not otherwise
considered in the guideline calculations or departure analysis. Since most grounds will have
already been considered by the guidelines or policy statements, officers are cautious when
identifying these factors.

